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ABSTRACT 
 
The study investigated the linkage between sectoral and competition laws in 
providing for plausible competition enforcement models in the tea sector using the 
CAF. Field survey was conducted on green tea leaves farmers and buyers in 
Rungwe, Mufindi and Muheza. Specific objectives were to (i) assess the adequacy of 
provisions of the legal and regulatory framework in providing for pro competition  
markets (ii) determine gross margins and examine their variations (iii) assess and 
compare the performance (GM) (iv) identify the factors affecting pro competition 
functioning of the identified relevant markets. Data analysis using SPSS entailed 
frequencies, means and cross tabulations, indexing, HHI, ANOVA, Chi square and t-
test were also used to test robustness of the statistics. A GLS multiple regression 
model was used to identify factors influencing farmers’ GM. Results reveal that there 
is need for economic regulation and that the current legal provisions are inadequate 
to provide for pro competition markets. The identified relevant markets are the 
buying and selling of green tea leaves in (i) Rungwe (ii) Mufindi and (iii) Muheza. 
Results show existence of abuse of dominance and unnotified mergers in Rungwe, 
anti-competitive agreements in Muheza and Mufindi, barriers to entry and vested 
interests in all the three. Results also showed that several factors do affect pro 
competition functioning of the three markets. It was recommended that there should 
developed comprehensive legal and regulatory framework to provide for economic 
regulation in the three markets. The identified anti-competitive issues should be 
pursued by the FCC by way of enforcement whereas non-enforcement issues should 
be pursued as matters of competition advocacy.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 In Tanzania agricultural markets have undergone a series of reforms that can be 
linked to major political, social, policy and economic changes that the country 
experienced. Traditionally, major cash crops have been under management of crop 
boards, which centrally control development of the respective crop. Farmers on the 
other hand have been collaborators of the crop boards in their various organized 
forms of cooperatives as second key market player. The buyers of crops have equally 
been important third player in these markets; as such they have been pivotal in 
description of structure and conduct in these markets. 
 
Following Tanzania’s adoption of market economy approach in economic 
management during mid 1980s; there were changes in the multisectoral regulatory 
structures that saw a repeal of the Price Control Act of 1973 in 1993 and enactment 
of the Fair Trade Practices Act of 1994 to provide for competition and regulation 
issues in the economy. This law was hardly implemented as it had flaws which made 
its implementation either shoddy or impossible (FCC, 2008).  
 
The Fair Trade Practices Act, 1994 was amended in 2001 and became known as Fair 
Competition Act, 1994. Eventually the Fair Competition Act, 1994 was repealed and 
replaced by the Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 (FCA) which among other issues 
it established the Fair Competition Commission which is charged with the 
responsibility to promote and protect competition in trade and commerce and 
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protection of consumers from unfair and misleading market conduct in the economy. 
Agro markets fall squarely in the ambit of the FCA. 
 
In the agriculture sector, these policy and legislation reforms changed both conduct 
and structure of most of its markets. Nevertheless, these reforms did not always bring 
about the desired effect partly because of the following: 
(i) The policy and legislation changes did not auger well with the philosophy of 
market economy, thus making their implementation either too difficult or 
impossible. 
(ii) There still exist policies and legislation that have not been fully reviewed in 
line with the spirit of market economy, yet they are expected to complement 
functioning of market economy.  
(iii) The foregoing is made worse with the fact that understanding and practice of 
the market economy principle including the discipline of competition remains 
generally low in the economy (FCC, 2008).  
 
A combination of the factors in (i) to (iii) above remain the bottleneck to optimal 
functioning of most markets in Tanzania including the agriculture related particularly 
the Tea agro markets which are the subject of this study. As a result of incomplete 
evolution of a sound competition regime in Tanzania, agricultural markets have 
suffered from all forms of anticompetitive behaviors of firms in relevant markets i.e. 
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, anticompetitive agreements and abuse of 
market power by dominant firms in markets. Agro markets especially of traditional 
cash crops are facing market coordination failures resulting to low productivity, 
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declining exports, low farm gate prices and failure to meet quality standards in the 
world market. The markets are fragmented to the extent that the actors (producers 
and buyers) in the markets make decisions in isolation from each other. 
 
Often, the Government, Members of Parliament and farmers have complained about 
agricultural product buyers shortchanging farmers in cashew nuts, tobacco, cotton, 
and coffee among other crops. Complaints have been about a few buyers (levels of 
concentration, a trend towards consolidation) agreeing to pay low prices to farmers 
(anti-competitive conditions). There have been several efforts to cure the effects of 
the observed market failures since mid-1980’s; most of these efforts have been 
policy oriented. These include introducing the ware house receipt system and 
engaging the traditional crop buyers in dialogue with the Government, Presidential 
and Ministerial statements condemning the acts by buyers. Despite the efforts, the 
vice still linger in most agro markets in Tanzania (Gibbs, 1990). 
 
Some studies have been undertaken to find out lasting stability of the weakening 
market competition for the major traditional cash crops in Tanzania Gibbs (1990) on 
cotton and cashew nuts, Temu (1999) on Coffee and FCC (2014) on tobacco. There 
have also been relatively recent studies addressing this course such as Kahyarara, 
(2011) on market competition and performance of Tanzanian manufacturing which 
used HHI as a measure for competition in the manufacturing sector. In Dickson, 
(2014), the study endeavored to assess competition in commercial banks in Tanzania 
employing Panzar-Rosse model. In Mfungahema, (2014) the study assessed 
competition telecommunication markets in Tanzania using the structure conduct and 
performance model. In Chekwoti (2013), the study assessed competition pressure in 
 
 
 
4 
agro processing at firm level in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. The study employed a 
combination of descriptive assessment on proportion of firms that cite product 
market competition pressure and logistic regressions for robustness checks.  
 
In tea agro markets, farmers have been receiving very low percentage of the export 
price per kilogram.  The Tea Board of Tanzania, 2015 show that farmers received 2.2 
%, 2.0%, 2.3%, 7.8%, 10.2%, 10.3% in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 
respectively. According to World Bank, (2013), ideally, a farmer should be able to 
receive up to a minimum of 70% of the export price. The FCC (2015) has reported 
that there are competition matters that remain un attended in the agro markets partly 
because of the inappropriate enforcement model. To this effect, the FCC has had to 
drop a case of un notified merger in the tobacco leaves market because of limitation 
of time that was occasioned by legal tussle on jurisdiction as to which law is 
applicable between the Tobacco Industry Act or the FCA. All these culminate to the 
fact that there regulatory framework is want of adequacy to provide for greatly 
needed competition justice in the markets and tea markets in particular.  
 
The history of tea dates back almost 5,000 years and it currently has more than 3,000 
different varieties. It is the most widely consumed beverage in the world with both a 
historical and cultural importance that cannot be rivaled (Tea Board of Tanzania, 
2015). Tea was introduced in Tanzania by German Settlers at the Agricultural 
Research Station at Amani, Tanga 1902. It was grown at Kyimbila in Rungwe 
District, Mbeya region in 1904. Commercial production began in 1926 and increased 
considerably after World War II, when the British took over tea plantations.  By 
1960 Tanzania’s tea production reached 3,700 tons of made tea (Tea Board of 
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Tanzania, 2015). Before independence, tea was produced in estates which were 
owned by foreigners and all tea related matters were handled by the then Tanganyika 
Tea Board.  Smallholder tea farming began during the 1960s.   
 
In 1968, the Government initiated a full-fledged smallholder tea development 
program whereby the Tea Ordinance Act (Cap 291) was amended and the 
Tanganyika Tea Board was replaced with Tanzania Tea Authority. At this point in 
time, all aspects of smallholder tea marketing and trade were turned over to Tanzania 
Tea Authority along with a wide array of other responsibilities.  
 
In the process of restructuring the tea industry the government repealed the Tea 
Ordinance that established Tanzania Tea Authority (TTA) and replaced it with the 
Tea Act No. 3 of 1997. The act established the Tanzania Smallholders Tea 
Development Agency (TSHTDA) and the Tea Board of Tanzania (TBT). The Tea 
Board is charged with among other functions, to advise the Government on the 
policies and strategies for the development of the tea industry; regulate and control 
the quality of tea and tea by-products; collect, refine, maintain, use or disseminate 
information or data relating to the tea industry; monitor the production and 
exportation of tea; regulate processing, exportation and storage of tea and tea by-
products; regulate import and export of tea; promote, protect interests of farmers 
against syndicates of buyers, which may be formed through associations and 
performing any commercial functions as the Minister may consider necessary. These 
are market related functions that shape and determine market dynamics in the tea 
markets of Tanzania.  
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The non-enforcement measures employed by the government over all the years in 
resolving market related problems such as low prices in the tea sector are a clear 
demonstration that an alternative approach needs to be developed that will ensure the 
green tea leaves farmers receive a better pay. World Bank (2013), reports that in 
Rwanda, the passage of a crucial reform on green leaf tea pricing is boosting tea 
farmers’ earnings and expanding production in this key sector. The reform brings 
into effect a new pricing mechanism set on the international market price of 
processed tea, the exchange rate, and the conversion rate from green leaf to 
processed tea. When market prices were high under the previous mechanism, tea 
factories would reap the benefits, but farmers did not garner higher earnings.  
 
The World Bank (2015) tresses on need for streamlining of the regulatory 
environment for agribusiness competition in priority agribusiness value chains in a 
holistic manner and prioritizing areas with recurring regulatory issues constraining 
agribusiness such as regulatory simplification to tackle monopolistic practices, 
constraints to competition, and opaque public sector practices in the sector with a 
view to open markets to increased domestic and foreign investment. The Rwandan 
case is almost a replica of the Tanzanian case in this study and thus making the 
finding useful in the current study. 
 
As earlier asserted, the Fair Competition Act is also a market support institution that 
is charged with the responsibility of enhancing the welfare of the people of Tanzania 
as a whole by promoting and protecting effective competition in markets and 
preventing unfair and misleading market conduct throughout Tanzania in order to (i) 
increase efficiency in the production, distribution and supply of goods and services 
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(ii) promote innovation (iii) maximise the efficient allocation of resources and (iv) 
protect consumers. 
 
Based on the foregoing, there is thus a need to synchronize the Fair Competition Act  
and the Tobacco Industry Act so as to ensure the tea markets are pro competition and 
efficient for the benefit of the stakeholders, particularly the farmers who sell their 
commodities to the buyers in the relevant markets.  
 
1.2  Statement of the Research Problem and Justification 
Against the foregoing background, it is the researcher’s informed position that an 
appropriate market enforcement model to coordinate competition in tea agro markets 
is yet to be developed in Tanzania. This is the underpinning lacuna in the current 
competition regulation framework that has motivated the researcher to come up with 
the current study. Using a Competition Assessment Framework CAF), which none of 
the referred studies in the background of the current study have used, the current 
study will come up with an alternative approach which shall seek to not only enforce 
competition but also shape market behavior dynamics in the tea agro markets for the 
benefits of all stakeholders i.e. the producers, buyers and the Government.  
 
According World Bank and DFID, (2008), CAF is an operational guide for 
identifying barriers to competition in developing countries. It is a practical guide 
designed to assist policy makers in developing countries identify and focus on the 
key barriers to competition. These barriers can take many forms such as technical, 
financial, and legal, as well as those related to political economy issues and may 
arise from public sector actions as well as private sector ones. They have a range of 
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policy and administrative implications. The Framework may be of interest to others 
such as NGOs and donors interested in the state of competition in a country. It is 
based on this robust coverage that is tailor made of developing countries that the 
study considered CAF as a practical and useful tool of analysis for this study.  
 
1.3  Research Objectives 
1.3.1  Overall Objective  
The overall objective of this study is to describe the required interlink between 
sectoral and competition laws so as to provide for a plausible competition 
enforcement model in the identified relevant markets in the tea sector using the 
Competition Assessment Framework (CAF).    
 
1.3.2  Specific Objectives 
(i) To assess the adequacy of the legal and regulatory framework in providing for 
competitive market dynamics in the identified relevant markets.  
(ii) To identify relevant markets and anti-competitive conducts in the identified 
relevant markets.    
(iii) To compare the performance of identified relevant markets in the competition 
assessment framework perspective. 
(iv) To identify factors affecting pro competition functioning of the identified 
relevant markets. 
 
1.3.3  Research Hypotheses 
(i) The legal and regulatory framework in the identified relevant markets in 
Tanzanian tea sector is inadequate to provide for competitive market 
dynamics in the identified relevant markets. 
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(ii) There are no anti-competitive conducts in the identified relevant markets. 
(iii) Gross margins are the same for all the identified relevant markets. 
(iv) There are no factors affecting pro competition functioning of the relevant 
markets assessed in the Tanzanian Tea sector.  
 
1.3.4  Research Question 
What is the plausible competition enforcement model arising from interlink between 
sectoral and competition laws to provide for competitive market dynamics in the 
identified relevant markets? 
 
1.4  Scope and Limitations of the Study 
The present study focuses on green tea leaves buying and selling businesses in the 
study areas; involving identified market players as they interact in production, 
marketing and selling of their produce. Using green tea leaves markets in Tanzania, 
the study analysed supply side primary information on the farmers and their 
experience in selling their produce in relation to the marketing systems. Secondly the 
study analysed the demand side by describing the buying aspect and the transaction 
arrangements as well as analyzing the impact of the transaction on farmers.  
 
Particularly, the study will provided an in depth analysis of the conduct of licensed 
green tea leaves buying companies in conformity with the principles of competition 
in a market economy on one hand; and the effect of the conduct of buyers in the 
market and on downstream players i.e. farmers. The study also describes and analyse 
the role of the Government in ensuring contestability of the market and the level of 
pro competition transactions is elevated and remain at acceptable standards.  Thirdly, 
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the study examined gross margins of farmers and buyers, in a bid to establish both 
the performance of the relevant markets and factors affecting pro competition 
functioning of the relevant markets.  
 
The study covered a sample of green tea leaves farmers and buyers in the three study 
areas of Rungwe, Muheza and Mufindi out of the 11 green tea leaves growing 
districts due to the limitations of time and financial resources. The other limitation is 
the fact that some of the information required by the present study was deemed to be 
privileged by either the parties themselves particularly the green tea leaves buyers. 
The fact that competition economics and competition law are relatively new 
phenomena in Tanzania and the region as whole; has also impacted negatively on the 
richness of empirical literature for competition economics and jurisprudence in terms 
of decided cases on competition law thus limiting the scope with which the findings 
could cover.  
 
1.5  Significance of the Study 
The overall objective of this study is to review the interlink between sectoral and 
competition laws in providing a plausible competition enforcement model in the 
identified relevant markets so as to uphold the spirit of the enabling Acts, meeting 
the expectations of the Public and thereby conforming to best practice both national 
and international. Secondly, the study is intended to provide to those interested in the 
field of competition and economic regulation of markets, useful information on the 
state of play in Tanzania by adding to the available information on treatment of 
competition issues in markets with statutorily provided monopolistic/monopsonistic 
features such as those in agriculture and tea in particular. Thirdly, findings of this 
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research may facilitate necessary steps needed in developing a better competition 
enforcement model for markets with statutorily provided monopolistic 
/monopsonistic features in the Tanzania.  
 
1.6  Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis contains six chapters. The background information of the work is found in 
chapter one. Chapter two provides for literature review covering both theoretical and 
empirical literature on competition and tea sector. Chapter three is on the legal 
framework governing competition in the Tanzanian tea sector covering the Fair 
Competition Act and the Tea Industry Act read together with subordinate legislation 
made thereunder. Chapter four presents the research methodology, on which the 
study relied in producing the findings. Chapter five is about results and discussions 
of the study whereas chapter six presents conclusions of the study and relevant 
recommendations thereto.  
 
 
 
12
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides definition of key competition terms as used in the practice of 
competition law and policy globally. The study endeavors to provide in details the 
not only the definitions but also the tuition behind the terms and their applicability 
against the backdrop of an established fact that competition policy and law are 
relatively new phenomena in the region and Tanzania in particular. For better 
readership, the review begins with the said terms. The underpinning economic and 
competition theories as well as the market assessment models were reviewed with a 
view to establish the research gap. The chapter also presents and discusses the 
conceptual framework.   
 
2.2  Definition of Key Competition Terms 
The key terms used in the present study are defined hereunder:  
 
2.2.1 Competition/Antitrust 
In economics it is a term that encompasses the notion of individual firms striving for 
a greater share of a market to sell or buy goods and services. In business, competition 
is defined as "the effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the 
business of a third party by offering the most favorable terms" (Merriam-Webster, 
2010). According to OECD as quoted in Horowitz and Currie (2007), competition 
protection includes adopting, interpreting and enforcing framework rules designed to 
ensure that markets are and remain as effectively self-regulating as possible.  
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In particular this involves preventing firms making anti-competitive agreements, 
abusing dominant positions and carrying out anti-competitive mergers. Competition, 
causes commercial firms to develop new products, services and technologies, which 
would give consumers greater selection and better products. The greater selection 
typically causes lower prices for the products, compared to what the price would be 
if there was no competition (monopoly) or little competition (oligopoly).  
 
Competition is seen as a state which produces gains for the whole economy (total 
welfare), through promoting consumer sovereignty. It may also lead to wasted 
(duplicated) effort and to increased costs (and prices) in some circumstances. In a 
small number of goods and services the cost structure means that competition may be 
inefficient. These situations are known as natural monopoly and are usually publicly 
provided or tightly regulated. The most common example is water, electricity, 
telecommunication services (Horowitz and Currie, 2007). 
 
2.2.2 Antitrust/Competition Policy  
These are governmental measures that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises 
and structure of an industry. The measures give primacy to market forces, facilitate 
entry and exit to markets, reduce administrative controls, and minimize regulations, 
typical of the economic reforms in Tanzania. Such policy aims at achieving efficient 
allocation of resources, technical progress and consumer welfare by curtailing 
business conduct and restructuring which lead to concentration of economic power 
with the aim of monopolisation of the market (Taimoon, 1999).  Petersmann (2006) 
defines competition policy as asset of measures that enhance inter-firm rivalry in 
markets by means of limiting anti-competitive private market distortions (market 
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failures) as well as governmental market distortions so as to promote economic 
efficiency (including "productive efficiency" of firms, "allocative" and "dynamic" 
efficiency of markets), consumer welfare and economic development”.  
 
2.2.3 Competition Law 
According to Taimoon (1999), these are specific and statutes of general application, 
together with the common law substance which prohibit and penalize anti-
competitive practices, violation of consumer rights, and regulation of anti-
competition mergers. It is an economic law; providing for the behavior of economic 
agents where economics as a science provides the tools with which to analyze 
markets and competition within them.  In order to protect the consumer sovereignty, 
competition law imposes the following types of limitation on business: 
 
(i) It limits the ability of an incumbent monopolist to create barriers to the entry 
or expansion of its rivals (abuse of dominance/market power). 
(ii) It limits the ability of firms to raise neither prices nor profits collectively 
(anticompetitive agreements). 
(iii) It limits the ability of firms to achieve market power by changing the market 
structure by way of mergers or joint ventures (anticompetitive mergers). 
 
2.2.4 Relevant Markets  
Refers to a combination of product and geographic market as defined herein; product 
market is a group of products (goods or services) most buyers regard as being 
reasonably substitutable for each other, taking account of their respective prices and 
conditions of sale at either wholesale, retail or both levels. Geographic market refers 
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to the territorial limit that is attributed to determination of the product’s value, its 
cost and availability among other factors (World Bank and DFID, 2008).   
 
2.3  Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1 Theoretical Aspects of Market Structures 
It is stipulated in economic theory known as the theory of the forma that markets are 
expected to exist in perfect competitive, monopoly, monopolistic competition among 
others. Under all structures mentioned in Table 1, several assumptions and detailed 
explanation is put forward as reported by Koutsoyiannis (1985). Some basic 
distinctions are as in the Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Market Characteristics in Different forms of Markets 
Characteristics Perfect competition  Monopolistic/ 
Monopsonistic Competition  
Monopoly/ 
Monopsony 
Number of firms  Many Relatively many (group)  One (seller) 
Product 
Homogeneity 
Homogenous  Differentiated   
Price formation  Determined by 
supply and demand  
Slight influence over prices, 
otherwise are given by 
demand and supply  
Sets prices 
Information flow   
 
Promotional 
Strategies 
Symmetrical Relatively Symmetrical 
 
Heavy advertisements  
Asymmetrical 
 
Informative 
advertisements.  
Entry and Exit Free Free (in the group) Restricted  
Profits  Normal  Above Normal  Super Normal   
Source: Modified from Koutsoyiannis, (1985) 
 
In this study, the theory underpinning the perfect competitive market model as 
summarized by the self explanatory assumptions was used as a guiding theory as 
against the empirical findings obtained from the field. Invariably, monopolistic 
competition tendencies were regarded as one and the same as oligopoly due to their 
resemblances. Nevertheless, due to the nature of the markets, the concept of 
monopsony and thus monopsonistic competition/oligopsony were the focus of the 
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discussions. Other theories discussed hereunder are meant to complement, 
corroborate and reinforce the guiding theory as discussed above.  
   
2.3.2 Marketing Channels 
Marketing channel of farm output plays a dual role. One is to transmit a price signal 
between consumers and producers. The other dimension is the physical transmission 
of the commodity from points of production by farmers to points of purchase by 
consumers. The marketing system thus transforms the commodity through time, 
space and form (Ellis, 1992).  
 
Form refers to all aspects physical changes in the physical attributes of the green tea 
leaves business between farmers and buyers. It includes production, plucking, 
labeling and packaging. Spatial refers to all aspects of the transport of green tea 
leaves from location of production to location of purchase (buying centers). 
Transport distances may be local (to a nearby buying centre in the village), medium 
(to district center) or long distance (to capital towns or gateways for exports). 
Marketing systems can be referred to as the vertical commodity systems or 
marketing channels in which commodities pass through before being ready for sale 
to the final consumer. The main sequential stages in a marketing system of 
agricultural products are: 
(a) Primary procurement, in which commodity is purchased from farmers and 
assembled at village level. 
(b) Processing of which commodity is transformed prior to onward distribution. 
(c) Wholesale, in which commodity changes hands in bulk at wholesale markets. 
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(d) Retail, in which the commodity is sold to it’s final consumers. 
(e) Export, where a commodity is traded directly across the borders. This sometimes 
replaces the wholesale stage. 
 
2.3.3  Market Exchange Types in a Marketing Channel 
The two extremes of market exchanges are the spot (open production and marketing) 
and vertical integration. In between there is contract kind of exchanges. Consider 
Figure 1. 
   Control offered to contractor                                   
   A     Market contracts   Production contracts  B  
Open production                                          Vertical integration 
Figure 1: Vertical Integration Spectrum   
 
Source: Mighell et al., (1993)                                                                             
 
At point A the owner of the produce has all the liberty of producing whatever he/she 
wishes and market it to whowever he/she deem fit (spot). At point B there is total 
transfer of ownership and liberty to the contractor. In between point A and point B there 
exist two types of contacts, that is resource providing or production contracts whereby 
the contractor provides a farmer with necessary inputs for specified production 
conditions.  
 
The other type of contract is the marketing contract whereby a farmer agrees to sell his 
/her produce to a contractor prior to harvesting day, there is usually a down payment 
paid to the farmer. Under these contractual arrangements there are risks of breach of 
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terms and conditions of agreement, this situation is referred to as moral hazard. Making 
of such contracts is usually associated with some costs including the costs of effecting, 
facilitating, implementing and monitoring of the agreement. Such costs are known as 
transaction costs. 
 
2.3.4  Institutions, Organizations, Transaction Costs and the Market 
North (1990) refer to institutions, as rules of the game in a society or more formally, 
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Institutions 
structure incentives in human exchange whether political, social or economical. 
Institutional constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and 
sometimes under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain 
activities.  
 
Organizations are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve 
objectives. They include political bodies (political parties, parliament), social bodies 
(trade unions, churches, clubs) and educational bodies (school, university). 
Transaction costs are costs that are incurred in enforcing and negotiating transactions 
in the market, they are shaped by institutional, technological and socio-economic 
factors surrounding the market and its participants (Gibbs and Bromley, 1990).  
 
According to Williamson (1993) market existence depends on institutional rules that 
influence exchange and organizations undertake strategies to optimise institutional 
structure in the market. Furthermore when fundamental conflicts between 
organizations cannot be mediated within the existing institutional framework, new 
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institutions have to emerge to combat the conflict in the market. For example 
organized producer groups could be cost effective than a network of individual 
producers working through open market transactions. 
 
Introduction of transaction cost theory in economic analysis implies that neoclassical 
assumptions of perfect competitive market do not hold. For example perfect 
information does not hold and the open market is no longer the ultimate resource 
allocating mechanism. Positive transaction costs show that the system cannot correct 
itself and non-market interventions may be necessary. Where formal institutions are 
not available, informal ones do emerge but rather slow thus necessitating 
interventions to identify institutions and organizations that could improve the market 
situation (Temu, 1999).  
 
In Stein (1994) it is argued that institutional structure of the market must evolve to 
support exchange where imperfect information about product attribute is prevalent. 
In Tanzania where agricultural markets are vulnerable to information asymmetry due 
to their infancy among other reasons, the arguments seem to fit well in its context, 
and pose a challenge to researchers in enabling the evolution of the said institutions 
to correct the markets.  North (1990) categorized three levels of market development 
as hereunder: 
(i) Personalized exchange involving small-scale production and local trade. 
(ii) Impersonalised exchange that involve some long distance and cross cultural 
trade. 
(iii) Impersonal exchange of modern economies; 
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These levels of market development reflect an increasing role of price as the major 
factor in screening partners. Furthermore it argued that African agricultural markets 
often have all three-market structures simultaneously. It was also reported that when 
transactions are too personalized they create a social barrier to new entrants, even at 
the point where monetary transaction costs could be low. New entrants may not be 
able to penetrate the social cultural barriers.  
 
In North (1990) it is provided that, in the course of evolving, institutions are thought 
to be a means to reduce transaction costs. Those that reduce transaction costs are key 
to the performance of economies. Since not all institutions that emerge are efficient, 
the role of government is crucial in specifying property rights and enforcing 
contracts. Furthermore, North (1990) concludes that the inability of societies to 
develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of 
both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the third world. 
The foregoing assertion has motivated the present study to develop a market 
enforcement model in the Tanzanian Tea sector.  
 
2.3.5  Social Capital, Asymmetry Information and Moral Hazards  
Moral hazard is defined by Coase (2000) as a situation that arises when a person 
misleads or tricks the decision maker in order to pursue their personal interests. Such 
conducts are responsible for poor or lack of availability of services such as insurance 
and credit to small entrepreneurs (including smallholder farmers) since providers of 
such services becomes vulnerable to losses in presence of moral hazards among other 
reasons. Moral hazards can also emanate from breach of contract by either party to 
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the contract. Breach could come as a result of providing wrong information 
(information asymmetry) to the other party concerning terms of agreements (Dutta, 
1994). Moral hazards are a phenomena rampantly found in agricultural markets that 
include those of tea and other cash crops. 
 
Putman (1993) defined social capital to be features of social organization (in 
particular, horizontal association) such as networks, norms and social trust that 
facilitates coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. The author further 
provides that social capital is hypothesized to lower transaction costs, improve 
diffusion of information and innovations, strengthen informal insurance mechanism, 
increase the probability of trust-sensitive exchanges being made and lastly improves 
local authority performance. Social capital has been said to be hard to measure since 
it a qualitative phenomena, however, Binswanger and McIntire (1987) suggested that 
at micro level it could be quantified by observing at contacts and other network 
measures, group membership and characteristics, degree of civic engagement and/or 
responsibility, strength of family networks and absence of violence in that particular 
society. The foregoing provided the general theoretical framework for the existence 
and functioning of the markets. The review of legal and economic aspects of 
competition/antitrust in markets is as provided in the subsequent subchapters.  
 
2.4  Theoretical Review of Competition Perspectives 
2.4.1  Classical Perspective to Competition 
The classical perspective on competition was that certain agreements and business 
practice could be an unreasonable restraint on the individual liberty of the citizenry 
to carry on their livelihoods. Courts judged restraints as permissible or not as new 
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cases appeared and in the light of changing business circumstances. Hence the courts 
found specific categories of agreement, specific clauses, to fall foul of their doctrine 
on economic fairness, and they did not contrive an overarching conception of market 
power.  
 
Smith (1776) reported that ‘A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a 
trading company has the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The 
monopolists, by keeping the market constantly under-stocked, by never fully 
supplying the effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, 
and raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly above 
their natural rate.” This was an early assertion on the concept of monopolisation or 
abuse of dominance in the history of economics.  
 
Regarding cartels, Smith (1776) reported that "People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to 
prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the 
same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate 
such assemblies; much less to render them necessary."  
 
Mill (1859) reported to have disagreed with existence of not only dominant and 
abusive corporations, but also corporations as a whole. "Again, trade is a social act. 
Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects 
the interest of other persons, and of society in general; and thus his conduct, in 
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principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society, both the cheapness and the good 
quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers 
and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for 
supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which 
rests on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the principle of individual 
liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of 
trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil". 
 
Nonetheless, as the world continued experiencing innovations and inventions of 
technologies overtime, it became apparent that large firms were an inevitable fact of 
the market economy; and lack of legal measures to combat them is cited as among its 
weaknesses. Nevertheless, the classical approach is highly acknowledged for its 
contribution in setting the basic principles in development of modern 
competition/antitrust theory and practice.    
 
2.4.2 The Neo Classical Perspective to Competition  
Beyond the classical theorists, there was a paradigm shift in economic theory, with 
emphasis in a more precise and theoretical model of competition.  Neo-classical 
model of market economy asserts that production and distribution of goods and 
services in competitive markets maximizes social welfare. This model assumes that 
new firms can freely enter markets and compete with existing firms; in other words 
there are no barriers to entry into markets.  
 
Galbraith (1967) reports that based on the neo classical model, competitive markets 
are enabled to deliver allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Allocative 
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efficiency is also known as Pareto efficiency which means that in the long run 
resources in an economy will flow towards those with the willingness and ability to 
pay for them. Rationality of the market actors is an inbuilt factor to the neoclassical 
model, whereby it is envisaged that rational producers will keep producing and 
selling on the supply side whilst buyers will continue buying up to the last marginal 
unit of possible output. Invariably rational producers will reduce their output to the 
margin at which buyers will buy the same amount as produced (equilibrium point). 
At this point, there is no waste and the greatest number of people’s wants are 
satisfied and utility is perfected because resources can no longer be reallocated to 
make anyone better off without making someone else worse off (pareto optimal); and 
ultimately the society was considered to have attained allocative efficiency.  
 
Productive efficiency means that society is producing as much as it can at a 
particular time. Markets are meant to reward those hard workers; economically 
speaking, best rewarded was those who will put society's resources on the frontier of 
its possible production (Galbraith, 1967). Dynamic efficiency refers to the idea that 
business which constantly compete must research, create and innovate to keep or 
even increase its consumer base. This phenomenon is also referred to as a "perennial 
gale of creative destruction" said to be ever sweeping through capitalist economies, 
driving enterprise at the market's mercy (Schumpeter, 1942).  
 
Monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels operate contrary to the allocative, productive 
and dynamic efficient market model. When only one (monopoly) or a few firms exist 
(oligopoly) in the market, and there is no credible threat of the entry of competing 
firms, prices rise above the competitive level, to either a monopolistic or 
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oligopolistic equilibrium price. Production is also decreased, further decreasing 
social welfare by creating a deadweight loss.  
 
Sources of this market power are said to include the existence of externalities, 
barriers to entry into the market, and the free rider problem. Inversely, these sources 
of market power are among a variety of reasons that make markets fail to be efficient 
(market failure); thus justifying the exception of competition law's intervention to the 
rule of laissez faire1.   
 
According to Clark (1940) and Whish (2003), orthodox economists2 fully 
acknowledge that perfect competition is seldom observed in the real world, and so 
aim for what is called "workable competition". This follows the theory that if one 
cannot achieve the ideal, then go for the second best option by using the law to tame 
market operation where it can (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1957).  This study has thus 
adopted the neoclassical approach as its theoretical base of analysis.  
 
2.4.3 The Chicago School’s Ten Propositions 
The Chicago School of Economics describes a recent and leading neoclassical school 
of thought within the academic community of economists, some of whom have 
constructed and popularized its principles. With regard to antitrust, the School has 
made the following positions:   
(i) Economic efficiency consists of two parts: Productive efficiency: the ratio 
between the value of the firm’s output and the value of the firm’s inputs. The 
                                               
1
In economics, laissez-faire describes an environment in which transactions between private parties are free from state 
intervention, including restrictive regulations, taxes, tariffs and enforced monopolies. 
2 Neoclassical economists, who believed that economic theory was to be created, not merely learned and applied. The main 
hallmark of orthodox economists is the attitude that economic principles may need clarification and perhaps even 
generalisation, but they exist and are to be mastered and applied in solving problems in the society. 
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higher this ratio the more efficient is the firm. Allocative efficiency: is the 
general efficiency of markets. Optimal allocative efficiency is attained when 
markets are competitive, that is, when price equals marginal cost. Increases in 
productive efficiency often reduce the market’s allocative efficiency. For 
example R&D, or the construction of a great plant. Bork (1978) reports “the 
whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative 
efficiency without impairing productive efficiency”.  
 
(ii) Most markets are competitive, even if there are few sellers. Even if they agree 
to coordinate prices they continue to compete in other ways, such as increasing 
customer services. Product differentiation undermines competition far less than 
presumed and it makes collusion far more difficult to maintain. 
 
(iii) Monopoly when it exists tends to be self-correcting: higher profits attract new 
entry. Natural barriers to entry are more imaginary than real. Investment tends 
to flow into any market where the rate of return is high, except when there are 
legal barriers. 
 
(iv) Economies of scale are far more pervasive than economists once believed, 
largely because economists looked only at intra-plant or production economies 
and neglected economies of distribution.  
 
(v) A firm generally maximizes its profits when downstream and upstream firms 
behave competitively. So, virtually all instances of vertical integration and 
vertical restraints are efficient.  
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(vi) The integrity of the market efficiency requires that only a few firms are profit 
maximizers. It may turn out that many firms are non-profit maximizing firms.  
The profits and market shares of the profit maximizers will grow at the expense 
of the non-profit-maximizers. 
 
(vii) Antitrust enforcement should be designed in such a way as to penalize conduct 
to the point that it is inefficient, but to tolerate or encourage when it is efficient. 
Most competitor lawsuits should be thrown out, and private enforcement 
limited to consumers.  
 
(viii) Government intervention is justified only if the result is an improvement, 
taking into account the costs of intervening. 
 
(ix) Antitrust policy should adopt the market efficiency model without regard to 
wealth distribution. That is a practice that produces greater gains to business 
than losses to consumers should not be considered illegal. The same should be 
said about practices that produce larger gains to consumers than losses to 
business (Posner, 2001). 
 
Irrespective of the foregoing perspectives, economists across the divides have a 
convergence in what is referred to as substance of competition economics as 
hereunder discussed.  
 
2.5  The Substance of Competition Economics 
According to Posner (2001), the role of economics in antitrust policy evokes two 
questions:  
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(i) Should economic efficiency be the only goal in antitrust policy? 
(ii) What kind of economics should antitrust policy use? 
 
Some people believe that antitrust policy should consider some “alternative goals” 
such as the maximization of consumer wealth, protection of small businesses, 
encouragement of morality or “fairness” in business practices, and some others. 
These “competing values” however, not only can be inconsistent with both allocative 
and production efficiency, but they are mostly inconsistent with each other.  
 
On the other hand, even the multivalued policy maker needs economics to help him 
estimate the relative costs of protecting certain non-economic values and determine 
whether society should pay the price. The best economics for antitrust is generally 
the one which is relatively uncontroversial and well established in the literature. 
More complex theories have policy implications and someday may become 
economic orthodoxy. But until that time occurs, they are best left to academics 
(Baca, 2007). 
 
2.5.1  Market Power and Consumer Welfare in Competition Economics 
2.5.1.1 Market Power 
Refers to the firm’s ability to deviate profitably from marginal cost or competitive 
pricing in the relevant market. The Lerner index is one attempt to quantify market 
power in terms of marginal cost. Its simplest formulation is: 
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Where P is the firm’s price and MC is the firm’s marginal cost, both at it’s profit 
maximizing level of output. The term P-MC is often called the monopoly mark-up. 
The Lerner index can also be shown to equal the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
demand facing the firm.  
 
For example, if the elasticity of demand is 3, the Lerner index is 1/3. 
Solving the equation above we obtain: P=1.5 MC 
In this case, a firm with marginal costs of TZS 10 would have a maximizing price of 
TZS 1.5. The monopoly mark-up is TZS 0.50 (or 50%). 
 
The monopolist maximizes its total profits when: 
MR= MC 
But MR= Px (1 -1/ D) 
So: Px (1 -1/ D) = MC 
P – P/ D = MC 
P – MC   = P/ D 
(P – MC)/   = 1/ D  
 
2.5.1.2 Consumers’ Surplus, Producers’ Surplus and Total Welfare 
Consumers’ surplus is the amount they are willing to pay for a product minus the 
amount they actually pay. Producer surplus is the amount that producers are paid for 
a product minus the total variable cost of production. A perfectly competitive market 
maximizes both consumer and producer surplus. Total welfare is the sum of both 
surpluses. So, a perfectly competitive market maximizes total welfare.   
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Figure 2: Consumers’ Surplus and Producers’ Surplus 
Source: (Posner, 2001) 
 
Figure 2 shows that at low levels of quantity or output, the market price is quite high. 
Sellers were earning excessive profits. Existing sellers were encouraged to increase 
their output. Additionally, new sellers will come into the market. As output 
increases, the market price will fall. The market will finally stabilize at point A. 
Triangle ABC represents consumers’ surplus. Triangle ACE represents “producers’ 
surplus.  
 
The attitude of antitrust laws towards productive efficiency is affirmative, but 
passive; those activities that increase a firm’s efficiency are generally permitted 
unless the activity also enhances the firm’s power. Allocative efficiency, that is, 
welfare for society, is a more theoretical and controversial concept. The most 
influential definition was given by the French-Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, 
early in the twentieth century: 
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“A given assignment of resources is most efficient (is “Pareto 
optimal”) if no alternative assignment will make at least one 
person better off without making at least one person worse off” 
(Posner, 2001 at pg 221). 
 
If one begins with an imperfect economy, a change is “Pareto-superior” if it makes at 
least one person better off and makes no one worse off. The concept of Pareto 
superiority is, however extremely rigorous: a change in a social policy is Pareto-
superior only if no one objects. Antitrust economists prefer a variation of Pareto-
efficiency called “potential” Pareto-efficiency. A change is efficient if the gainers 
from the change gain enough so that they can fully compensate all losers out of these 
gains. Whether the gainers actually compensate the losers out of their gains is 
irrelevant. The adoption of a rule against monopolization or price fixing is efficient 
under the potential Pareto criterion. 
 
 
Figure 3: Monopolistic Vs Competitive Market Scenarios  
 
Source: (Posner, 2001) 
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In a competitive market, with price at marginal cost, consumer’s surplus would equal 
A+B+F in Figure 3. The monopolist or cartel will reduce output to QM and raise 
prices to PM. Consumer surplus will reduce to triangle F and the loss to consumers 
will equal A+B. The gain to the monopolist is only A. Triangle B is lost by both 
consumers and the monopolist. 
 
Although monopolists are richer as a result of monopolization, consumers are poorer 
in even a greater amount. So, a move from monopoly to competition is efficient by 
the potential Pareto measure. The same thing is generally true of actions that increase 
a firm’s productive efficiency without increasing its market power. For example, a 
cost reducing vertical integration that makes both consumers and the integrating firm 
better off, while competitors are worst off (Posner, 2001).   
 
Potential Pareto efficiency can be a useful guide for antitrust policy, but it is subject 
to two important qualifications. 
(i) Potential Pareto analysis is indifferent to how resources are distributed in 
society. However, the legislative history of the Sherman Act in the US shows a 
great deal of concern for wealth transfers from consumers to monopolists.  
(ii) The potential Pareto criterion requires identifying all the winners and losers; 
and sums the value of their benefits and losses.  
 
Despite these criticisms, the potential Pareto criterion is still a useful guide. In most 
cases it is easy to predict that the social gains outweigh the social loss or vice versa. 
Antitrust analysis has often used a substitute term, the “consumer welfare principle” 
on many people’s account that the goal of antitrust should be to maximize the 
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welfare of consumers. This concept is however, ambiguous as it assumes that 
everyone is a consumer without regard to scenarios issues like when antitrust policy 
seeks to maximize small business welfare. Since all of us are consumers, an antitrust 
policy of maximizing welfare is really a policy of maximizing everyone’s welfare 
(Bork, 1993).  
 
2.5.1.3 Competition Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly 
Monopolization is a process with its social costs which in turn bring about the main 
concern of antitrust law. A social cost is a net loss that society suffers as a result of a 
particular transaction (Sullivan and Grimes, 2006). For example, if consumers 
abstain from buying a product for which they are willing to pay TZS 140, because 
the producer charges TZS 150, and decide to buy a substitute that they value at TZS 
130 and costs TZS 110. If the alternative transaction takes place, the consumer was 
TZS 20 better off. However, this transaction is less favourable to both consumers and 
society as a whole than the preferred transaction would have been. 
 
For antitrust purposes, the social loss of monopoly is equal to the loss produced by 
monopoly pricing and monopoly behaviour, minus any social gain that monopoly 
produces. For example, monopoly can be created by research and development. A 
monopoly can avoid some costs involved with competition such as the costs of 
making and interpreting competitive bids, or the inefficient duplication of productive 
assets or processes (Posner, 2001).  
 
The competition offence of creating or maintaining a monopoly by means of 
anticompetitive exclusionary practices is a process rather than merely an outcome. 
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Sometimes we distinguish the outcome “monopoly” and the process by which it is 
created. Competition policy is concerned with both the process and the outcome.  
Competition law requires not only a monopoly position, but also the commission of 
one or more anticompetitive exclusionary practices, thus signalling that the process 
by which the monopoly is to be created, determines its legality. Antitrusters often say 
that their main concern is monopoly, but this is not quite true. Their principal 
concern is monopoly created by certain means (Hovenkamp and Areeda, 2004). The 
social cost of monopoly includes deadweight loss caused by monopoly, rent seeking 
and the lost competitor investment as discussed hereunder.  
 
2.5.1.4 The Deadweight Loss Caused by Monopoly 
Monopoly forces some consumers and firms to forego the transactions that were their 
first choice and would have produced the largest benefit. The social cost of these 
foregone transactions is the difference in social value between the transactions that 
take place in a monopolized market and those that would have taken place in a 
competitive market. For this reason the patent law may be socially valuable, even 
though they create monopolies. 
 
Figure 4: The Deadweight Loss of Monopoly 
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In Figure 4, the triangle ABC represents the reduction in consumers’ surplus. 
Rectangle CDEF represents a wealth transfer to the monopolist. Triangle EFB is the 
deadweight loss of monopoly. Consumers located between E and B are not willing to 
buy the monopolized product at the monopoly price. Instead, they substitute to some 
other product that would have been their second choice in a competitive market. The 
deadweight loss arises because the monopoly encourages some customers in an 
alternative transaction that produces less social value than their first choice would 
produce. A monopoly in the copper market may force electrical equipment producers 
to switch to aluminium they prefer copper and are willing to pay the competitive 
price (Mitchell, 2003). 
 
2.5.1.5 Rent Seeking 
The de facto monopolist must continually exclude competitors who would increase 
output and drive prices down to the competitive level. At the outer limit, the 
monopolist would expend all its expected monopoly profits in protecting its position 
by means of inefficient exclusionary practices. For example, the monopolist might 
deter competition by charging a price lower than its short run profit-maximizing 
price (predatory pricing). The monopolist might also invest resources in other 
practices such as sabotage, espionage, vexatious litigation, false and misleading 
advertising.  
 
According to Mitchell (2003), it is also possible that monopoly “deadens initiative” 
and results in less efficient use of resources. Schumpeter (1942) holds the view that 
since research is both expensive and risky, firms in competition would not be able to 
afford it. However, the evidence of the relationship between monopoly and 
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innovation is ambiguous. For example, the computer revolution in the late 1970’s 
and early 1980’s involved the research activity in many tiny firms. 
 
2.5.1.6 Lost Competitor Investment 
Exclusionary practices, or rent seeking, by the monopolist imposes inefficient losses 
on competitors or perhaps other agents, and these losses are potentially unlimited. 
These losses are the cost of the competitor’s disassembled plant, inventories and 
perhaps goodwill, as well as the cost of retraining employees whose jobs have been 
lost and of reliance interests lost by broken contracts (Mitchell, 2003). 
 
2.5.1.7 Monopsony: Definition, Prices, Output Effects and Policy Implications 
According to Barry and Argus (2008), monopsony is a market form in which only 
one buyer (the monopsonist) faces many sellers; as such it is a mirror image of 
monopoly. A monopsonist has market power, because it can affect the market price 
of the purchased good by varying the quantity bought. For example, it can force 
suppliers to sell at a lower price by reducing its demand. Formally, this is so because 
a monopsonist faces a supply curve with finite (and generally positive) price 
elasticity. The monopsonist increases its market demand until the cost of one 
additional unit (marginal cost) equals the value of the services rendered by this unit 
(marginal revenue). Marginal cost is more than price because the supply curve is 
upward-sloping. That is, in order to buy another unit, the monopsonist must pay a 
higher price on all units. The monopsonist maximizes its profits where:  
MR = MC  
The price that the monopsonist is willing to pay for each additional unit (P) is the 
extra revenue produced by this unit (MR). That is: MR = P  
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C= Total Cost = PxQ 
MC= Marginal Cost =C/Q = (PxQ)/Q 
MR= Px(Q/Q) + Q x (P/Q) 
MR =P + Qx (P/Q) 
P/Q > 0 
MC > P 
 
Figure 5: Price and Output Determination by a Monopsonist 
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Source: (Mitchell, 2003) 
Figure 5 explains a situation in a competitive market whereby Q0 units would be 
produced at a price of P0. However, given that there is only one buyer in this market 
(the monopsonist), Q1 units was produced. The monopsonist will pay the lowest 
price the producers are willing to accept, that is P1.The important policy implication 
of a monopsony is that it usually reduces both price and output in the monopsonized 
market (Barry and Argus, 2008). 
 
A principal difficulty of competition policy towards monopsony is distinguishing 
between efficient low purchase prices that result from reduced transaction costs of 
upstream monopoly and the inefficient low prices that result from monopsony. The 
most problematic area is joint purchasing arrangements, which create a significant 
potential for cost savings but may also facilitate buyer price fixing. The practical 
point that analyst should address is whether the monopsonists are encouraging their 
managers to buy as much as possible, which is inconsistent with buyer price fixing, 
or encouraging them to suppress their buying (Barry and Argus, 2008). 
 
In this study, the relevant markets are expected to be monopsonistic, duopsonistic or 
oligopsonistic as there are a few buyers or one buyer and many sellers; so the study 
focused on “buyer power”; a form of market power which can disadvantage sellers 
and create inefficiencies just like "seller power," more commonly known as 
monopoly power in monopoly markets.  The study generally examined “monopsony" 
concerns, referring to the potential for sellers to be harmed by anticompetitive 
conduct or mergers at the buyer side in the market.   Weiser (2009) reports that focus 
on promoting competition as a guiding principle is entirely compatible with 
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enforcement action in a monopsony case when the facts warrant especially in a 
scenario that buyers obtain market power through merger or restrained trade and 
thereby depress prices for the products they purchase below competitive levels. 
Producers of those products will have depressed incentives to produce, which will 
result in reduced quantities of those products available for consumers compared to 
what would be available in a competitive market.  
 
2.5.2 Benefits of and Limitations of Competition  
According to Petersmann (2006), competition causes commercial firms to develop 
new products, services and technologies, which give consumers, not only better 
products and services but also increased choices thereof. The increased choices 
typically causes lower prices for the products and services, compared to what the 
price would be if there was no competition (monopoly) or little competition 
(oligopoly).  
 
Generally, competition is a state which produces gains for the whole economy (total 
welfare), through promoting consumer sovereignty (consumer welfare) while 
ensuring sustainable production of goods and services and provision of services 
(producer welfare). Depending on country’s respective economic policy, competition 
is to a greater extent regulated by competition policy and competition law with 
emphasis on promotion of consumer welfare. Competition policy and law focuses on 
ensuring that at any point in time in market, there is the following: 
(i) Most efficient use of resources; (efficient allocation of resources) 
(ii) Passing of cost savings to consumers; (efficiency) 
(iii) Generation of better production processes; (innovation) 
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(iv) Generating better organization structures; (consumer protection) 
It is important to recognize at this juncture, that competition policy refers to broader 
phenomena than competition law does. Whereas competition law emphasizes on 
enforcement of certain agreed set of principles to guide competition, competition 
policy seeks to promote compliance with the said agreed set of principles through 
both non enforcement (advocacy) and enforcement (Petersmann, 2006).  
 
In a small number of goods and services markets, competition may lead to increased 
costs and prices thus rendering competition inefficient. The most common examples 
are water, electricity and telecommunication services. These situations are known as 
natural monopoly and are usually regulated by a designated sectoral regulator or 
publicly provided in some economies (Taimoon, 1999). 
   
2.5.3  Market Regulation  
In the context of competition, this is a term that refers to framework for guiding of 
sectors whose structures are such that competitive market forces (demand and 
supply) cannot operate to bring about market efficiency (Taimoon, 1999). 
Regulation is thus categorized into two aspects as discussed hereunder. 
 
2.5.3.1 Economic Regulation 
Regulation would usually concern markets where fixed costs are so high that many 
firms (as required by competition) would not operate profitably; this market 
characteristic describes a market structure known as a natural monopoly. Examples 
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of these markets are electricity (its transmission phase), telecommunications (local 
loops) and railways (the network).  
Activities that entail economic regulation include the following: 
(i) Ensuring non-discriminatory access to necessary inputs like network 
infrastructures; 
(ii) Adopting cost based measures to control monopoly pricing; 
(iii) Controlling or specifying production technologies (other than those linked with 
setting of technical product/service standards); 
(iv)  Granting and policing licenses to eligible providers; and 
(v) Setting output prices and other terms of sale. 
 
Economic regulation therefore applies to sectors where structural conditions are such 
that competition is either non-existent or inherently limited to the extent that 
consumer welfare would in fact be damaged in the absence of regulatory intervention 
(Taimoon, 1999).  
 
2.5.3.2 Technical Regulation 
It includes setting and monitoring standards of goods/services so as to ensure 
compatibility with agreed benchmarks. It also addresses privacy, safety and 
environmental protection concerns as well as allocating publicly owned resources 
such as spectrum (Taimoon, 1999). 
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2.6  Relationships between Competition Law and Economic Regulation 
Basically, competition law and economic regulation aim at defending the public 
interest against monopoly power.  If both provide tools to a Government to fulfill 
this objective, they vary in scope and types of intervention. Competition law and 
regulation are not identical. There are four ways in which competition law and 
economic regulation problems can interact. These are as follows:  
 
2.6.1  Regulation can Contradict Competition Policy 
Regulations may have encouraged, or even required, conduct or conditions that 
would otherwise be in violation of the competition law.  For example, regulations 
may have permitted price coordination, prevented advertising or required territorial 
market division. Other examples include laws banning sales below costs, which 
purport to promote competition but are often interpreted in anti-competitive ways, 
and the very broad category of regulations that restrict competition more than 
necessary to achieve the regulatory goals. Modification or suppression of these 
regulations compels firms affected to change their habits and expectations 
(Taimoon, 1999).  
 
2.6.2  Regulation can Replace Competition Policy 
In natural monopolies, regulation may try to control market power directly, by 
setting prices (price caps) and controlling entry and access. Changes in technology 
and other institutions may lead to reconsideration of the basic premises in support of 
regulation, i.e. that competition policy and institutions would be inadequate to the 
task of preventing monopoly and the exercise of market power (Taimoon, 1999).  
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2.6.3  Regulation can Reproduce Competition Law and Policy 
Coordination and abuse in an industry may be prevented by regulation and regulators 
as competition law and policy do. For example, regulations may set standards of fair 
competition or tendering rules to ensure competitive bidding. However, different 
regulators may apply different standards, and changes or differences in regulatory 
institutions may reveal that seemingly duplicate policies may have led to different 
practical outcomes (Taimoon, 1999).  
 
2.6.4 Regulation can use Competition Institutions’ Methods 
Instruments to achieve regulatory objectives can be designed to take advantage of 
market incentives and competitive dynamics. Coordination may be necessary in 
order to ensure that these instruments work as intended in the context of competition 
law requirements.  
 
Table 2: Differences between Competition Policy and Sector-specific Regulation 
Approaches 
Requirement Competition Policy  Sector-specific Regulation 
General approach Ex-post, harm based approach Ex-ante, prescriptive business 
conduct  
Institution design  Horizontal institution lawyers 
and economists  
Sector-specific institution: sector-
specific scientists, engineers and 
economists  
Amount and nature of 
information required  
Only information on the 
allocated abuse  
General and detailed information on 
the sector  
Nature of the remedies 
imposed on undertaking  
Structural remedies addressed to 
specific conduct  
Detailed conduct remedies requiring 
extensive monitoring  
Nature of public 
intervention  
Permanent based on general 
competition policy principles  
As competition is more effective, 
part of sector specific regulation are 
replaced by competition law  
Source: Taimoon, (1999) 
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2.7  Review of Methodologies in Competition Assessments 
Literature on methodologies of agro market behavior in developing countries is 
mostly based on the theory of the firm which studies the supply of goods by profit-
maximizing agents and attempts to distinguish between long-run motivations 
(sustainability) and short-run motivations (profit maximization) of the agents.  
Features of the theory of the firm include Perfect Competition, Monopoly, 
Monopsony, Monopolistic Competition, Price Discrimination and The Demand for 
Labor (www.econmodel.com).  
 
2.7.1  Structure, Conduct and Performance Model  
According to Daly et al (2010) the structure-conduct-performance approach, an 
industry's performance (the success of an industry in producing benefits for the 
consumer) depends on the conduct of its firms, which then depends on the structure 
(factors that determine the competitiveness of the market). The structure of the 
industry then depends on basic conditions, such as technology and demand for a 
product. Components that make up the structure, conduct, and performance model 
for industrial organization include: 
 
2.7.1.1 Structure 
Refers to number of buyers and sellers, barriers to entry of new firms, product 
differentiation, vertical integration and diversification. The structure critically 
determines nature of performance depending on the firm’s concentration. It can be 
measured by HHI statistics, which is the measure of the degree of concentration. 
Structure is reported to significantly affect firms’ performance and pricing strategy 
(Bikker and Haaf, 2002).  
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2.7.1.2 Conduct 
Refers to advertising, research and development, pricing behavior, plant investment, 
legal tactics, product choice, collusion, merger and contracts. Basic conditions to 
conduct include consumer demand, production, elasticity of demand, technology, 
substitutes, raw materials, seasonality, unionization, rate of growth, product 
durability, location, lumpiness of orders, scale of economies, method of purchase, 
and scope economies (Daly et al., 2010).  
 
2.7.1.3 Performance 
Refers to price, production efficiency, allocative efficiency, equity, product quality, 
technical progress and profits. Performance indicates the status of efficiency. 
Structure, conduct and performance are three interrelated items. Structure influences 
conduct and conduct influences firms behaviour, hence performance. The main 
weakness of the structural conduct performance model is that it treats the market 
structure as an exogenous variable, but in real world market structure is also affected 
by the firms conduct, hence performance (Daly et al., 2010). 
 
2.7.1.4 Government Policy 
Refers to government regulation, competition, barriers to entry, taxes and subsidies, 
investment incentives, employment incentives and macroeconomic policies. The 
Chicago School drawing on analysis by Alchian (1950), Stigler (1951), Posner 
(1972), Demsetz (1973) and reflecting the influence of the Austrian School, 
challenged the notion central to the S-C-P paradigm that market behaviour and 
performance are strictly related to market power.  
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Critiques argue that since competition is a process, it can lead to a variety of market 
structures that give efficient results adding that competition only generates un 
atomistic market structure in those cases where the market and production processes 
favour the operation of very small, efficient firms. Otherwise, production efficiency 
may have a scale dimension and require large firms, so the highly concentrated 
industry can also be associated with efficiency. 
Regardless of the critiques levelled against the S-C-P paradigm, it is still in use and 
command wide acceptance among economist worldwide. According to Hovenkamp 
and Areeda (2004), the S-C-P paradigm has proven hard to kill; the most that can be 
done to the theory is improvement to suit analyses in the myriad markets.  One such 
improvement is that offered by DFID in the Competition Assessment Framework 
(CAF). The model borrows from the S-C-P, and builds on it to provide for a tool that 
can be applied in analysing competition in markets. The model is as hereunder 
discussed.  
 
2.8  The Research Model: Competition Assessment Framework  
According to World Bank and DFID (2008), the essential parts of the model are 
provided in step, for which the last is a logical conclusion based on the issues 
identified under the every steps, their inter linkages and severability. The steps are as 
follows: 
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2.8.1 Identify the Relevant Markets  
The first step is to identify and define the relevant ‘market/s’ in the sector as a sector 
could include a number of distinct markets. If so, each of the markets should be 
examined separately, as the state of competition might vary significantly between 
them. Markets have two key dimensions and both are needed for a complete 
definition. One is the good or service concerned, (the ‘product market’). The other is 
the geographic extent of the product market within which buyers and sellers can 
interact (the ‘geographic market’). The term relevant market refers to the group of 
goods or services most buyers regard as being close substitutes when relative prices 
change. If the suppliers of a product were to increase price by a non-trivial amount, 
would it retain sufficient customers to make the price rise profitable? The answer to 
this will depend on whether the customers have any feasible alternatives, taking 
account of any costs that might be involved in changing suppliers. 
 
2.8.2 Identify the Existing Competitors 
The major suppliers should be identified by names and if there are numerous small 
suppliers, they should be grouped appropriately. It should also be established, to 
what extent are imports a realistic alternative for buyers, taking account of any 
unique features of the products, delivery time, import duties and transport costs? 
 
2.8.3 Examine the Market Structure 
This involves identifying the relative importance of the main suppliers in the market. 
If a small number of suppliers accounts for a large proportion of supply, the market 
is said to be highly concentrated. Market shares of participants and concentrations 
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have to be measured. Market shares are usually measured by the value of sales, but 
the quantity of goods sold or the capacity of the suppliers may also be relevant.  
 
When assessing the size of a market, information should be sought from the major 
participants (both sellers and buyers), relevant trade associations, consumer 
organizations and any relevant government agencies. High concentration does not 
necessarily indicate high market power and a competition problem, and further the 
following issues must be considered: 
(i) Have the market shares of the major suppliers (or buyers) been stable over a long 
period?  This may lead to entry barrier and predation. 
(ii) Has there been much market entry in the past and how successful has it been? (If 
there has been little or no entry over an extended period, this might suggest barriers 
to entry are high). 
(iii) Does a single buyer, or a small number of large buyers, account for a substantial 
part of the market?  
 
2.8.4 Barriers to Entry 
For a market to remain competitive, it must be possible for new firms to enter, and 
for existing firms to expand or to leave. If there are barriers that either prevent entry 
or would delay it considerably, or that would make it costly to enter the market, the 
existing suppliers might be able to raise prices above the competitive level. Even if 
market shares are high, this might not result in prices above competitive levels if new 
suppliers are likely to enter. 
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However, for a threat of new entry to provide a significant constraint, it must be 
likely, sufficient and timely. Classification of barrier to entry includes (a) natural 
barriers such as Resources (sunk costs), Access to Technology, Existence of large 
economies of scale, Access to raw materials and Access to distribution channels (b) 
strategic barriers which are a result from actions by existing suppliers that are 
intended to discourage new entry. They could include: creating excess capacity, 
bundling and tying, exclusive contracts, individually or collectively acting in ways 
that indicate the incumbent firm or firms would act in a predatory or aggressive way 
if new entry took place, such as through price responses (c) regulatory and policy 
barriers, that there can be sound public policy reasons for restrictions, such as health 
and safety concerns, national security, or even short-term ‘industrial policy’ to 
develop infant industries or particular geographical districts. However, the rationale 
for restrictions that limit competition requires objective justification. 
 
2.8.5 Government Policies or Institutions Limiting Competition 
2.8.5.1 State-owned Enterprises 
(i) Does any state-owned enterprise/s operate in the market/s being assessed? 
(ii) If so, does the enterprise/s receive any benefit/s or preferential treatment not 
available to other firms which appear to have the effect to competition in the relevant 
market/s? 
(iii) If the state-owned enterprise does receive benefits and these appear to limit 
competition, how significant is the effect? 
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2.8.5.2 Public Procurement 
Represent a significant part of trade in an economy, and the way in which 
procurement is undertaken can raise substantial competition issues. The way in 
which Government organizes its procurement might limit the scope for new 
competitors to enter the market. If the Government is a major buyer of the product/s, 
does it appear that Government procurement policies have adequate safeguards for 
competitive bidding, for transparency and for fairness? 
 
2.8.5.3 Regulated Sectors 
Are the sectors condemned to economic regulation selected objectively based on 
economic principles and the process that preside the selections credible? How are the 
selected markets governed in relation to competition? Are block exemptions 
provided for in the competition law and how is it being operationalized in co-
existence with the sectoral laws, economic regulation authorities law and other 
macro policies?  
 
2.8.5.4 Trade Policy and Industrial Policy 
Policies of Governments on trade and on industry can have a large impact on the 
level of competition.  
 
2.8.5.5 Unequal Enforcement of Laws and Regulations 
Do any firms in the market suffer from the unequal application of laws or 
regulations? Examples of where this might occur include the unequal enforcement of 
taxes, labour regulations, health and safety regulations, access to land, access to key 
infrastructure, standards and intellectual property rights. 
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2.8.5.6 Vested Interests 
In many situations there are stakeholders who are opposed to increased competition 
in a market. Even if their identity and objectives are widely known, their power and 
influence should be reflected in the competition assessment. Politics, including 
funding for political parties from sector interests, may well be involved. 
 
2.8.6 Anti-Competitive Conduct  
2.8.6.1 Horizontal Issues 
 
(a) Abuse of Dominance  
For a firm to abuse dominance in a market, it needs to have a high market share. A 
dominant firm is one that has sufficient market power to allow it to make price and 
output decisions without having to take account of the likely reaction of competitors. 
A dominant firm may: 
 
(i) Increase prices above competitive levels, (charge excessive price); 
(ii) Prevent smaller competitors from increasing their market shares; 
(iii) Discourage market entry (engage in an exclusionary act); 
(iv) Refuse to give competitor access to essential facility. 
 
 (b) Collusion and Cartels  
Competitors sometimes collude to limit the intensity of competition by making 
agreements to fix prices, to divide the market between them, to conduct boycotts or 
to rig bids for contracts. 
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2.8.6.2 Mergers 
Where there is a substantial increase in concentration through mergers or 
acquisitions, dominance or collusion may be more likely. However, if there are low 
barriers to entry, or countervailing buyer power, the anticompetitive influences 
arising from increased concentration might be offset. 
 
2.8.6.3 Vertical Integration Issues  
There could be vertical arrangements in business, such as those between suppliers 
and retailers. Under such circumstances, dominance, collusion and mergers can all 
generate extra issues when there are vertical restraints within supply chains, that is, 
between producers, wholesalers or retailers. 
(i) Do any suppliers require that resellers not sell below prescribed minimum prices, or 
that they observe prescribed discount levels? 
(ii) Are there any other vertical restraints such as quantity forcing, franchise fees, 
exclusive dealing or exclusive territories? 
2.8.7 Draw Conclusions 
Based on the facts and figures gathered from the itemized steps above, a logical 
conclusion on the state of competition in the relevant market can be drawn.  
 
2.9  Review of Empirical Competition Literature 
The Chicago school antitrust scholar believes that courts should not intervene unless 
the economic case against a practice is so strong that all reasonable dissenting voices 
have been squelched. When in doubt, let the market take care of itself.  By contrast, 
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the antitrust moderate is more willing to weigh competitive economic theories and 
decide which one, competitive or anticompetitive, is better fit for the case at hand.  
 
Competitors are simultaneously the worst and the best of antitrust plaintiffs. First, 
their incentives are almost always questionable. In most cases they sue because they 
are injured by increased efficiency. But, on the other hand, they are also the best 
antitrust plaintiffs as they feel the injury in much more perceptible ways that 
consumers do (ABA, 2007). 
 
The value of consumer suits has been greatly exaggerated. In most antitrust cases, 
they are not as well prepared to prove their claims as competitors are.  Although 
class actions have been effective against cartels and some tying arrangements, they 
have not been very successful in challenges to exclusionary prices.   
 
According to Ross (2009), in recent years, agricultural producers have expressed 
concern about competitive conditions, levels of concentration, and about the impact 
on farmers of particular mergers and acquisitions. Continuous development and 
refinement of policy positions for description of agriculture-related enforcement 
activity by antitrust bodies was useful to US agricultural markets as agricultural 
marketplace worldwide is undergoing significant changes. 
 
The changes include major advances in technology and productivity, an increasingly 
global marketplace, changes in business relationships between producers and their 
packers or processors, and in many markets, a trend toward consolidation or vertical 
integration.  These concerns and changes are shared by farmers in both developed 
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and least developed countries alike, despite the observable development difference in 
their agro markets.  
 
In Tanzania, some studies have been undertaken to find out lasting stability of the 
weakening market competition for the major traditional cash crops in Tanzania, they 
include Gibbons on cotton, Temu (1999) on Coffee, Polton (2003) on cashew. To a 
greater extent, these studies and more others have been very helpful in understanding 
the extent of the market failures albeit with minimal integration of the research 
findings into the mainstream competition policy and law that oversee anticompetitive 
behavior of the market participants.  
 
In FIAS (2002) it is reported that International Finance Corporation in collaboration 
with World Bank through Foreign Investiment Advisory Services (FIAS) held a 
review on foreign direct investment and competition in Tanzania. The review aimed 
at strengthening competition position by providing the Government with strategies to 
better market environment. The review focused on three main areas as follows: 
(i) Assessement of barriers to entry; 
(ii) Competition related issues in strategic areas/sectors; and 
(iii) Assessement of the legal and institutional framework.  
 
The tea sector showed to have  29,000 peasants were found in 8 different regions.  
Also there are big estates wholly owned by foreign investors and they account for 
90% of all tea produced in the country. These companies are also engaged in tea 
proccessing among 23 processing companies that exist. Furthermore, there were 8 
industries for proccessing and packing tea. Therefore this sector indicated to have 
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more players compared to other sectors. The tea sector also showed to be a good 
example for increasing farmer’s income because it involved every farmer in the 
proccessing level.  
 
Thus, the profit obtained after sales was distributed to the farmers as additional 
earnings different from other crops. However, this sector indicated to have some 
competition problems such as ban on exportation of unproccessed tea;  nuisance 
taxes, fees and local authorities licences were too many.   
 
The report  recommended relaxation of administrative procedures on issuance of 
licences which hike market entery costs. It also recommended conduct of a research 
to establish the exact cause of the wide gap between export price and famers’ price. 
Invariably, called for FCC to be at the forefront to establish the determinants of the 
reduction of famers’ share into the export price over time.  
 
In Kingwala, (2015) it was reported that both Fair Competition Act, 2003 and 
Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority Act fulfill the same goal of 
protecting consumers of communication services and effective consumer choice. 
However it was reported that the existing laws have shortcomings as far as the issue 
of price fixing in communication industry is concern to the effect that the Tanzania 
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TCRA) is not independent in exercise of 
its functions, adding that conflicting laws in their objectives cannot be effective 
unless they are free from possible evasive loopholes. It was further alluded that 
TCRA should be disentangled from its operational difficulties for attainment of its 
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intended goals which include having technical competition experts so as to make 
their own investigation and decision on the competition matters of communications 
descend.   
 
In Ugula (2013), it was reported that the FCA remains substantially untested on its 
substantive provisions of anti competitive agreements, misuse of market power and 
regulation of mergers. More specifically, it is reported that the FCC has not in its 
nine years of operation by then; not dealt with any cartel case.  The report touted for 
bodies entrusted with the statutory duty of administering competition justice in 
Tanzania to engage in concerted effort that aim at simplifying the competition 
adjudication processes that shall ensure increase in the enforcement of competition 
matters with a view to deter anti competitive conducts in Tanzanian markets.    
 
In FCC (2014), it is reported that in the period between 2006 and 2014, there were 
101 merger notification lodged before the FCC; out of which 12 (11.8%) were from 
the agro allied markets. The low magnitude of applications from the agro allied 
markets was construed to imply that either there were no competition issues in the 
agro allied markets or there was still a lot to be done given the architecture of the 
agricultural markets and the potential susceptibility to anticompetitive conduct 
attached thereto. It was further asserted that there was a growing need for closer 
monitoring of the agriculture sector’s competition issues. 
 
In FCC (2015) it was reported that evidence from the analysed price data in the 
tobacco leaves markets showed the two dominant buyers in the market who are 
members of one trade association i.e. the ATTT had intentionally fixed price/bought 
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the tobacco at a price below Cost of production (CoP) contrary to Tobacco Industry 
Act and FCA, 2003 abetted by the loopholes of the disconnect of the two legislation 
that are to curb the price fixing menace in the markets. Since the tobacco sector in 
Tanzania is also under prudential regulation of a crop board, it is worth for this study 
to learn from such a reported experience.  
 
According to CTC, (2015) the Competition and Tariffs Commission (CTC), the   
Zimbabwean competition authority has on average, initiated between 7 to 9 
restrictive business practices cases annually, for which more than 50% are closed for 
lack of evidence. Only a few out of the remaining 50% get to be heard on the merits 
and final decision reached by the CTC. Regarding mergers, records show that 
between 2005 and 2010, an average of 8 to 10 notifications are lodged at the CTC. 
The report further asserts that much as the performance of CTC has been upbeat, 
there remain a substantial number of issues that may require either introduction or 
amendments in the current Competition Law. The low level of reported cases has 
been partly caused by conflict of law with sectoral regulator laws that have landed 
CTC in court with the electricity regulator.  This experience shows that competition 
laws require development so as to ensure effective enforcement of competition 
matters in sectors of the economy that are statutorily foreclosed in terms of entry and 
exit and pricing among other monopolistic tendencies.   
 
World Bank (2013), reports that in Rwanda, the passage of a crucial reform on green 
leaf tea pricing is boosting tea farmers’ earnings and expanding production in this 
key sector. The reform brings into effect a new pricing mechanism set on the 
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international market price of processed tea, the exchange rate, and the conversion 
rate from green leaf to processed tea. When market prices were high under the 
previous mechanism, tea factories would reap the benefits, but farmers did not garner 
higher earnings. This new mechanism links the price of green leaf to the auction 
price and motivates farmers to produce higher volumes of tea. The Rwandan case is 
almost a replica of the Tanzanian case in this study and thus making the finding 
useful in this study.  
 
The World Bank (2015) has also reported that there is need for streamlining of the 
regulatory environment for agribusiness competition in priority agribusiness value 
chains in a holistic manner and prioritizing areas that are critical and most recurring 
regulatory issues constraining agribusiness development in client countries. Such 
issues include regulatory simplification to tackle monopolistic practices, constraints 
to competition, and opaque public sector practices in the sector with a view to open 
markets to increased domestic and foreign investment. This in turn will foster 
competition for growth and investment.  
 
In Wang’ombe, (2013) it was reported that unsuitable institutional framework and 
outdated regulatory framework led to distorted markets along the maize value chain. 
In turn the supply side experienced low productivity at the farmer level to the 
detriment of consumers who suffered high final prices for maize.  The report further 
provides that in 2010 commodity price volatility led to agitation for price controls in 
rice, sugar, wheat and maize flour, among others by the Legislature. The 
Competition Authority was of the view this legislation would not benefit the poor 
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more as intended and engaged in an advocacy spree that was met with a positive 
outcome that the President rejected the bill as goods recommended for price controls 
represented 15% of the consumption basket of the poor households, 44% for middle 
and 35% for upper income households. This is a lesson that acting timely and with 
required expertise is of essence to prevent further distortions by way of legislation 
which was meant to cure the menace at hand.  
 
The foregoing is summarized to the effect that competition and economic regulation 
are often referred to as two sides of the same coin as they seek to address a common 
good in the society by fighting misuse of market power in protection of the 
consumer. As moral hazards cause market failures that require enforceable corrective 
measures, is essential that an economic law; providing for the behavior of economic 
agents where economics as a science provides the tools with which to analyze 
markets and competition within them.  
 
Nevertheless, there have been several efforts to cure the effects of the observed 
market failures since mid-1980’s; most of these efforts have been policy oriented and 
not towards strengthening of competition enforcement per se. Comprehensive review 
of empirical literature was conducted in the course of the present study; none of the 
studies have addressed the issue on how sectoral laws and competition law interlink 
to provide a plausible competition enforcement model in the identified relevant 
markets using the Competition Assessment Framework (CAF). This is the 
knowledge gap that the current this study seeks to address.     
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2.10  The Conceptual Framework 
The framework was used to guide the study, especially on the interconnectedness of 
the variables including their identification. It also provide for the understanding of 
the study from the conceptual perspective so as to nurture the thinking of the 
researcher in the course of analysis as well as providing for scope of the analysis.  
 
The framework presents the logical flow of the study from the conceptual 
perspective. The competition enforcement mechanism of the study traces its genesis 
from the Competition policy and law, sectoral legislation, subordinate legislation, 
Government policies and linkages and synergies found therein. These in turn shape 
the market structure i.e. competitive, monospsonistic competition and their 
distinguishing attributes as described in Table 1. Invariably the characteristics of the 
players (buyers and farmers) in the structure they are found in are equivocally shaped 
by the do’s and don’ts together with their typical accompanying moral hazards. The 
performance of the farmers as expressed in gross margins is dependent on two 
factors namely, those that they have control with such as agronomic practices, 
acreage, yield and social capital. On the other hand there are issues that impact the 
farmers (without them having control upon) but are buyer driven such as dominancy 
of the trading firms they have to engage with, market shares, buyer associations, 
unilateral and coordinated tendencies which if improperly regulated or completely 
unregulated are all geared towards farmers demise.  
At a crucial stage buyer-farmer relationship, the two key players engage in 
trade/business that is highly statutorily regulated by variant legislation. Issues that 
come into play include price determination, bargaining power of players, social 
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relations, knowledge sharing, contract enforcement mechanisms, communication 
reliability, input supply, access to loans and extension services. The interrelation 
arising therefrom is presented as marketing chain/channel and the resultant conduct 
of the players is referred to as market characteristics. 
 
It is at this continuum of buyer-farmer relationship, marketing chain/channel and 
market characteristics that the study focus in relation to the economic and 
competition governance structures’ efficiency towards lowering of competition harm 
that hit farmers who do not have control over the vagaries they are faced with. The 
efficiency of the enforcement model that oversee the out of control of framers’ issues 
such as restriction of where to sell their green tea leaves, limited choice of which 
buyer to sell to and most crucial at which price to sell their green tea leaves entail the 
heart of this study and thus its focus.  
 
The summary of causality is complex because of the mutual reinforcements and 
complementarities that exist among the players and various stages. Nevertheless, the 
general hypothesis is that gross margins (performance/efficiency) will be high under 
the auspices of a robust competition enforcement model in the tea markets.    
 
The following chapter discusses the theory and practice of the legal framework 
governing competition in the Tanzanian tea sector in complement to the foregoing.   
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Figure 6: Conceptual Framework 
MARKET STRUCTURE, 
CONDUCT AND PERFOMANCE 
AND THE COMPETITION 
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
FARMER 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Acreage, agronomic practices, yield, 
experience, farmer associations and 
social capital 
BUYER CHARACTERISTICS 
(Dominant firms, market shares, 
buyer associations, unilateral and 
coordinated tendencies) 
BUYER-FARMER RELATIONSHIP 
Price determination, bargaining power of players, social relations, knowledge sharing, 
contract enforcement mechanisms, communication reliability, input supply, access to 
loans and extension services 
MARKET 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Supply chain, type and number of 
market players, product volume, 
Government intervention, conduct of 
market players and contractual 
farming arrangements 
 
MARKET CHAIN 
Relevant farmer-buyer, buyer processor, 
processor-exporter, commodity markets, 
geographical markets and relevant markets 
ECONOMIC AND COMPETITION GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES’ EFFICIENCY 
Crop Boards, Fair Competition Commission, Fair 
Competition Tribunal, Courts, Local Government 
Authorities 
 
EFFICIENT MARKET COMPETITION MODEL 
(Less Anticompetitive Agreements, Abuse of Market Power/Dominant 
Position, Anticompetitive Mergers and Acquisitions Cases), Competitive 
Gross Margins 
 
COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM  
Competition policy and law, sectoral legislation, subordinate legislation, 
Government policies 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING COMPETITION IN THE 
TANZANIAN TEA SECTOR 
 
3.1  Chapter Overview 
The chapter covers theoretical and practical legal issues in competition that 
complement the foregoing economic based review of competition matters. As earlier 
asserted, competition is a discipline that encompasses both economics and law, to the 
effect that economic principles propagated in the theory of the firm and in particular 
the perfectly competitive market model are coded as laws so as to limit the moral 
hazards that often occasion market failure by private players. On the other side, the 
laws so made have also in several occasions occasioned the same market failure that 
they were meant to curb. This chapter seeks to provide the said provisions of law in 
the context of the foregoing literature review so as to have a complete dimension of 
competition covering both the economics and law sides of competition.   
 
3.2  Theoretical Review of Competition Law   
Much as classical theory rejected large firms, tainting them as destructive and evil to 
social welfare, the theory fell short of devising ways to tame the growing social 
welfare devil that grew to become the way of life in modern world.  While other 
countries particularly European, had some form of regulation on monopolies and 
cartels, the U.S. codification of the common law position on restraint of trade had a 
widespread effect on subsequent competition law development. Modern competition 
law begins with the United States legislation of the Sherman Act of 1890 and the 
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Clayton Act of 1914. Over the years, competition law has gone through phases of 
renewed attention and legislative updates around the world.  
 
Different countries enact such laws considering the economic, social and legal 
contexts with which the law will operate.  Notwithstanding the difference in the 
economies, all competition laws would have the following features as provided by 
the UNCTAD model law in Table 3. The Table has also reflected Tanzanian 
Competition Law called Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 (FCA) compatibility 
with the model law.  
 
Table 3: Compatibility of the FCA with the Model Law 
 
SN Model Law Provision Provision in FCA 
1 Title of the law Section 1 
2 Objectives or purpose of the law Section 3 
3 Definitions and scope of applications Section 2 
4 Abuse of dominant position/market power Section 10 
5 Notification, investigation and control of mergers Section 11 
6 Anti competitive agreements Section 8 
7 Relationship between competition authorities and sector 
regulators 
Section 96 
8 Establishment, functions and powers of the competition 
authority 
Section 62, 65, 83 
9 Powers of enforcement Section 59, 60, 68, 70, 71, 88 
10 Sanctions and remedies Section 59, 60 
11 Appeals Section 61 
Source: UNCTAD, (2007) 
 
From the earlier definition of competition policy and law; such laws deal with 
essentially three concerns, namely anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant 
position/market power, notification, investigation and control of mergers. This 
section discusses the theory behind the underlying competition concerns from both 
the economic and legal perspectives. 
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3.3  Anti-Competitive Agreement  
Most of competition issues are in line with economic theories. In economics, 
collusion is found in a situation whereby firms’ prices are higher than the 
competitive benchmark overtime among competitors (Massimo, 2006). In other 
words, it is a situation where the prices in a seemingly competitive market, closely 
resemble that of a monopolistic market. Collusion can be either explicit (organised) 
or tacit (implied); economic principles alone cannot provide a distinction between 
the two, unless abetted by the legal dimension of competition.  According to 
Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007), organised collusions are often harmful hence 
mostly scrutinised.  
 
Cartels refer to cases of multiple producers acting in agreement that allow them to 
exercise monopoly power (Khemani and Shapiro, 1993). Largely, cartels refer to 
shady behaviour of competitors in which they co-ordinate explicitly or tacitly to 
regulate markets so as to restrict competition. These agreements are frequently verbal 
and, although they can be harmful to competition, are difficult to detect. Increase in 
cartel practices is partly due increasing transparency in most market, which makes it 
easier for cartel members to have access to sales and market share data of their 
competitors who eventually become cartel members (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). 
 
3.1.1 Economics of Cartels 
In a period of high demand whereby capacity constraints, high concentration index, 
low elasticity of demand are observed, bigger firms have incentives to join the cartel 
as they cut their production to maximise profits through price increases and vice 
versa during high season. On the other hand, during the period of low demand, 
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smaller firms have greater incentives to remain outside the cartel as they would be in 
an advantageous position (become more efficient in terms of economies of scale 
because of full capacity utilisation) to sell their products without the risk of fixing 
prices and vice versa during high season.  Generally, cartels persist among firms with 
similar cost functions, thus facing similar production and marketing constraints 
hence incentives for the participating firms to create and remain in the cartel 
(Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). 
 
According to Aurora and Sarkar (2008) cartels usually become deterrents to new 
entrants into markets, or force outsiders to join the cartel by mounting fierce price 
wars to non-members. Cartels also punish the defectors for their non-compliance. 
Cartel members agree on price fixing, total industry output, market shares, allocation 
of customers, bid-rigging, setting common agencies and allocating territories, 
lobbing to the Government, division of profits or a combination of these actions to 
gain supernormal profits. Table 4 summarises the factors affecting sustainability of 
cartels. 
 
Table 4: Impact of Market Factors on Cartel Sustainability 
SN Factor Impact on Cartel Sustainability 
1 Small number of firms Positive 
2 High concentration Positive 
3 Similar cost functions of firms Positive 
4 High entry and exit barriers Positive 
5 Low price elasticity of demand Positive 
6 Discontent with the existing performance Positive 
7 Trade association Positive 
8 Mutual trust Positive 
9 Homogeneous goods Positive 
10 Market transparency Positive 
11 Threat of legal sanctions Negative 
12 Large powerful buyer Negative 
13 Demand fluctuations Negative 
Source: Arora and Sarkar (2008) 
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3.1.2 Legal Aspects of Cartels 
Depending on the legal text of a respective countries law, the basic element to be 
proved in a cartel case is an agreement. That there was a form of agreement among 
competitors and that content of the said agreement materially restrains competition 
and is restricted by law.   
 
There are usually two forms of prohibited agreements, those which are prohibited per 
se (under no circumstances, they can be allowed) and those that can be allowed if 
they bring more benefit than the detriments they cause to competition (rule of 
reason).  Some jurisdictions do not have per se prohibitions e.g. USA while Tanzania 
is among those countries having per se provisions.  
 
In the Tanzanian context where the study was carried out, the FCA provides for anti-
competitive agreements as follows:  
(i) Agreements which are anticompetitive, but can be allowed if they pass the 
test that the benefit the agreements bring outweigh detriments to competition 
(Rule of Reason) provided under Section 8 of the FCA.  
 
In such agreements, the Commission will establish the harm caused by the proposed 
agreements on competition, consumers and the economy and weigh the harm against 
the projected benefits resulting from the agreement. If the benefits outweigh the 
harm the Commission may allow the agreement to proceed and vice versa. Decision 
of the Commission will heavily depend on the cost-benefit analysis results and the 
economic arguments advanced by both the applicant and the Commission’s 
economists for and against the proposed agreement.   
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(ii) Agreements which the FCA prohibit under no circumstances (per se 
prohibition) provided under section 9 (1) of the FCA. Agreements prohibited 
are: 
(a) Price fixing between competitors.  
(b) Collective boycott by competitors. 
(c) Output restrictions between competitors; or  
(d) Collusive bidding or tendering. 
 
In such agreements the Commission will investigate the possibility of existence of an 
agreement between competitors by deploying the market factors in Table 1. Most of 
the factors require deployment of economic principles to establish their existence. 
Decisions of the Commission are mostly based on the evidence to prove existence of 
an agreement.  The economic evidence will only corroborate that of existence of an 
agreement.    
 
3.2 Abuse of Dominant Position/ Market Power 
According to Burling (2004), dominant position relates to a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to prevent effective competition 
being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an 
appreciable extent independent of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the 
consumer. Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where 
there is a monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by 
it, if not to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the condition 
under which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard 
of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment.    
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Abuse of dominance refers to a behavior which, through recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators has the effect of hindering the 
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of 
that competition. Abusive behavior can be exclusionary practices e.g. price 
discrimination or an exploitative practice such as charging excessive prices to buyers 
(or extorting too low prices from suppliers). Prohibitions differ across 
jurisdictions/economies depending on nature and levels of market development e.g. 
USA does not prohibit charging excessive prices while the EU and South Africa does 
(Burling, 2004).  
 
Competition laws do not punish creation of dominant position but its abuse. A firm 
that builds dominance/market power however strong through innovation, investment, 
and marketing activities, this is legally allowed. It is only abuse not the creation of a 
dominant position that is forbidden. It makes sense from economic efficiency 
standpoint that a firm should not be punished because they are better, more 
successful or even luckier than others as this would reduce incentive for this firm 
(Massimo, 2004).  
 
In Tanzania, Abuse of Dominance/Market power is provided in Section 10 (1) of the 
Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003.  
 “A person with a dominant position in a market shall not use his 
position of dominance if the object, effect or likely effect of the 
conduct is to appreciably prevent, restrict or distort competition”. 
 
Sections 5 (6) of the Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 provide that: 
“a person has a dominant position in a market if both (a) and (b) apply: 
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(a) Acting alone, the person can profitably and materially restrain or reduce 
competition in that market for a significant period of time; and 
(b) The person's share of the relevant market exceeds 35 percent”. 
 
Generally, challenges that lawyers and economist for the plaintiff, defendant as well 
as the decision makers face in dealing with cases brought under Section 10 of the 
Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 are elements to prove “acting alone”, 
“materially” restraining competition and “appreciably” prevent, restrict or distort 
competition as provided in the relevant sections. More elements to be proven in 
abuse cases are as discussed in respective types of abuse as provided hereunder. The 
types of abuse relevant to the current study include the following: 
 
3.2.1 Exclusive Dealing 
Refers to conduct by a dominant firm in a relevant market that requires or induces 
customers or suppliers to deal solely or predominantly with the dominant firm. It 
operates as demonstrated with the two examples. The manufacturer or customer 
agrees that customer will buy a product only from this manufacturer, or that 
manufacturer will supply a product only to this customer, or both. Alternatively, the 
manufacturer and dealer agree that the dealer will not carry products of other 
manufacturers, or Manufacturer agrees not to supply products to competing dealers, 
or both.  In such practices, there may or may not be a contract but a customer may 
simply refuse to deal with a manufacturer that sells to rival customers or a 
manufacturer may simply refuse to deal with a distributor that carries rival products. 
Such exclusive contracts may cover a short period of time or many years (ABA, 
2007). 
 
 
 
71
3.2.1.1 Economics of Exclusive Dealing 
Economics literature on exclusive dealing shows that exclusive dealing can be either 
efficient or inefficient (causing harm to competition). The economic challenge 
underlying such practice is the “Basic Tradeoff” of the effects of such practice. 
Exclusive dealing changes the nature of price competition; as firms compete for the 
right to be the exclusive supplier and intensify competition in the market thus lower 
prices. The basic tradeoff was between lower prices and reduced product variety as 
result of the exclusive contract (ABA, 2007).  
 
Pro competition effects of exclusive dealing include increased competition between 
manufacturers to supply all of the needs of particular dealers, retailers, or customers 
may be more intense and result in lower prices. Exclusive dealing is also known for 
enhancing incentives for suppliers and dealers to make production and capacity 
expansion investments. Suppliers may make investments that increase demand for 
the product, leading to free-riding. At this point, dealers may invest too little in their 
relationships with a seller without an exclusive arrangement, hence making explicit 
contracts infeasible in exclusive deals. Exclusive contracts are common in 
competitive markets in which buyers and sellers do not have substantial market 
power (ABA, 2007). 
 
There are also potential anti competition effects of exclusive dealing; static effects 
include raising product prices in the long run and reduced product variety in the short 
run. Dynamic effect of exclusive dealing is mostly deterrence of entry (or diminish 
rival investment incentives) by denying rivals economies of scale as products require 
multiple buyers and economies of scale in production to sustain in the market. In 
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considering the “Trade off” discussed earlier, two scenario emerge as described 
hereunder.   
 
(i) Tradeoff when Suppliers are Symmetric 
Exclusive dealing may intensify competition when the rival suppliers are relatively 
symmetric. Exclusive dealing can also reduce product variety; however competition 
policy typically avoids variety issues, since unfettered competition may lead to too 
much or too little variety relative to the social optimum, making analysis of this 
tradeoff complicated as it would depend on a variety of uncontrollable factors (ABA, 
2007). 
 
(ii) Tradeoff when Suppliers are Asymmetric 
Exclusive dealing may reduce competition when rival suppliers are relatively 
asymmetric. If one rival is much larger than the other, the small rival cannot 
realistically compete to become the exclusive supplier. If the small firm competes 
less vigorously, the large firm may do the same. In weighing the effects of exclusive 
contracts, there is no simple rule of thumb. Net effect depends on details of the 
market such as relative demands, own- and cross-elasticities, nature of feasible 
contracts, economies of scale and transaction costs. In most cases, it has been found 
that less likely will increased competition outweigh the loss of variety (ABA, 2007). 
 
3.2.1.2 Legal Aspects of Exclusive Dealing 
Basic legal elements that need to be considered are whether the alleged firm has the 
following: 
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(i) Dominance 
Depending on the relevant legislation, dominance is established by market shares. In 
Tanzania, Section 5 (6) of FCA provides that a person has a dominant position in a 
market if both (a) and (b) apply: 
(a) Acting alone, the person can profitably and materially restrain or reduce 
competition in that market for a significant period of time; and 
(b) The person's share of the relevant market exceeds 35 percent. 
 
(ii) Exclusive Dealing Arrangement 
No formal contract requirement to prove either there exist a de jure or de facto 
exclusivity. Percentage of purchases or sales involved is not limited to arrangements 
covering 100% of purchases/sales, generally no presumptions or safe harbors in 
assessing such arrangements as all vulnerable to exclusivity. Duration of the 
arrangement may be considered in mitigation of penalties in case of conviction. 
Exclusivity arrangements requested by the non-dominant party are “not per se 
illegal” as both parties are likely to obtain pro-competitive efficiencies (ABA, 2007). 
 
(iii) Anticompetitive Effects 
Anticompetitive foreclosure which is an act of hindering or eliminating actual or 
potential competitors’ profitable access to the market is what is prohibited by 
competition law. Furthermore, it should be noted that, it is harm to competition 
process and consumers, not just competitors that is sought to prove a case. Factors in 
assessing foreclosure are market coverage, duration of the obligation, alternative 
sources and practicality of switching as well as entry and expansion barriers the 
exclusive contract bears (ABA, 2007).  
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(iv) Justifications and Defenses 
Defendants will most probably raise the most widely-recognized efficiencies of 
relationship-specific investments, facilitating innovation or reduced transaction costs 
in their defense in the course of justifying the alleged exclusivity. Generally, 
efficiencies that result in lower costs, better products or improved quality do not 
meet competition cases defense standard and are not recognized (ABA, 2007).  
 
 
3.2.3 Refusal to Deal 
This conduct refers to unilateral, unconditional refusals (actual or constructive) to 
supply (or continue to supply) a rival in the downstream market. Upstream market 
power is necessary in establishing a refusal to deal violation. Theoretically, it is 
important to acknowledge that without the profits from the downstream sales, the 
firm may not have invested in the upstream asset.  If rival firms learn of the profits, 
and be able to use the leading firm’s assets, they may not invest in their own assets 
thus bring about free rider problem. Refusal to deal may be either pro-competitive or 
anti-competitive (ABA, 2007). In analyzing refusal to deal cases, a few questions are 
usually asked as follows:   
(i) Does the firm have monopoly power?  
(ii) Will the refusal to deal cause prices to be raised or maintained at supra-
competitive level?  
(iii) Is there another market where the entrant is an actual or potential competitor of 
defendant? 
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3.3  Mergers 
According to ABA (2007), generally mergers are prohibited if they either create or 
strengthen a position of dominance in a given relevant market. The merger 
regulation fraternity is often characterized by notifications and thresholds thereof for 
which consummating a notifiable without notifying the requisite authority amounts 
to a punishable offence under completion law.       
 
3.4  Provision of the FCA in Relation to Competition in the Tea Sector  
3.4.1 The Agreements’ Exemption Test  
Since the regulation of agreement encompass legal, competition and market aspects; 
it is important to take cognizance of Section 2 of the FCA, further provides that 
"competition'' ''market'' and ''dominant position in a market'' are economic concepts 
and, subject to the provisions of this Act (FCA), shall be interpreted accordingly. 
The exemptions for agreement are applied for under Section 8 read together with 
Section 12 of the FCA. It requires rule of reason in determining whether the 
agreement merit an exemption or otherwise as discussed hereunder. The test is 
provided in Section 8 of the FCA as follows: 
 
Subsection 1 provides that “A person shall not make or give effect to an agreement 
if the object, effect or likely effect of the agreement is to appreciably prevent, restrict 
or distort competition”. 
 
Subsection 2 provides that “An agreement in contravention of this section is 
unenforceable except to the extent the provisions of the agreement causing it to be in 
contravention of the section are severable from the other provisions of the 
agreement”. 
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Subsection 3 provides that “Unless proved otherwise, it shall be presumed that an 
agreement does not have the object, effect or likely effect of appreciably preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition if none of the parties to the agreement has a 
dominant position in a market affected by the agreement and either (a) or (b) applies: 
(a) The combined shares of the parties to the agreement of each market affected by 
the   agreement is 35 per cent or less; or 
(b) None of the parties to the agreement are competitors”. 
 
Subsection 4 provides that “For the purposes of this section, in determining whether 
the effect or likely effect of an agreement is to appreciably prevent, restrict or distort 
competition, the fact that similar agreements are widespread in a market affected by 
the agreement shall be taken into account”. 
 
Subsection 5 provides “This section does not apply to an agreement to the extent it 
provides for a merger”. 
 
Subsection 6 provides that “For the purposes of sub-section (1), an object is the 
object of an agreement if it is a significant object of the agreement even if it is only 
one of a number of objects of the agreement”. 
 
Subsection 7 provides that “Any person, who intentionally or negligently acts in 
contravention of the provisions of this section, commits an offence under this Act”. 
Furthermore, Section 12 of the FCA provides as follows:  
 
Subsection 1 provides that “The Commission may, upon the application of a party to 
an agreement, grant an exemption for that agreement, either unconditionally or 
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subject to such conditions as the Commission sees fit, if the Commission is satisfied 
in all the circumstances that both paragraph (a) and (b) apply: 
(a) the agreement either contravenes section 9 or has, or is likely to have, the effect 
of appreciably preventing, restraining or distorting competition; and 
(b) the agreement results or is likely to result in benefits to the public in one or more 
of the following ways: 
(i) by contributing to greater efficiency in production or distribution; 
(ii) by promoting technical or economic progress; 
(iii) by contributing to greater efficiency in the allocation of resources; or 
(iv) by protecting the environment; and the agreement: 
(v) prevents, restrains or distorts competition no more than is reasonably 
necessary to attain the benefits; and 
(vi) the benefits to the public resulting from the agreement outweigh the 
detriments caused by preventing, restraining or distorting competition”. 
 
Subsection 2 provides that “The Commission may grant a block exemption, either 
unconditionally or subject to such conditions as the Commission sees fit, for all 
agreements falling within a class of agreements if the Commission is satisfied in all 
the circumstances that paragraph (a) of sub-section (1) shall not apply to the class of 
agreements”. 
 
Subsection 3 provides that ”When granting an exemption under this section, the 
Commission shall fix a period, not exceeding 5 years from the date the exemption is 
granted, as the period of the exemption”. 
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Subsection 4 provides that “An agreement exempted under this section is not 
prohibited by section 8 or section 9 during the period of the exemption”. 
 
Subsection 5 provides that “For the purposes of this section, ''agreement'' includes 
proposed agreement and 'party' includes party to a proposed agreement”.  
 
Subsection 6 provides that “The Commission may revoke or vary an exemption at 
any time during the period of the exemption if it is satisfied that circumstances since 
the grant of the exemption have materially changed or the exemption was granted 
wholly or partly on the basis of false, misleading or incomplete information”.  
 
3.4.2 The Merger Test  
Since the regulation of mergers is a both a competition and market related 
phenomena, it is important to take cognizance of section 2 of the FCA further 
provides that "competition'' ''market'' and ''dominant position in a market'' are 
economic concepts and, subject to the provisions of this Act (FCA), shall be 
interpreted accordingly. The merger test is provided in section 11 (1) that “A merger 
is prohibited if it creates or strengthens a position of dominance in a market”. 
 
Section 11 (2) provides that “A merger is notifiable under this section if it involves 
turnover or assets above threshold amounts the Commission shall specify from time 
to time by Order, in the Gazette, calculated in the manner prescribed in the Order.”  
Section 11 (6) provides that “Any person who intentionally or negligently acts in 
contravention of the provisions of this section, commits an offence under this Act”. 
 
Section 60 (1) provides that “Where a person commits an offence against this Act 
(other than under Part VI, Part VII or sections 58, 59 or 88) or is involved in such an 
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offence, the Commission may impose on that person a fine of not less than five 
percent of his annual turnover and not exceeding ten percent of his annual turnover”. 
 
Section 60 (8) provides that “The Commission may act upon an offence at any time 
within six years after the commission of the offence”.  
 
3.4.2.1 Fair Competition Commission (Threshold for Notification of a Merger) 
Order, 2007  
The Order is made pursuant to section 11(2) of the FCA, and provides as follows: 
“This order may be cited as the Fair Competition (Threshold for Notification of a 
Merger) Order, 2006, and shall be deemed to have come into effect on 10th March, 
2006. Order 1 (2) it is hereby specified that the threshold for notification of a merger 
is Tanzania Shillings Eight Hundred Million only (TZS 800,000,000/=). The 
calculation of the threshold shall be based on the combined market value of assets of 
the merging firms”.  
 
3.4.2.2 The Fair Competition Commission Procedure Rules, 2013  
Rule 33 (1) provides that “A firm which intends to acquire control through a merger 
shall notify the Commission of that intended merger by filing a notification under 
Section 11(2) of the Act.  
 
3.4.3  Review of Provision for Inconsistency of the FCC with Other Laws 
Section 96 provide for inconsistency of the FCA with other laws to the effect that:  
Subsection 1 provide that “Subject only to this section, this Act applies to all 
persons in all sectors of the economy and shall not be read down, excluded or 
modified (a) by any other Act except to the extent that the Act is passed after the 
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commencement of this Act and expressly excludes or modifies this Act; or (b) by any 
subsidiary legislation whether or not such subsidiary legislation purports to exclude 
or modify this Act”.  
 
Subsection 2 provide that “A person shall not contravene this Act by reason only of 
engaging in a conduct, unless a provision of an enactment specified in sub-section 
(3): (a) requires the person to engage in the conduct or conduct of that kind; or (b) 
authorizes or approves the person engaging or refraining from engaging in conduct 
of that kind.  
 
Subsection 3 provide that “The enactments referred to in sub-section (2) are: 
EWURA Act, 2001 SUMATRA Act, 2001 the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority Act, 2003 the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority Act, 2003 and 
sector legislation referred to in the sector legislation, enactments for the protection of 
the environment; and, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under any of the 
aforementioned Acts”. 
 
Subsection 4 provide that “Where the Commission is of the opinion that, any 
conduct required, authorised or approved by a regulatory authority under an 
enactment referred to in sub-section (3) would be in breach of this Act if sub-section 
(1) did not apply to the conduct the Commission, shall report the matter to the 
Minister”.  
 
Subsection 5 provide that “Where the Minister receives a report from the 
Commission under sub-section (4), he may direct the relevant regulatory authority to 
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take the necessary steps to ensure that the conduct described by the Commission is 
not required, authorised or approved by the regulatory authority. 
  
Subsection (6) “A person shall not contravene this Act by reason only of engaging in 
conduct required in order to comply with an enactment other than an enactment 
referred to in sub-section (3) of this section’.  
 
It is observed that the provision has expressly mentioned of sectors that have been 
exempted from the operation of the Fair Competition Act, 2003 which means the rest 
of the sectors are its subjects and for that matter they are bound to comply with all 
the provisions irrespective of the nature of the sector and the provision of their 
respective enabling statutes.  
 
Tea sector is not among the exempted which means the statutory provisions of the 
tea sector legislation that are contrary to some basic competition principles, such as 
controlled price determination and restrictions to market access continue to harm the 
respective market. An alternative approach to the failed orthodoxies is at this stage 
inevitable thus the motivation for this study.    
 
3.4.4  Provision of Selected Sector Specific Provision on Competition Matters  
In Tanzania there no practise of economic regulation in any of the agricultural 
markets, this has necessitated that the study to borrow a leaf from a closely distant 
sector which also deal with a product for benchmarking purposes. To this effect, 
petroleum has been selected for the purpose. 
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3.4.4.1 The Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority Act Inconsistency 
with the FCA 
 
Section 38 of the EWURA Act provide as follows: 
Subsection 1 “A person shall not contravene a provision of the Fair Competition Act 
or the Standards Act by reason only of engaging in conduct or refraining from 
engaging in conduct if this Act, a sector Act or any subordinate legislation or 
instrument under any of the aforementioned Acts (a) requires the person to engage or 
refrain from engaging in the conduct or conduct of that kind; or (b) authorises or 
approves the person engaging or refraining from engaging in conduct of that kind”.  
 
Subsection 2 “Where the Commissioner for Fair Competition is of the opinion that 
any conduct required, authorised or approved by the Authority (a) would be in 
breach of the Fair Competition Act if subsection (1) did not apply to the conduct; and 
(b) the conduct is against the public interest, the Commissioner shall report the 
matter to the Minister.  
 
Subsection 3 “Where the Minister receives a report from the Commissioner for Fair 
Competition under subsection (2), he may direct the Authority to take the necessary 
steps to ensure that the conduct described by the Commissioner is not required, 
authorised or approved by the Authority”.  
 
Sections 29 and 38 of the EWURA Act provides for appeals of its decisions to be 
referred to the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT).   
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Power to Regulate Rates and Charges 
Section 17 provides as follows:   
Subsection (1) “Subject to the provisions of sector legislation and licences granted 
under the legislation, the Authority shall carry out regular reviews of rates and 
charges”.  
 
Subsection (2) “In making any determination, setting rates and charges or 
establishing the method for regulating such rates and charges, the Authority shall 
take into account– (a) the costs of making, producing and supplying the goods or 
services; (b) the return on assets in the regulated sector; (c) any relevant benchmarks 
including international benchmarks for prices, costs and return on assets in 
comparable industries; (d) the financial implications of the determination; (e) the 
desirability of establishing maximum rates and charges, and in carrying out regular 
reviews of rates and charges; (f) any other factors specified in the relevant sector 
legislation; (g) the consumer and investor interest; and (h) the desire to promote 
competitive rates and attract market; (i) any other factors the Authority considers 
relevant. (3) The Authority shall publish in the Government Gazette all the rates, 
tariffs and charges regulated by the Board”. 
 
3.4.4.2 The Petroleum Act  
Prohibition against Activities Contrary to Principles of Fair Competition 
 
Section 24 provides as follows: 
Subsection (1) “Subject to the provisions of the Energy and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Authority Act, all petroleum operations shall be subject to the provisions 
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of the Fair Competition Act in relations to  (a) The formation of cartels; (b) Barriers 
to entry and exit; (c) Abuse of dominant position and market power; (d) Formation of 
mergers and acquisitions for anti- competitive purposes; (e) Attempts to control 
prices; (f) The creation of artificial shortages of products or services; and (g) Other 
restrictive trade practices as defined in that Act, with intention to contravene the 
principles of fair competition or impeding the functioning of a free market for 
petroleum products within the country.  
 
Subsection (2) “Subject to the provisions of the Fair Competition Act, all 
participants in the supply chain shall sell products and offer services to all interested 
persons without undue delay and without any form of discrimination by means of 
quality, quantity, price and any other form of discrimination. (3) The Fair 
Competition Commission shall monitor conditions of the market and trade practices 
of participants in the supply chain”.  
 
Section 52 of the Petroleum Act provides for appeals of the decisions of EWURA to 
be referred to the Fair Competition Tribunal (FCT).   
 
3.5 Provisions of the Tea Industry Legislative Framework in Relation to 
Market Competition  
 
3.5.1  The Tea Industry Act No. 3 of 1997  
The Tea Act No. 3 of 1997 and came into force on the 1st October 1997 following the 
separation of the regulatory and development functions of the then Tanzania Tea 
Authority (TTA). It is entrusted with the mandatory responsibility of regulating the 
tea industry in Tanzania. 
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Section 2 of the same Act defines “green leaf tea” to mean a leaf detached from tea 
plants but not dried or processed in any way.  
 
Section 5 (4) of the Tea Industry Act No. 3 of 1997 (as amended in 2009 provide for 
the main functions of the act follows:  
(a) Advise the Government on the policies and strategies for the development of 
the tea industry. 
(b) Regulate and control the quality of tea and tea by-products. 
(c) Collect, refine, maintain, use or disseminate information or data relating to the 
tea industry. 
(d) Monitor the production and exportation of tea. 
(e) Regulate processing, exportation and storage of tea and tea by-products. 
(f) Represent the Government in international and local fora in matters relating to 
the tea industry. 
(g) Regulate import and export of tea. 
(h) Control pests and diseases; and 
(i) Promote and protect interests of farmers against syndicates of buyers, which 
may be formed through associations. 
(j) Performing any commercial function as the Minister may consider necessary. 
 
3.5.2  The Tea Regulations, 2010 
Issues of particular interest to this study as provided by the Tea Regulations are as 
follows:  
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(a) Interpretation of Key Terms 
Regulation 3 provide for the following important definitions that are of interest to the 
study: 
“Grower” includes an individual grower, cooperative society, association or 
company cultivating tea and registered by the Board.  
“small scale grower” means a grower holding less than 20 hectares of land planted 
with tea.  
“medium scale grower’’ means a grower holding not more than 200 hectares but not 
less than 20 hectors of land planted with tea. 
“large scale grower’’ means a grower holding over 200 hectares of land  planted with 
tea. 
“Estate” means an area of not less than 200 hectares of land planted with tea and has 
a primary processing factory attached to it. 
“Green leaf buyer” means a person, association or company licensed by the Board to 
buy green leaves from a registered grower for processing into made tea using his 
own processing factory.  
 
(b) Registration by the Board 
Regulation 11 (1) provides that “Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 5 of 
the Act, and for the purposes of (a) monitoring contracts of farming (b) regulating 
green leaf tea quality (c) regulating tea processing and manufacturing (d) controlling 
import and export of tea (e) establishing a basis for planning; and (f) dealing with 
any other relevant matters in the tea industry, the Board shall register and maintain a 
register of all tea dealers. 
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Regulation 11 (2) provides that “a tea dealer registered pursuant to sub-regulation 
(1) shall be issued with a Registration Number”.  
 
Regulation 11 (3) provides that “The Board shall not charge registration fee to any 
tea dealer”. 
(c) Restriction on Growing or Selling Green Leaf Without Registration 
Regulation 12 (1) provides that “A grower shall not sell green leaf tea to a tea 
processing factory unless he has been registered by the Board pursuant to Regulation 
11”. 
Regulation 12 (2) provides that “A person shall not deal with a grower in either 
buying green leaves from him or any activity related to tea industry unless such 
grower has been registered by the Board”.  
 
Regulation 12 (3) provides that “Any person who contravenes the provisions of this 
regulation   commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine of not 
more than five hundred thousand shillings or to imprisonment for a term of not more 
than twelve months”. 
 
(d)       Qualification for Registration of a Grower 
Regulation 16 (1) provides that Before any person is registered as a grower, he shall 
be required to satisfy the Board that (a) he is already growing tea at the time of 
registration or, he has definite intention to (b) commence growing tea within a period 
of six months from the date of being registered (c) the area under tea or area on 
which tea is to be grown is not less than one acre (0.40 ha); and (d) the tea field is 
located within a radius not exceeding 40 km from the tea processing factory, 
 
 
 
88
provided however, where the distance exceeds 40 km the tea buyer provides proof 
satisfactory to the Board that he is able to transport and deliver tea to the processing 
factory. 
 
Refusal of registration and De-registration of a tea dealer is dealt with under 
Regulations 17 and 18 of the Tea Regulations, 2010 respectively.   
 
(e) Mode of application for a license and permit 
Regulation 21 provides that “An application for a license or permit shall be in a 
prescribed form as provided for in the First Schedule”.  
 
(f) Type of Licenses and Permits 
Regulation 23 (1) provides that “The Board shall issue to any qualified applicant, 
the following licenses or permits (a) Green Leaf Tea Buying License, (b) Green Leaf 
Tea Processing License, (c) Tea Blending and Packing License (d) Tea Export 
Permit, and (e) Tea Import Permit”. 
 
Regulation 23 (2) provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of sub regulation 
(1), the Board shall not issue a license under paragraph (c) to a manufacturer for the 
purpose of bulk packing for export sales or for sale to licensed local tea blenders and 
packers”. 
 
(g)   Buying Centers 
Regulation 48 (1) provides that “The Board shall register an established buying 
center for the purpose of buying and selling of green leaf tea”.   
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Regulation 48 (2) provides that “For the purposes of preservation of green leaf tea at 
buying centers, the Board shall set sanitary standards to be adopted by growers, 
buyers or transporters of green leaf tea”. 
Regulation 48 (3) provides that “The trading hours at tea buying centres shall be 
from 8.00 hours in the morning to 18.00 hours in the evening”. 
 
Regulation 48 (4) provides that “Registered tea manufacturers shall produce 
monthly reports to the Board showing monthly purchases and deliveries of green leaf 
tea to the processing factory”. 
 
Regulation 48 (5) provides that “Any person who sells green leaf tea outside an 
established and registered buying centre commits an offence”. 
Regulation 48 (6) provides that “No person other than a grower shall sell green leaf 
tea at a buying centre”.   
 
Regulation 48 (7) provides that “A person shall not sell green leaf tea obtained from 
the farm of another person”. 
 
(h)    Indicative and Actual Price 
Regulation 49 (1) provides that “The Board shall, after consultation with other 
stakeholders, set indicative price for buying green leaf tea for each year which shall 
be used as a minimum price. 
 
Regulation 49 (2) provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of sub regulation 
(1), negotiations for the establishment of the actual price of green leaf tea in a 
respective tea growing area shall be done by tea growers through their associations 
or co-operative societies and buyers”. 
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Regulation 49 (3) provides that “The actual price arrived at under sub regulation (2) 
shall not be below the minimum price”. 
 
(i)      Domestic Sales of Tea 
Regulation 50 provides that “A manufacturer shall sell made tea to blender and 
packer or any other person who has been licensed”. 
 
 (j)      Export and Import Procedures 
Regulation 51 (1) provides that “A manufacturer, blender or packer may, subject to 
the acquisition of an export permit from the Board issued upon such terms and 
conditions as the Board may prescribe, export made tea”.  
Regulation 51 (2) provides that “A blender and packer shall import made tea, 
subject to the acquisition of an import permit from the Board issued upon such terms 
and conditions as the Board may prescribe”.  
 
(k)       Requirement for Processing within the Country 
Regulation 53 (1) provides that “All green leaf tea produced in Tanzania shall be 
processed within the country”.  
 
Regulation 53 (2) provides that “The Board shall set standards to guide small scale 
green leaf tea processing within the country”.  
 
Regulation 53 (3) provides that “Without prejudice to the provisions of sub 
regulation (1) the Minister may, for a specified period, allow the sale or processing 
of green leaf tea outside the country”. 
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(l) Roles of the Stakeholders Meeting 
Regulation 55 provides that “Roles of the stakeholders meeting shall be to (a) 
deliberate and make resolutions on issues presented to it (b) determine modalities for 
financing its meeting and activities (c) arrange for funding of the shared functions 
and other matters of common interest to tea stakeholders (d) form committees and 
working groups for the better carrying out the shared functions (e) deliberate and 
determine indicative green leaf tea price (f) implement any other matter for 
sustainability and stability of the tea industry”. 
 
(m)     Value Chain Analysis in Service Delivery  
Regulation 65 provides that “in ensuring compliance to standards of service to 
stakeholders, the Board and the Agency in collaboration with other key stakeholders 
shall observe that (a) the roles and responsibilities of each actor in the tea industry 
contributes to adding value to the development of the tea industry (b) the potential 
for adding value through the means of cost advantage or differentiation is enhanced 
(c) the tea industry attains sustainable competitive advantage”.   
 
(n)      Information and Data Collection 
Regulation 66 (1) provides that “Every respective tea dealer shall submit to the 
Board a monthly report on (a) the tea planted acreage (b) volume or tonnage of crop 
purchased and processed (c) export and local sales and average price (d) availability 
and distribution of inputs in accordance with the relevant terms of the farming 
contract (e) Any other information as the Board may deem necessary”.  
 
Regulation 66 (2) provides that “The Board shall compile and furnish a copy of the 
monthly report to the respective key stakeholders”. 
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Regulation 66 (3) provides that “The Board shall maintain all statistical data and 
information relating to the tea industry in the country”. 
 
(o)   General Offence and Penalty 
Regulation  67 provides that “Any person who contravenes any of these Regulations 
where no other punishment has been specified commits an offence and shall upon 
conviction be liable to a fine of not less than five hundred thousand shillings or to a 
term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve months or to both such fine and 
imprisonment.   
 
(p)        Corporate Liability 
Regulation 68 provides that “Where any offence against these regulations has been 
committed   by any person with the consent or approval of a director, manager, 
secretary or any other authorized officer with the capacity as a director of that body 
corporate, shall be deemed to have committed the offence in the corporate name”. 
 
(q) Contract Farming between Smallholder Farmers and Green Tea Leaves 
Buyers 
Schedule One of the Tea Regulation in its Form 2 Green Leaf Tea Buying License in 
the 13th  Condition in the Green Leaf Tea Buying Licence provides that “Every buyer 
should enter into sales contract with any grower for minimum period of one year on 
such terms and conditions as the parties may agree upon and no buyer should enter 
into a sale contract with a grower who has another contract with another buyer”.  
 
The statutory provisions cited in the discussion above and their effects shall be 
discussed in the context of market analysis in the results chapter of the current study.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1  Chapter Overview 
This chapter covers the overall research design and further provides for details in 
data collection methods, description of data to be used in each and every objective 
and sampling methods employed in data collection. It also provide for data collection 
methods as well data analysis covering the models employed in the analyses as well 
as the statistical package to be employed.  
 
4.2  Research Design 
The research design of this study is constructed around the Competition Assessment 
Framework (CAF) which is basically a neoclassical approach. The CAF borrows 
from competition theory and methods common in studying complex phenomena such 
as market behaviour dynamics involving remotely located small holder farmers and 
giant multinational firms in interacting one market with the Government in a 
changed role play as an overseer. The study is descriptive in nature where both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, using field data on green tea leaves trade so 
as to create deeper understanding of the actual behavior of economic actors in thin 
markets.  
 
4.3  Data Collection 
Green tea leaves data were collected from the Rungwe, Mufindi and Muheza green 
tea leaves Districts in Tanzania where there are high, mid-level and low volumes of 
trade respectively.    
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4.3.1  Types of Data 
Cross sectional data in farmers segment (primary data), secondary data for Gross 
margins for buyers and processors. Time series data were also collected to establish 
trends in the relevant markets.  
 
4.3.1.1 Secondary Data 
Secondary data on tea leaf buying and selling markets in Tanzania and in particular 
Rungwe, Mufindi and Muheza tea growing districts and the Tea Board of Tanzania. 
Data were also sourced from the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) Regional 
Offices in Iringa, Tanga and Mbeya. Other organizations both governmental and 
non-governmental that deal with tea, District Agricultural and Livestock 
Development Officers (DALDO) were approached in search of the required data.  
 
4.3.1.2 Primary Data 
Cross-sectional data were collected from a sample of 180 farmers selected from 
purposefully sampled farmer groups. There was collection of primary data from a 
sampled tea buying companies operating in the relevant markets. A structured 
questionnaire for each group was developed and administered. In addition, 
participatory appraisal was employed to collect relevant qualitative information. This 
involved discussing market issues with key informants including Government 
officials at district and regional offices, village officials, cooperative society leaders, 
cooperative union leaders, Tea Board officials in the relevant markets and 
Headquarters in Dar es Salaam. The researcher also held focus group discussion with 
farmers and their group/association leaders; checklists were prepared to guide these 
discussions.  
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4.3.2 Sampling Methods 
Stratified sampling was employed in selecting farmers to be interviewed. The 
stratification was based the following factors, whether the farmers belong to an 
association, group, institution or an individual. This was the prime criteria for 
selection, another criteria was distance from green tea leaves buying centers and 
accessibility (30 km from the main road).  
 
The researcher chose the interviewed farmers (those meeting the criteria due to 
budget and time constraints) randomly from a sampling frame. Lists of registered 
green tea leaves farmers obtained from district agricultural offices were used as 
sampling frames for respective green tea leaves growing districts i.e. Rungwe, 
Mufindi and Muheza.   
 
The population for Rungwe and Mufindi were found to be too big compared to that 
of Muheza thus the researcher based on the fact that the farmers are faced with the 
same constraints and subject to benefit from similar steam of benefits; as per Kothari 
(2006), employed extra criteria of picking farmers who had been on particular 
association from 2004 when the FCA became operational as reductive criteria that 
would make the three samples compare.  
 
The sample size for each green tea leaves growing districts was 60 thus making the 
total of sampled and interviewed green tea leaves farmers to be 180. This was a 
representative sample was pegged at 10.5 % of the population of the farmers which 
is within the range 5-20% of the population reported in Mayoux (2006).  
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Census was adopted in interviewing the 7 green tea leaves processors cum green tea 
leaves buyers found in the respective green tea leaves growing districts i.e. Rungwe 
(2), Mufindi (3) and Muheza (2).  
 
4.3.3 Questionnaire Design and Administration 
The questionnaire was designed to collect both quantitative and qualitative primary 
data. A structured questionnaire designed to collect primary data from farmers and 
buying companies. The questionnaires consisted of sections arranged to suit both 
requirements of the Competition Assessment Framework model and ensuring capture 
of all information required to suffice the study. The researcher and other trained 
enumerators administered questionnaires to both farmers and buying companies. The 
key informant interviews and focus group discussions were conducted by the 
researcher.   
 
4.3.4 Key Informant Interviews 
The researcher held in-depth discussions with seven (7) individuals who were 
selected because of their presumed knowledge about particular topics and issues 
within the tea sector (2), competition law (2), competition and markets economics 
(3). The inquiries were organized around a carefully considered set of questions that 
were designed to engage the informant in offering information and their opinions.  
 
Key informant interviews were also used in landscape performance tracking to 
gather information from a wide range of informants in the identified relevant markets 
that include but not limited to professionals, residents and external stakeholders who 
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have firsthand knowledge about green tea leaves business, agro markets and 
competition.  
 
4.4 Data Analysis 
4.4.1 Descriptive Analyses 
Descriptive analysis including percentages, sums, cross tabulations and means were 
employed to describe general characteristics of market participants. Data on the 
indicators of entry and exit to the business, capital and social capital needed to 
practice in a higher position within the chain were gathered based on actual position 
of the market participants and potential entrants. Diagrams and graphical plots were 
used to describe marketing channels identified from primary information collected. 
Other variables captured descriptively include social economic characteristics of 
market participants e.g. age and marital status. 
 
4.4.2 Content Analysis 
Content analysis refers to an almost boundless set of diverse research approaches and 
techniques, used in the social science domains and in the humanities to identify 
methods for studying and/or retrieving meaningful information from documents. It 
further refers to a family of techniques oriented to the study of "mute evidence" of 
texts and artifacts. The technique was successfully employed in (Mlulla, 2005) and 
also in (Ferrarra, 2010). The technique was employed in review of literature in 
identifying variables of interest in addressing the first and second objectives. 
 
4.4.3 Triangulation 
Triangulation involves using multiple data sources in an investigation to gain 
understanding. Some see triangulation as a method for corroborating findings and as 
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a test for validity.  Triangulation assumes that a weakness in one method will be 
compensated for by another method, and that it is always possible to make sense 
between different accounts.  A single method can never adequately shed light on a 
phenomenon.  Using multiple methods can help facilitate deeper understanding.  
 
Triangulation is therefore a method for validation or verification; qualitative 
researchers generally use this technique to ensure that an account is rich, robust, 
comprehensive and well-developed (O'Donoghue and Punch, 2003). This technique 
was successfully used in (Mlulla, 2003 and Mlulla, 2005). The technique was 
employed in addressing objective number three and testing the third hypothesis in 
this study whereby cross tabulations, t-test and ANOVA where used.  
 
4.4.4 Benchmarking 
A measurement of the quality of an organization's policies, products, programs, 
strategies and their comparison with standard measurements, or similar 
measurements of its peers. The objectives of benchmarking are (i) to determine what 
and where improvements are called for, (ii) to analyze how other organizations 
achieve their high performance levels, and (iii) to use this information to improve 
performance (businessdictionary.com, 2015).  
 
For this study, EWURA’s functioning and performance as reported in Mlulla, 
(2014), were chosen as a benchmark for economic regulation in lieu of competition 
in the tea sector and the identified relevant markets. The technique was employed in 
addressing objective number one and testing the first hypothesis in this study.  
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4.4.5 Competition Harm Index 
Competition Harm Index (CHI) refers to a number (as a ratio) derived from a series 
of observations and used as an indicator or measure; specifically a number or 
expression (as an exponent) associated with another indicator use or position in an 
arrangement. Based on literature, the competitive harm arising from each and every 
theory thereof was assigned a weight as provided in the Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Competition Harm Index 
Anti competitive harm  Weight (w) Assigned 
Vested interests  ≤ 1 
Vertical integration ≤ 2 
Barriers to entry  ≤ 3 
Un notified mergers ≤ 4 
Cartels ≤ 5 
Abuse of market power ≤ 5 
 
To compute the overall competition index for particular markets we add up weights 
as cumulative total. The maximum harm was rated at (5+5+4+3+2+1) = 20. In this 
case where the market would be faced with all five anticompetitive conduct at their 
maximum severity. The higher the overall score in the competition index the more 
the severity of anticompetitive harm in that particular market. means the market 
participant faced with several competition misconduct hence high market distortion.  
 
For example, the market faced with vested interest, vertical integration and barriers 
to entry allotted with competition index score of 6 (1+2+3). The weights were 
assigned based on the literature as cited in Ross, 2009 and the intensities where 
assigned based on the assessments of individual farmers in the study areas.   
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4.4.6  The Chi-Square Statistic 
The Chi-Square statistic is most commonly used to evaluate Tests of Independence 
when using a cross tabulation. Cross tabulation presents the distributions of two 
categorical variables simultaneously, with the intersections of the categories of the 
variables appearing in the cells of the table.  
 
The Test of Independence assesses whether an association exists between the two 
variables by carefully examining the pattern of responses in the cells; calculating the 
Chi-Square statistic and comparing it against a critical value from the Chi-Square 
distribution allows the researcher to assess whether the association seen between the 
variables in a particular sample is likely to represent an actual relationship between 
those variables in the population. This technique was successfully used in (Mlulla, 
2003, 2005). The technique was employed in addressing all the four objectives and 
corroborate the testing of all the four hypotheses in this study.  
 
4.4.7  Student's t-test 
A is any statistical hypothesis test in which the test statistic follows a Student's t-
distribution if the null hypothesis is supported. It can be used to determine if two sets 
of data are significantly different from each other, and is most commonly applied 
when the test statistic would follow a normal distribution if the value of a scaling 
term in the test statistic were known. This technique was successfully used in 
(Mlulla, 2003 and Mlulla, 2005). The technique was employed in addressing the 
third objective and corroborate the testing of the third hypothesis of the present 
study.  
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4.4.8  Gross Margin Analysis 
Gross margins of farmers and buyers were determined and used as a proxy variable 
for profits in this study. This model has been found to be useful where some data 
might be hard to collect e.g. profits of firms have been hardly declared by firms, also 
depreciation calculations have been difficult to obtain due to life time of fixed assets, 
appreciation and salvage values estimation problems in many firms thus 
necessitating the use of gross margins rather than profit margin analysis in this study.  
 
Gross margins for different farmer categories were estimated. Farmer categories are: 
(a) those organised in Farmers’ Groups (b) those organised in Farmers’ Associations 
(c) those Institutional Farmers (d) Individual Farmers. Gross margins of Green Tea 
Leaves buying companies were also determined. Gross Margin (GM) is obtained by 
subtracting Total Variable Cost (TVC) from Total Revenue (TR) as follows: 
GMi= TRi - TVCi 
Where; 
GM = Gross Margin of a farmer/buyer 
TR= Total Revenue of farmer /buyer 
TVC= Total Variable Cost of farmer/buyer 
 i      =  1-n    farmer/buyer 
 
Total Revenue was obtained by multiplying kilogrammes sold during the 2013/2014 
season by price of green tea leaves in (TZS) offered during the same season. Total 
Variable Costs where obtained by summing up all the variable costs the ith 
farmer/buyer incurred during the 2013/2014 season. Cost items for farmers were 
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determined by the study present as seen in the attached farmers and buyers’ 
questionnaires.  
 
The fundamental advantage of gross margin analysis as an economic analytical tool 
includes the easiness to understand, logical interrelation of economic and 
technological parameters and its forecasting ability of rational variants for the 
operational structure of an enterprise or individual farmer. Disadvantages of the 
model include its inability to take into account variations of fixed costs structure 
within and/or among enterprises and its failure to make allowance for 
complementary and supplementary relationship between farmers (Pomeroy and 
Trinad, 1995). The model was employed in addressing objectives number three and 
four and also provided an essential statistic in testing the third and fourth hypotheses 
in the present study. 
 
4.4.9  Analysis of Variance  
F-test is used for comparisons of the components of the total deviation. For example, 
in one-way or single-factor ANOVA, statistical significance is tested for by 
comparing the F test statistic (Kilem Li, 2011). 
 
Means for these different farmer categories were determined and compared using 
one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test the hypothesis that gross margins are 
the same for all farmers under different marketing channels in the relevant market. 
Successful studies that employed the model include (Philip, 2001) in a study of 
economics of medium scale sugarcane producers in Morogoro. Silomba (2000) in 
assessing performance of beans marketing in Kigoma also employed the model 
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successfully.  The model was employed in addressing objective number three and 
testing the third hypothesis in this study.  
 
4.4.10  Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price Test  
In competition law, before deciding whether companies have significant market 
power which would justify government intervention, the test of small but significant 
and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) is used to define the relevant market in 
a consistent way. It is an alternative to ad hoc determination of the relevant market 
by arguments about product similarity. The SSNIP test is crucial in competition law 
cases accusing abuse of dominance and in approving or blocking mergers. 
Competition regulating authorities and other actuators of anti-trust law intend to 
prevent market failure caused by cartel, oligopoly, monopoly, or other forms of 
market dominance (Scherer, 2009). 
 
The SSNIP test seeks to identify the smallest relevant market within which a 
hypothetical monopolist or cartel could impose a profitable significant increase in 
price. The relevant market consists of a "catalogue" of goods and/or services which 
are considered substitutes by the customer. Such a catalogue is considered "worth 
monopolising" if should only one single supplier provided it, that supplier could 
profitably increase its price without its customers turning away and choosing other 
goods and services from other suppliers (Scherer, 2009).  
 
The application of the SSNIP test involves interviewing consumers regarding buying 
decisions and determining whether a hypothetical monopolist or cartel could profit 
from a price increase of 5% for at least one year (assuming that "the terms of sale of 
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all other products are held constant"). If sufficient numbers of buyers are likely to 
switch to alternative products and the lost sales would make such price increase 
unprofitable, then the hypothetical market should not be considered a relevant market 
for the basis of litigation or regulation.  
 
Therefore another, larger, basket of products is proposed for a hypothetical 
monopolist to control and the SSNIP test is performed on that relevant market 
(Scherer, 2009). The model was employed in addressing objective number one and 
two and testing the first and second hypotheses in the current study. 
 
4.4.11 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  
The HHI is a measure of market concentration. HHI is an indicator of 
anticompetitive behaviour among firms in an industry. It is calculated by summing 
the squares of the individual firms’ market shares, and thus gives proportionately 
greater weight to the larger market shares. The HHI ranges from 10,000 to a number 
approaching zero.  
 
The HHI of 10,000 shows that the market is characterized by a single seller i.e. 
monopoly market. On the other hand the HHI close to zero indicate that the market is 
nearly perfect competitive. The HHI thresholds are provided to cater for competition 
issues that revolve around market power, mostly mergers and abuse of dominance 
(U. S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010). HHI is 
however often used to assess concentration markets in general as it is the case for 
this study.  The thresholds are as presented in Table:    
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Table 6: Description of HHI Thresholds and Effects to Competition 
Degree of 
Market 
Concentration 
Post Merger HHI Market Competition Effects 
Un 
concentrated 
HHI<1500 
Markets are unlikely to have adverse 
competition effects. 
Moderately 
Concentrated  
1500<HHI<2500; 
and delta HHI<100 
Markets are unlikely to have adverse 
competition consequences. 
1500<HHI<2500; 
and delta HHI>100 
Markets are raising a potential for significant 
competition concerns. 
Highly 
Concentrated 
HHI>2500; and 
delta HHI <100 
Markets are unlikely to have adverse 
competitive consequences. 
HHI>2500; and 
100<delta HHI 
<200 
Markets are raising a potential for significant 
competition concerns.  
HHI>2500; and 
delta HHI >200 
Markets likely to create or enhance market 
power or facilitate its exercise. 
Data Source: U. S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010 
 
4.4.12 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Cost benefit Analysis (CBA) refers to an approach to making economic decisions 
whereby the analysis helps analyst to appraise, or assess the case for a project, 
programme or policy proposal. The process involves, whether explicitly or 
implicitly, weighing the total expected costs against the total expected benefits of 
one or more actions in order to choose the best or most profitable option (Ferrara, 
2010). Cost–benefit analysis is often used by governments to evaluate the desirability 
of a given intervention. It is heavily used in today's government. It is an analysis of 
the cost effectiveness of different alternatives in order to see whether the benefits 
outweigh the costs. The aim is to gauge the efficiency of the intervention relative to 
the status quo (Ferrara, 2010). This methodology was employed in evaluating 
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scenarios that which require rule of reason i.e. the benefits to the public resulting 
from the merger/agreement outweigh the detriments caused by preventing, 
restraining or distorting competition in the relevant market. The model was 
employed in addressing objective number one and two and testing the first and 
second hypothesis in this study.  
 
4.4.13 Regression Analysis 
The theory behind regression models provide that linear regression, estimates the 
coefficients of the linear equation, involving one or more independent variables that 
best predict the value of the dependent variable. The regression model was employed 
to address the fourth objective.  
 
According to Strutz, (2010), Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is a technique for 
estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model. GLS can be used to 
perform linear regression when there is a certain degree of correlation between the 
explanatory variables (independent variables) of the regression. In these cases, 
ordinary least squares and weighted least squares can be statistically inefficient, or 
even give misleading inferences (Strutz, 2010).  
 
GLS technique was used in estimation because of the nature of its dependent variable 
(Gross Margins) being non probabilistic and having a normal distribution. Gross 
Margins were used as a proxy for pro competition functioning (performance) of the 
market. As farmers seek to raise their incomes from the green tea leaves business in 
their respective relevant markets on one hand and the Government seeks to ensure 
that the markets also work to the advantage of the same farmers; it follows therefore 
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that a common denominator for the two farmer and Government can be arrived at in 
Gross margins thus the reason for its choice as a proxy measure for pro competition 
functioning of the market. The estimated parameters were also having logical signs 
proving further that the model had no severe multicollinearity after the corrections. 
The other common problem (inherent) with cross sectional data is heteroskedasticity, 
which makes the t values small due to large variances, the researcher transformed the 
variables in the model into natural logarithm form so as to take care of the inherent 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
Both spatial and non-spatial factors were included in the model. Spatial variables 
included distance of the farm to green tea leaves buying centre and time taken from 
the farm to the green tea leaves buying center. Non-spatial variables include, age of 
green tea leaves farmers, duration of training on skills for green tea leaves farming, 
distance from the farm to the green tea leaves buying centre, time taken to get to the 
green tea leaves buying centre from the farm, distance from the farm to the green tea 
leaves buying centre, years of experience in green tea leaves farming, dummy for 
farmers’ ownership in the processing plant, number of mature green tea leaves trees 
in the tea farm and dummy for competition issues found in the relevant markets.  
Specification of the model is as hereunder: 
GM =  (A, S, D, T, C, E, O, N, C) …………………………………………… (1) 
GM  =  Gross Margin (Performance) 
A = Age of green tea leaves farmer 
S          =  Duration of training on skills for green tea leaves farming 
D = Distance from the farm to the green tea leaves buying centre 
 
 
 
108 
M         =  Dummy for the marketing channel for which the green tea leaves are sold 
T = Time taken to get to the green tea leaves buying centre from the farm 
E = Years of experience in green tea leaves farming 
O = Dummy for farmers’ ownership in the processing plant   
N = Number of mature green tea leaves trees in the tea farm 
C =  Index for competition issues found in the relevant markets  
 
In analyzing the factors affecting pro-competition functioning of the identified 
relevant markets, the following empirical model was estimated using Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) estimator. 
 
… (2) 
Where 
  - represent elasticity of parameters to be estimated. 
  -  represent individual farmer ( =1, 2,………….., 180). 
 - is a random error term capturing all other factors that influences the Gross  
     Margin but not included the model. 
 
As the right hand side includes several variables both spatial and non-spatial factors, 
the model permits the multivariate analysis required to analyze the intricate 
relationships between these explanatory variables and farmers gross margins. 
 
Detailed description for each and every variable used in the specified model above 
and their anticipated signs is as provided hereunder: 
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(i) Age of green tea leaves farmer  
Age of exporter was thought to be of significant influence since it could bear an 
element of decision-making and aggressiveness of labour offered by the participant 
in the course of trading. For these reasons, the researcher decided to include it in the 
model. It is expected that the variable would bear a negative sign implying that as 
age advances the gross margins would decline. 
 
(ii) Duration of training on skills for green tea leaves farming  
Skills are practical ability to perform a certain job an individual acquires after a 
period of training. It is expected that the longer the training the more efficient an 
individual becomes and it would be reflected in the earnings one gets from whatever 
one does. The expected sign is positive. 
 
(iii) Time taken to get to the green tea leaves buying centre from the farm  
This would reflect the picking and loading expenses that incurred by farmers through 
the price the producer receives from the buyer. It is predicted that the longer it takes 
to get the green tea leaves buying centre the higher the cost and thus the lower green 
tea leaves farmers’ gross margin. The variable tries to assess how remoteness of the 
farm affects the gross margin of the respective green tea leaves farmers. The variable 
is expected to bear a negative sign. 
 
(i) Distance from the farm to the green tea leaves buying centre  
This would reflect the picking and loading expenses that incurred by farmers through 
the price the producer receives from the buyer. It is predicted that the longer distance 
to the green tea leaves buying centre the higher the cost accruing to the green tea 
 
 
 
110 
leaves farmer and thus the lower green tea leaves farmers’ gross margin. The 
variable tries to assess how remoteness of the farm affects the gross margin of the 
respective green tea leaves farmers. The variable is expected to bear a negative sign. 
 
(ii) Dummy for the marketing channel for which the green tea leaves are sold  
In the study areas there are nine different marketing channels identified for which 
green tea leaves are sold out to both domestic and international markets. The 
presumption is such that all the nine different market channels do result in different 
gross margins to farmers. Invariably, there are those marketing channels that results 
in bigger gross margins to green tea leaves farmers that the others. In this regard, the 
variable has value 1 “if the marketing channel results in bigger gross margins to 
green tea leaves farmers” and 0 “if otherwise”. The two groups (marketing channel 
resulting in bigger gross margins to green tea leaves farmers and otherwise) were 
identified by the green tea leaves farmers themselves during the study.  The variable 
is expected to bear positive sign. 
 
(iii) Years of experience in green tea leaves farming  
This variable aims at capturing the effect of experience of farming on gross margins 
of the producers. It is presumed that the more experienced the producer is the more 
efficient he is and thus realize big gross margin, for this case the variable is expected 
to bear a positive sign. 
 
(vii) Dummy for farmers’ ownership in the processing plant  
A dummy variable for the farmers’ ownership in the green tea leaves processing 
plant with 1 “for those farmers with ownership in the green tea leaves processing 
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plant” and 0 “for otherwise”. It is presumed that those farmers who own a stake in 
the upper value chain that is in the green tea leaves processing plants are having 
bigger gross margins than those who do not have any ownership in green tea leaves 
processing plants. The variable is expected to bear a positive sign. 
 
(viii) Number of mature green tea leaves trees in the tea farm  
The number of mature trees was used as proxy variable for farm size, it was thought 
that the productivity of the farm depended more on the number of trees present in the 
farm than the farm size. The higher the numbers of mature trees the higher the gross 
margins. The variable was expected to bear a positive sign.  
 
(ix) Index for competition issues identified in the relevant markets  
A continuous variable representing the score for competition issues found in the 
identified relevant markets in terms of anticompetitive agreements between buyers, 
misuse of market power or abuse of dominance and anti-competitive mergers. The 
study had also investigated on possible barriers to entry into the identified relevant 
markets and vested interests as non-enforcement anticompetitive issues. It is 
presumed that those relevant markets where green tea leaves farmers reported 
anticompetitive issues (either enforcement or non-enforcement); those green tea 
leaves farmers are having smaller gross margins than those who did not report 
anticompetitive issues (either enforcement or non-enforcement). The variable is 
expected to bear a negative sign. 
 
(x) Gross Margin  
This is a continuous variable independent variable that represents performance of 
every farmer that was a sampled in this study. For all those dependent variables 
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which increased the margin they bear a positive sign and those that bear a negative 
sign means that the variable decreased the gross margin. The model was employed in 
addressing objective number four and testing the fourth hypothesis in this study. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents findings and insights to the findings of the study. The first 
section deals with the socio economic characteristics of the green tea leaves farmers 
and the description of the study areas. The second section deals with the legal 
framework providing for competition issues in the Tea sector and its markets.  The 
third section reports on the identified relevant markets and anti-competitive conducts 
in the Tea sector particularly in the identified relevant markets as per the competition 
assessment framework. The fourth section addresses the issue of performance of the 
identified relevant markets in the competition assessment framework perspective. 
The last section identifies and discusses factors affecting pro competition functioning 
of the identified relevant markets in the Tanzanian Tea sector.  
 
5.1.1 Description of the Tea Sector  
Table 7: Distribution of Farmers and Cultivated Area by Tea Growing Districts 
S/N District Number of Farmers Cultivated Area (Hectares) 
1. Rungwe 15,233 3,237.20 
2. Njombe 5,441 3,703.50 
3. Ludewa 234 42.57 
4. Mufindi 1,552 1,500.00 
5. Kilolo 306 78.60 
6. Korogwe 1,882 612.48 
7. Lushoto 3,908 1,950.86 
8. Muheza 393 292.18 
9. Tarime 481 46.91 
10. Muleba 64 60.20 
11. Bukoba 255 114.16 
Total 29,749 11,638.66 
Data Source: Tea Board of Tanzania (2015) 
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The tea sector is subdivided into 11 different tea growing districts as shown in Table 
7.  There are 29,758 farmers who cultivate a total area of 11,638.66 hectares. The 
three selected districts of Rungwe, Mufindi and Muheza (the study areas) constitute 
57.8 % of the farmers and 43.2 % of the total area under green leaf tea cultivation in 
Tanzania.  
 
5.1.2  Description of Market Participants in the Study Areas 
Table 8: Results of Distribution of Farmers by Age in the Identified Relevant 
Markets 
 Sample Distribution by Age group (%) 
 Age Groups Mufindi Muheza Rungwe Total 
20-29 1.8 0.6 1.2 3.6 
30-39 3.6 4.2 3.0 10.8 
40-49 5.4 9.0 16.2 30.5 
50-59 11.4 9.6 4.2 25.1 
60-69 6.0 5.4 4.2 15.6 
70-79 3.6 3.0 5.4 12.0 
80+ 1.2 0.6 0.6 2.4 
 Total  32.9 32.3 34.7 100.0 
 
In terms of ownership of the green tea leaves farms, results in Table 8 show that the 
age group of 40 - 49 years is the dominant with 30.5 % followed by that of 50-59 
years. This finding explains the fact that ownership is a subject of longevity in life is 
required to acquire the necessary financial resources to own land and thus cultivate 
green tea leaves in the study areas. Furthermore, it is observed that the results were 
independent of districts the responses came from (p>0.05, х2 value= 0.251) implying 
that the response is common to all green tea leaves farmers irrespective of their tea 
buying districts in the study. 
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Results show that Rungwe had the most experienced farmers in all the study areas 
followed by Muheza and Mufindi. This is explained by the fact that Rungwe was 
among the first areas that tea was established in Tanzania (since 1904), and thus the 
explanation on the high number of farmers as well. Much as Muheza is also an old 
timer in green tea leaves business, its performance has been halted by a number of 
reasons. 
 
According to key informant findings, presence of alternative crops which pay more 
than tea like, cardamon, cinnamon, cloves, black pepper, sugar cane and banana have 
to a great extent contributed to the decline of tea in the relevant market. These crops 
pay more compared to green leaves tea for example when you compare 1 
kilogramme of cloves sells between TZS 18,000 and 25,000 as compared to 1kg of 
green tea leaves which sells at TZS 176. Cardamon sells between TZS 12,000 and 
18,000 per kg as a result green tea leaves farmers prefer them for green tea leaves. In 
some cases it has even resulted into crop switch i.e. uprooting tea trees and replacing 
the same with the said alternative crops. 
 
Table 9: Results on Distribution of Farmers by Education Level 
  Distribution of Producers by Education Level (%) 
Districts None Primary Education Secondary Education Tertiary Level Total 
Mufindi 3.4 24.7 3.4 0.0 31.6 
Muheza 0.0 31.0 2.9 0.0 33.9 
Rungwe 2.9 24.1 2.3 5.2 34.5 
Total 6.3 79.9 8.6 5.2 100.0 
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Results on Table 9 show that the most (79.9%) of the green tea farmers were 
educated to Primary school level implying that they could read, count and write to be 
able to run a green tea leaves farming enterprise.  Furthermore, it is observed that the 
results were independent of districts the responses came from (p>0.05, х2 value = 
22.3) implying that the response is common to all green tea leaves farmers 
irrespective of their tea buying districts in the study.  
 
5.1.3 Socio-economic Characteristics of the Farmers 
Mufindi had the largest mean acreage followed by Rungwe and Muheza at 4.76, 1.58 
and 3.15 acres respectively as shown on Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Results on Distribution of Farmers by Key Social Economic 
Characteristics  
 Districts 
  Mufindi Muheza Rungwe Mean 
Farm acreage 4.76 1.58 3.15 3.16 
Acreage with matured tea 4.80 1.57 3.00 3.09 
Acreage with immature tea 0.93 0.63 0.13 0.27 
Number of mature trees in the farm 18453.00 8976.00 12210.00 11728.00 
Number of immature trees 3950.00 1375.00 466.53 814.21 
Vacant percentage in the farm 11.22 6.40 4.39 6.54 
 
This is explained by the fact that green tea leaves farming in Muheza is 
predominantly done in estates and as per key informant interview findings there are 
more paying alternative cash crops in the area that make tea a non priority to farmers.  
 
Table 11: Results for Responses on Farmer’s Conduct in Changing Buyers by 
Districts 
District How often do you change the buyer you trade with 
and/or into contract with (%) 
 Total  
  very often  very rare never   
Mufindi 
Muheza 
Rungwe 
 0 
0 
3 
 28 
34 
15             
5 
0 
16 
 33 
34 
33 
Total  3  76 21  100 
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Furthermore, it is observed in Table 11 that the results were dependent of districts 
the responses came from (p<0.01, х2value =56.0) implying that the response is 
common to all green tea leaves farmers irrespective of their tea buying districts in the 
study. This is explained by the fact that in Rungwe the largest buyer (WATCO) has a 
unique feature of having farmers owning shares in the processing plant thus their 
preference to the company as compared to the rest of the farmers in all the three 
identified relevant markets. Invariably, the same Rungwe farmers are the ones that 
responded never in bigger quantum (16%) as compared to the rest of farmers.   
 
Table 12: Distance and Time taken from the Farm to Buying Centers 
Districts Average Time Taken (in minutes) Average Distances (in meters) 
Mufindi 46.4 658.1 
Muheza 19.8 1327.9 
Rungwe 18.3 221.8 
Total 24.58108 747.025 
 
 
Results in Table 12 show that Muheza had both the longest distance to time ratio to 
reach to the buying centre as compare to the other two relevant markets. Since green 
tea leaves are a low value bulky commodity, the transportation cost is a factor that 
might hamper the performance of the green tea leaves farmers in this relevant 
market.  
 
5.2 The Legal and Regulatory Framework in the Identified Relevant 
Markets of the Tea Sector  
The first hypothesis to be tested was based on the premise that the legal framework 
in the tea sector and its resulting value chain is inadequate to provide for competitive 
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market dynamics in the identified relevant markets. The discussion will focus on 
value chain in the identified relevant markets, key market players in the value chain, 
the discovery of indicative and actual green tea leaves prices, the missing link 
between the FCA and the TIA on Provision of Adequate Oversight in the relevant 
markets.  
 
5.2.1 Legal Framework and its Resulting Value Chain in the Identified 
Relevant Markets 
The provisions shaping the value chain in the identified in the literature review and 
in particular Regulation 12 (1) provides that 
 “A grower shall not sell green leaf tea to a tea processing factory 
unless he has been registered by the Board pursuant to Regulation 
11”. 
 
Regulation 12 (2) provides that  
“A person shall not deal with a grower in either buying green 
leaves from him or any activity related to tea industry unless such 
grower has been registered by the Board”.  
 
Regulation 16 (1) (d) provides that 
 “Before any person is registered as a grower, he shall be required 
to satisfy the Board that the tea field is located within a radius not 
exceeding 40 km from the tea processing factory, provided 
however, where the distance exceeds 40 km the tea buyer provides 
proof satisfactory to the Board that he is able to transport and 
deliver tea to the processing factory”.  
 
Schedule One of the Tea Regulation in its Form 2 Green Leaf Tea Buying License in 
the 13th Terms and Conditions For Green Leaf Tea Buying Licence provides that  
“Every buyer should enter into sales contract with any grower for 
minimum period of one year on such terms and conditions as the 
parties may agree upon and no buyer should enter into a sale 
contract with a grower who has another contract with another 
buyer”.  
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Regulation 3 provide for the following important definitions that are of interest to the 
study: 
 “Grower” includes an individual grower, cooperative society, association or 
company cultivating tea and registered by the Board.  
 
“Green leaf buyer” means a person, association or company licensed by the Board to 
buy green leaves from a registered grower for processing into made tea using his 
own processing factory.  
 
“tea buyer” means a tea blender or packer licensed to buy made tea from local tea 
processors for blending and packing. 
 
“tea dealer” for the purpose of registration includes a grower, processor, blender and 
packer, exporter and importer of tea. 
 
The above provisions have culminated into a value chain as described in Figure 7. 
This study is based on the upstream part of the value chain which involves the 
growers in particular the green tea leaf smallholder farmers, and the green tea leaf 
buyer cum green tea leaf processor cum made tea manufacturer. The study went 
further into sale of made tea in one aspect of buyer’s gross margins only as it is 
deemed to indirectly affect the gross margins of the small holder farmers.     
 
The foregoing provisions have restricted both the farmers and the buyers from 
growing, selling or buying of green tea leaves if not registered a tea dealer and 
outside the radius of 40 kilometers from a tea processing factory. It is also important 
to note that a green leaf buyer other than themselves being registered thus being 
restricted, but more grievous is the fact that the Board requires them to buy green 
leaves from a registered grower for processing into made tea using his own 
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processing factory. This means, there is a statutory enjoinment of green leaf growing 
and processing as according to the study findings, over 90 % of the green tea leaves 
buyers are also large green tea leaves growers. Invariably, the contract farming 
arrangement as provided in the 13th term of the green tea leaves buyer’s license 
restrict not only the small holder farmers’ choice to sell their produce but also ties 
them down with one buyer for at least a year; although key informant interview 
findings have shown that farmers in the relevant markets seldom change buyers they 
have engaged with at the start of their green tea leaves business unless assigned by 
the earlier buyer to the current buyer.  
 
The presence of these two provisions in the tea sector legal framework have 
foreclosed the all the three relevant markets and thus violate the basic assumption of 
free entry and exist into a market that characterises perfect competitive market model 
as discussed in Koutsoyiannis (1985). Equivocally, the assumption on the existence 
of many buyers and many sellers as reported in Koutsoyiannis (1985) has also been 
violated as witnessed by the fact that the relevant markets had an average of two to 
three buyers who engage with an average of 5,726 registered farmers (Tea Board of 
Tanzania, 2011).  This is not withstanding the mutually reinforcing detraction that 
the 13th term in the green tea leaves buyers license throw into the competitive 
landscape as explained above.  
 
The anticompetitive harm that usually result from violation of the said assumption is 
usually reflected in two key competition aspects of price and other non-price terms 
of trade/business; of particular interest to this study is the price of green tea leaves 
offered to green tea leaves farmers yearly and create a perpetual problem in the tea 
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sector. Invariably, it has taken social and political dimensions at greater heights to 
warrant it being referred to as unresolved phenomena.  This was discussed in details 
from legal, economic and best practice aspects as hereunder provided.  
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Figure 7: Green Tea Leaf Value Chain in Tanzania 
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5.2.1.1 Key Market Players in the Value Chain  
Based on the available information at the Tanzania Tea Board, the registered tea 
manufacturing ccompanies are Uniliver Tea Tanzania Limited (UTTL) which own 3 
factories in Mufindi namely Lugoda, Kilima and Kibwela. Kisigo Tea Company 
Limited who own 1 factory in Mufindi and Kiganga Tea Factory. Mufindi Tea and 
Coffee Limited (MTC) who own 4 factories namely Itona Tea factory in Mufindi and 
Ikanga Tea Factory, Kilena Tea Factory and Luponde Tea Factory all in Njombe.  
 
Wakulima Tea Company Limited (WATCO) who own 2 factories in Rungwe 
namely Katumba and Mwakaleli. Kagera Tea Company Limited who own 1 Factory 
called BKD Maruku Tea Factory. Mohamed Enterprises Limited (MeTL) who own 3 
factories namely Arc Mountain Tea Factory and Dindira Tea Factory in Korogwe 
and Chivanjee Tea Factory in Rungwe. Bombay Burmah Trading Company (BBTC) 
who own two Factories namely, Marvera Tea Factory in Muheza and Herkulu Tea 
Factory in Lushoto.  East Usambara Tea Company Limited (EUTCO) which owns 
two factories namely Kwamkoro and Bulwa in Muheza. Mponde Tea Company 
Limited which owns 1 Factory called Mponde Tea Factory in Lushoto which is 
currently not operational since May 2014.  Lastly, Dhow Merchantile Limited which 
own 1 factory in Lupembe Njombe, the factory has not been operational since 2008.  
 
With regards to blenders, there Chai Bora Limited in Mafinga (Mufindi); BK Tea 
Blenders in Bukoba (Yetu Chai).  International Food Packers Limited in Tanga (Chai 
Amani). Chai Leo Limited, Tanzan Tea Blenders Limited (Chai Asili); Promasidor 
Company Limited (Chai Jaba), Kyimbila Tea Blenders Limited (Chai Tausi), Afri 
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Tea and Coffee (1967) Blenders Limited (formerly known as Tanzania tea Blenders 
Limited), Al- quam Tea Blenders (My Gold Tea) Limited in Dar es Salaam.  
 
With regards to the made tea that the above mentioned buyers process, it was learnt 
that it is either (ungraded tea) which is known as DMT (Dry Mouth Tea) or graded 
tea with the following grades.   
 
 1. BP - Broken Pekoe 
(Primary) 2. PF - Pekoe Funnings 
1st grades 3. PD - Pekoe Dust 
 4. D  - Dust 
 
(Secondary) 
2nd grades 5.  BMF - Broken Mixed Funnings 
 6. FNGS - Funnings 
 
 
5.2.2 The Discovery of Indicative and Actual Green Tea Leaves Prices  
Regulation 49 (1) provides that “The Board shall, after consultation with other 
stakeholders, set indicative price for buying green leaf tea for each year which shall 
be used as a minimum price. Key informant interviews have revealed that in practice 
the different sects of stakeholders do hold their own caucus to deliberate and agree 
on a common position with regards to the indicative price. Green tea leaves buyers 
through their Trade Association called Tea Association of Tanzania have been doing 
this annually under the auspices of the Tea Act and Regulation prior to Stakeholders 
Meetings. The issue of concern here is the fact that these green tea leaves buyers are 
competitors who meet to discuss and agree on a price to be offered to sellers (green 
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tea leaf farmers). According to Key informant findings, this is construed to mean that 
the Tea Industry Act and Regulation 55 (e) of the Tea Regulations, 2010 have 
statutorily empowered the green tea leaves buyers to agree to fix a price contrary to 
section 9 (1) (a) of the FCA which provides that “A person shall not make or give 
effect to an agreement if the
 
object, effect or likely effect of the agreement is price 
fixing between competitors”.  
 
Furthermore, key informant interviews findings based on the benchmark as provided 
by Arora and Sarkar (2008) have shown that the relevant markets in this study are 
haunted by a very high likelihood of occurrence of anticompetitive agreements 
commonly known as cartels which is a grievous offense from a competition 
perspective, as shall be demonstrated hereunder. Table 13 summarises the findings.  
 
Table 13: Results on the Impact of Market Factors on Cartel Sustainability in 
the Relevant Markets 
SN Factor Impact on 
Cartel 
Sustainability 
Presence in the 
Tanzania Tea 
Sector 
Commentary 
1 Small number of 
firms 
Positive Yes very few buying firms (2 to 3 in a 
relevant market)  
2 High concentration Positive Yes The HHI for Rungwe is 6415.12 
The HHI for Mufindi is 5472.72 
The HHI for Muheza is 8924.9 
Markets likely to create or enhance 
market power or facilitate its 
exercise. 
3 Similar cost 
functions of firms 
Positive Yes. Costs are determined in the 
Stakeholders Meeting pursuant to 
Regulation 55 (e) of the Tea 
Regulations, 2010 in which the 
price build up encompasses cost 
thus affording firms having similar 
cost functions.     
4 High entry and exit 
barriers 
Positive Yes. Requirement provided in 
Regulation 3 that “Green leaf 
buyer” shall buy green leaves from 
a registered grower for processing 
into made tea using his own 
processing factory erects a 
significant regulatory barrier.  
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5 Trade association Positive Yes. The green tea leaves buyers who 
are also green tea leaves processors 
and made sellers are organised in an 
association known as Tea 
Association of Tanzania. 
6 Mutual trust Positive Yes. The green tea leaves buyers who 
are also green tea leaves processors 
and made sellers are organised in an 
association known as Tea 
Association of Tanzania. 
7 Homogeneous 
goods 
Positive Yes. The green tea leaves are the same 
irrespective of where they are 
grown and are not graded.  
8 Market 
transparency 
Positive Yes. The green tea leaves buyers who 
are also green tea leaves processors 
and made sellers are organised in an 
association known as Tea 
Association of Tanzania. Moreover 
Regulation 66 (1) provides sharing 
of sensitive information such as 
price and volumes of trade.   
9 Threat of legal 
sanctions 
Negative No. Neither the Act nor the Regulations 
have created competition offences. 
Rule 67 has provided for general 
offences light penalties of fines of 
not less than TZS 500,000 or   or to 
a term of imprisonment not 
exceeding twelve months or to both 
such fine and imprisonment. 
10 Large powerful 
buyer 
 
Negative No.  
11 Demand 
fluctuations 
Negative No. Influenced by the buyers. 
 
Furthermore, with regards to Regulation 49 (2) which provide that “Notwithstanding 
the provisions of sub regulation (1), negotiations for the establishment of the actual 
price of green leaf tea in a respective tea growing area shall be done by tea growers 
through their associations or co-operative societies and buyers”. Regulation 49 (3) 
provides that “The actual price arrived at under sub regulation (2) shall not be below 
the minimum price”; Key informant finding have shown that seldom do the green tea 
leaves buyers differentiate the Actual price from the Indicative price in the relevant 
markets. This is equivalent to saying that in practice the indicative price is often the 
actual price that green tea leaves farmers end up getting season after season thus 
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rendering Regulation 49 (2) less effective if not redundant in the absence of its 
proper management.   
 
Further examinations of the growers’ category show that there are small holder 
farmers (who are the focus of the study) and estates (growers with over 200 
hectares). The study findings have shown that all (100%) green tea leaves buyers 
also grow green tea leaves for their factories as well as per Regulation 3 of the Tea 
Regulations, 2010. Literal interpretation of the Regulation 49 (1) in this context is 
that smallholder green tea leaves growers, green tea leaves buyers who are also 
processors and manufacturers of made tea do meet, discuss and agree on indicative 
price that is eventually set by the Board pursuant to Regulation 55 (e) of the Tea 
Regulations, 2010.  
 
Key informant interview findings have given insights that the green tea leaves 
indicative price formula has three key variables and their explanations as given 
hereunder: 
 
(a) Made Tea Price 
 What price did tea processing factories obtained by selling made tea in the market 
i.e. both local and export. 
 
(b) Out-turn Ratios 
How much of the green leaf from farmers was used to produce made tea sold by the 
tea processing factories. Production coefficients i.e. input-output proportions which 
is currently given as 4.5 kilograms of green tea leaves produces 1 kilogram of made 
tea.  
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(c) Farmers’ Share 
How much of the market price should the farmer get by selling green leaf to the tea 
processing factory? Farmers should get at least X% of the made tea price achieved 
by the factory that they supply green leaf.  
 
The fact that green tea leaves buyers are also growers of green tea leaves raises a 
reasonable suspicions that they are market player with an advantage of knowing both 
the growing, buying and selling, processing of green tea leaves let alone the selling 
of made tea they produce which eventually impact on the indicative price of green 
tea leaves. Furthermore, key informant findings have revealed that green tea leaves 
farmers through their associations do not have an equivocal access to the information 
that buyers possess regarding their upper value chain part of the green tea leaves 
business. This raises an issue of violation of a basic assumption of a perfectly 
competitive market model on information symmetry.    
 
The same findings are from a competition perspective, construed to amount to an 
abuse of dominance issue of vertical integration backwards of the green tea leave 
buyers/processors in the value chain that arises and ought to be addressed either 
directly by the Tea Industry Act or indirectly through reference of such issues to the 
relevant law and the authority established therefrom that is the Fair Competition Act.   
 
Despite all this evidence of existence of threats of two core anticompetitive matters, 
the framework composed of the Fair Competition Act No. 8 of 2003 and its Fair 
Competition Commission Rules of Procedure, 2013 together with the Tea Industry 
Act of 2009 (as amended) and its Tea Regulations, 2010 do not provide for clarity on 
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handling of competition issues in the sector hence it inadequacy. The following sub 
topic moves to explain on this missing link.  
 
5.2.3 The Missing Link between the FCA and the TIA on Provision of 
Adequate Oversight 
It is true that both competition law and policy on one side and economic regulation 
aim at defending the public interest against monopoly power.  It has been observed 
Section 96 (2) of the FCA provide that “A person shall not contravene the FCA by 
reason only of engaging in a conduct, unless a provision of an enactment specified in 
sub-section (3): (a) requires the person to engage in the conduct or conduct of that 
kind; or (b) authorizes or approves the person engaging or refraining from engaging 
in conduct of that kind.  
 
Section 96 (3) provide that “The enactments referred to in sub-section (2) are: 
EWURA Act, 2001 SUMATRA Act, 2001 the Tanzania Communications 
Regulatory Authority Act, 2003 the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority Act, 2003 and 
sector legislation referred to in the sector legislation, enactments for the protection of 
the environment; and, any subsidiary legislation or instrument under any of the 
aforementioned Acts”. 
 
For ease of understanding the relevant provisions of subsections 2 and 3 are read 
together as follows  “A person shall not contravene the FCA by reason only of 
engaging in a conduct, unless a provision of EWURA Act, 2001 SUMATRA Act, 
2001 the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, 2003 the Tanzania 
Civil Aviation Authority Act, 2003 and sector legislation referred to in the sector 
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legislation (a) requires the person to engage in the conduct or conduct of that kind; or 
(b) authorizes or approves the person engaging or refraining from engaging in 
conduct of that kind”.  
 
From the theory of competition and market regulation as reported by Taimoon 
(1999) it is an established fact that activities that entail economic regulation include 
(a) adopting cost based measures to control monopoly pricing (b) granting and 
policing licenses to eligible providers and (c) setting output prices and other terms of 
sale. These activities are done by EWURA, SUMATRA, TCRA and TCAA based on 
the fact that Economic regulation applies to sectors where structural conditions are 
such that competition is either non-existent or inherently limited to the extent that 
consumer welfare would in fact be damaged in the absence of regulatory intervention 
(Taimoon, 1999). 
 
It is indeed true that in the relevant markets in this study, competition is either non-
existent or inherently limited to the extent that consumer welfare would in fact be 
damaged; so in the course of ensuring markets are free of anticompetitive 
disruptions, the Legislature through amendment to the Tea Act in 2009 introduced 
section 5 (i) to provide for the promotion and protection of interests of farmers 
against syndicates of buyers, which may be formed through associations. Invariably 
the Legislature enacted section 5 and 26 of the Tea Act read together with Regulation 
49 (1) of the Tea regulations to provide for alternative way of price discovery other 
than competition (forces of supply and demand).  
 
It follows therefore that, these provisions were meant to cater for statutory legal 
requirements to provide for a pro competition environment in the relevant markets. 
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Before commenting and concluding on the same, it is important to make reference to 
selected legislation that have been enacted to ensure existence of contestable markets 
in their sector.  
 
Section 24 of the Petroleum Act (2009) expressly referred competition issues such as 
cartels (anti-competitive agreements), abuse of dominant position, attempts to 
control prices, barriers to entry and all other Restrictive Trade Practices have been 
referred to the FCA and are to be handled by the FCC in the event of their 
occurrence. 
 
Invariably, section 38 (2) and (3) of the EWURA Act (2003) provides for a 
mechanism where the Commissioner for Fair Competition is of the opinion that any 
conduct required, authorised or approved by the Authority (EWURA) (a) would be 
in breach of the Fair Competition Act; and (b) the conduct is against the public 
interest, the Commissioner shall report the matter to the Minister responsible for 
EWURA. Where the Minister receives a report from the Commissioner for Fair 
Competition he may direct the Authority to take the necessary steps to ensure that the 
conduct described by the Commissioner is not required, authorised or approved by 
the Authority (EWURA).  
 
Furthermore, both the EWURA Act in sections 29 and 38 and the Petroleum Act in 
section 52 provide for appeals of EWURA’s decisions to be made at the Fair 
Competition Tribunal (FCT) which is the FCC’s decision appellant body as well. 
Key informant findings have shown that there is a case involving Oil Marketing 
Companies with their trade association Tanzania Oil Marketing Companies 
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(TAOMAC) that have been referred to the FCC through the said provision of the 
Petroleum Act. This demonstrates a legal and regulatory framework and mechanism 
that ensures is adequately providing for a sector where structural conditions are such 
that competition is either non-existent or inherently limited to the extent that 
consumer welfare would in fact be damaged in the absence of regulatory intervention 
as provided by Taimoon (1999) with resulting value chain which is adequate to 
provide for competitive market dynamics in its identified relevant markets.  
 
The price discovery mechanism under the EWURA Act is as provided in section 17 
(2) of the EWURA Act to the effect that “In making any determination, setting rates 
and charges or establishing the method for regulating such rates and charges, the 
Authority shall take into account– (a) the costs of making, producing and supplying 
the goods or services; (b) the return on assets in the regulated sector; (c) any relevant 
benchmarks including international benchmarks for prices, costs and return on assets 
in comparable industries; (d) the financial implications of the determination; (e) the 
desirability of establishing maximum rates and charges, and in carrying out regular 
reviews of rates and charges; (f) any other factors specified in the relevant sector 
legislation; (g) the consumer and investor interest; and (h) the desire to promote 
competitive rates and attract market; (i) any other factors the Authority considers 
relevant. (3) The Authority shall publish in the Government Gazette all the rates, 
tariffs and charges regulated by the Board”. 
 
In comparison to the price discovery mechanism as provided in the Tea Regulations 
whereby Regulation 49 (1) provides that “The Board shall, after consultation with 
other stakeholders, set indicative price for buying green leaf tea for each year which 
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shall be used as a minimum price. Regulation 49 (2) provides that “Notwithstanding 
the provisions of sub regulation (1), negotiations for the establishment of the actual 
price of green leaf tea in a respective tea growing area shall be done by tea growers 
through their associations or co-operative societies and buyers”. Regulation 49 (3) 
provides that “The actual price arrived at under sub regulation (2) shall not be below 
the minimum price”.  
 
The general observation is that the pricing formula for green tea leaves as earlier 
discussed is not as detailed as would be in other economically regulated sector such 
as that of petroleum products regulated by EWURA. Fundamental differences arise 
from the fact that EWURA has been vested with the statutory powers to 
DETERMINE and SET rates and chargers (tariffs). The rate or charge (price) so set 
having considered all the factors mentioned by the EWURA board that is appointed 
base on their knowledge of industry and strict conflict of interest provisions to ensure 
impartiality; is the ACTUAL price to be paid at the market place. WHEREAS as in 
Tea Regulation, the Board sets indicative price and let the farmers whom in section 5 
(4) (i) of the Tea industry Act, have an obligation to promote and protect interest of 
farmers against syndicates of buyers; pursuant to Regulation 49 (2) negotiate with 
the same buyers. This is a shortcoming, that if left un attended shall continue to 
haunt the welfare of the farmers in the relevant markets and beyond in the Tanzanian 
tea sector. 
 
Key informant interview findings have also shown that EWURA has a fully-fledged 
directorate for Economic Regulation which executes the issues to be considered in 
setting the rate or charge (price). The manpower, skills and competencies required 
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are adequately provided for by the Board. In the contrary, Key informant findings 
have revealed that the prices so set by the Board are arrived at by way of voting after 
the buyers have practically imposed the same at the consultative meeting. The Tea 
Board is mainly an observer as the defacto price setting player is the buyers, the Tea 
Board does not bear the mantle of DETERMINING the indicative price as would 
have been if the EWURA approach would have been employed. It is important to 
note that Indicative Price is determined at the Stakeholders’ Meeting and the Board 
only endorses. The Tea Board has only one vote at the Stakeholder’s Meeting as per 
Schedule three of the Tea Regulations, 2010.    
 
Appeals against the decisions of the Tea Board are made to the Minister Responsible 
for the Tea Board. The Minister as a person may not be adequate to ensure the 
acumen required for the competitive price to emerge in the event of a dispute thus 
making the whole process wanting. In comparison to the EWURA provisions, where 
the acumen is ensured even at the appellant level where whereby again the appellant 
body, the FCT is a collegiate body of professionals advised by competent staff with 
required skills.   
           
With regards to the handling of the statutorily provided potential anti-competitive 
conducts (abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive agreements) in the earlier 
findings discussions; it is a considered opinion of most (90%) of the key informants 
that there is need for a legislative review that will ensure that there is equal treatment 
for similar cases. This is based on the fact that there is a common situation in both 
the Tea and Petroleum sectors as reported by Taimoon, (1999) that economic 
regulation applies to sectors where structural conditions are such that competition is 
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either non-existent or inherently limited to the extent that consumer welfare would in 
fact be damaged in the absence of regulatory intervention. 
 
What remains wanting is the fact that despite the existence of commonality in the 
prevalence of structural condition requiring economic regulation the diversity of 
style and manner with which the two markets (petroleum and tea) have been 
legislated upon as elaborated in the foregoing discussions. Based on the foregoing 
discussions and findings that Hypothesis One is thus answered to the affirmative that 
“the legal framework in the tea sector and its resulting value chain is inadequate to 
provide for competitive market dynamics in the identified relevant markets”. 
 
5.3 Relevant Markets and Anti-Competitive Conducts in the Identified 
Relevant Markets  
The sub topic follows the provisions of the CAF by identifying the relevant markets 
by way of defining both the product and geographical markets which jointly provide 
for the relevant market. In the course of identifying the relevant markets, a SSNIP 
test was run and thus its results are being discussed and presented. The discussion 
proceeds to identify the anti-competitive conducts in the identified relevant markets 
in terms of abuse of dominance, anticompetitive mergers, anticompetitive mergers 
and other related anticompetitive conducts.   
 
5.3.1  Identified Relevant Markets  
In the identification of relevant markets the study considered both the product and 
geographical markets as asserted in (World Bank and DFID, 2008). The analysis is 
as follows hereunder.  
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5.3.1.1 The Product Market 
In the identification of product markets, the study considered the definition provided 
by section 2 of the Tea Act on green leaf tea, which means leaf detached from tea 
plants but not dried or processed in any way. The study therefore for the purpose of 
ease of reference in this study considers the product market as buying and selling of 
green tea leaves.  
 
5.3.1.2 The Geographical Market 
In the identification of geographical markets, the study considered the provision of 
Regulation 16 (1) (d) of the Tea Regulations which provides that “Before any person 
is registered as a grower, he shall be required to satisfy the Board that the tea field is 
located within a radius not exceeding 40 km from the tea processing factory, 
provided however, where the distance exceeds 40 km the tea buyer provides proof 
satisfactory to the Board that he is able to transport and deliver tea to the processing 
factory”. Key informant interview have also shown that the Board has designated 11 
tea growing districts in Tanzania. Among them are the Rungwe, Mufindi and 
Muheza. Invariably, for the purpose of ease of reference in this study, considers the 
geographical markets Rungwe, Mufindi and Muheza tea growing districts.  
 
5.3.1.3 SNNIP Test Results 
Table 14: Results for Responses on Allowance to Sell Outside Districts by 
Districts 
District Are you allowed to sell to any other Green Tea Leaves 
Processor outside your Tea Growing District (%) 
 Total  
  No  I do not know    
Mufindi 
Muheza 
Rungwe 
 32.2 
31.6 
30.5 
 1.1 
1.7 
2.8 
  33.3 
33.3 
33.4 
Total  94.3  5.7   100 
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The results on Table 14 show that 94.3% of the respondents reported that they were 
knowledgeable of the fact they were not allowed to sell their green tea leaves outside 
their prescribed green tea leaves buying district. Only a few (5.7%) said they did not 
know about such restriction whereas none reported that they are allowed to sell their 
green tea leaves outside their prescribed green tea leaves buying district.  
 
Furthermore, it is observed that the results were independent of districts the 
responses came from (p>0.05, х2 value= 0.090) implying that the response is 
common to all green tea leaves farmers irrespective of their tea buying districts in the 
study. With regards to the price at which farmers would defy the odd and sell their 
green tea leaves outside the prescribed tea buying districts in the study, Table 15 
provides for the responses to the effect that most farmers (43%) considered TZS 400 
to be such a price. Invariably, the average price that would make farmers sell outside 
there prescribed district is found to be TZS 420 in the tea buying districts in the 
study.  
 
Table 15: Response on the Price that Farmer would sell outside Tea Growing 
Districts 
Price (TZS) Frequency Percentage Average Price (TZS) 
300 1 4.3  
350 3 13.0  
400 10 43.5 420 
450 4 17.4  
500 5 21.7  
    
 
Furthermore, it is observed that the results were independent of tea buying districts 
the responses came from (p>0.05, х2 value= 0.0270) implying that the response is 
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common to all green tea leaves farmers irrespective of their tea buying districts in the 
study.  
 
Table 16: Response on the Actual Price Paid to the Farmer in 2013/2014 
Price (TZS) Frequency Percentage Average Price (TZS) 
225 57 31.7  
231 31 17.2 237.2 
240 29 16.2  
250 63 35.0  
 
The actual price paid for a kilogram of green tea leaves in the 2013/2014 is TZS 
237.2. The comparison with the price that would make farmer sell outside their green 
tea leaves outside the designated Tea Growing Districts which is TZS 420.  The 
percentage price differential between the two is (420 – 237)/100 = 183%. According 
to Scherer (2009), in running of SSNIP test, the price difference is required to be 
small to a maximum of 5%.  
 
Based on the findings from the analysis of the two limbs of the relevant market, in 
this case, the 183% price increase shall be deemed to have failed the SSNIP test and 
for that matter the prevailing demarcations as provided by the Tea Act and its 
regulations would be upheld. To this effect the identified relevant markets are as 
hereunder.  
 
5.3.2 Identified Relevant Markets  
The identified relevant markets are a combination of the product and geographical 
markets. To this effect, based on the above discussions of duo, the relevant markets 
are identified as follows: 
(i) Buying and selling of green tea leaves in Rungwe tea growing district. 
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(ii) Buying and selling of green tea leaves in Mufindi tea growing district. 
(iii) Buying and selling of green tea leaves in Muheza tea growing district. 
 
5.4 Anti-competitive Conducts in the Identified Relevant Markets 
In identifying the relevant markets, the provisions of the Competition Assessment 
Framework as reported in World Bank and DFID, 2008 were employed and detailed 
findings are as hereunder discussed.  
 
5.4.1 Identified Existing Competitors 
Table 17: Production Based Market Shares in the Identified Relevant Markets 
Market 
Company  
Name July August September Total 
Market 
Shares (%) 
R
U
N
G
W
E
 
METL 60876 51100 117900 229876 23.4 
WATCO 188227 211257 352257 751741 76.6 
TOTAL 249103 262357 470157 981617 100.0 
       
M
U
FI
N
D
I Mufindi Tea Co. 90182 80844 128651 299677 27.4 
Unilever 201770 174965 374067 750802 68.6 
Kisigo Tea Co. 17393 11484 15548 44425 4.0 
TOTAL 309345 267293 518266 1094904 100.0 
       
M
U
H
E
Z
A
 
EUTCO 124773 68037 146991 339801 94.3 
Bombay Burmah 7975 5249 7429 20653 5.7 
TOTAL 132748 73286 154420 360454 100.0 
 
In Rungwe Mohamed Enterprises Limited (METL) is in competition with Wakulima 
Tea Company Limited (WATCO). According to the available documents and key 
informant findings, WATCO was incorporated in August, 2000 as a joint venture 
between Tanzania Tea Packers (TATEPA) AND Rungwe Small Holders Tea 
Growers Association (RSTGA) also known as UMOJA.  
 
Key informants also provided that at inception TATEPA owned 75% and RSTGA 
owned 25% of the company share capital.  After few years RSTGA increase shares 
to reach 33% and they intend to have shares more than 50%. WATCO through 
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RSTGA are in trade since 2002 whereas premiums to go village development 
projects (e.g. schools, water projects, fertilizer subsidy, health center and social 
services). Apart from that benefit, each farmer owns not less than five shares in 
RSTGA from which, these farmers also get additional payment through RSTGA 
from either the world market or local blenders in the event the respective player 
provide high price of made tea. This additional payment is also called second 
payment of green tea leaves price in case there was earning high price of made tea.  
 
On average farmers can get up to TZS 300 per kilogram in a good season. Key 
informant findings further provide that farmers selling their green tea leaves to 
MeTL have no shares in MeTL. Contrary to their counterparts in WATCO who 
receive second payments in the event their company fetch good made tea price; these 
farmers do not get this and other benefit. This is in contradiction to the assertion by 
FIAS (2002) that made an impression that all farmers have stake in all stages of the 
tea value chain in Tanzania.  
 
In Mufindi there are three competitors Mufindi Tea Company, Unilever and Kisigo 
Tea Company Limited. In Muheza, there are two companies, East Usambara Tea 
Company (EUTCO) and Bombay Burmah. The two companies have been in the 
relevant market since 2011. EUTCO is seemingly bigger than Bombay Burmah. 
According to Key informant findings, there have been cordial relations between the 
two companies as such there have been reported incidents particularly in periods of 
factory maintenance whereby Bombay Burmah has been selling green tea leaves to 
EUTCO. 
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Figure 8: Smallholder Tea Grower’s Farm in Muheza 
 
Furthermore it has been reported by key informants that in 2013/2014 green leaves 
tea selling/buying seasons Marvera factory owned by Bombay Burmah was shut 
down for maintenance and that time the other factory (EUTCO) could not have 
accommodated the extra green leaves tea from Marvera. This led to a situation where 
Marvera had to sell the tea green leaves to its Mother company Bombay Burmah 
which is outside the Muheza green tea leaves buying district. According to further 
key informant findings, this exercise was conducted under strict conditions that 
assured the Tea Board there would be no distortion of green tea leaves quality as a 
result of care and handling requirements during the longer distance covered during 
the transportation of the green tea leaves outside prescribed district.  
 
This reported incident was carried out pursuant regulation 16 (1) (d) of Tea 
Regulations, 2010 as earlier discussed. Otherwise green tea leaves tea are sold at the 
registered or approved buying centre so any person who sells green tea leaves 
outsides an established and registered buying centre commits an offence pursuant to 
Regulation 48 (5) (6) and  (7) of the Tea Regulations, 2010. 
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5.4.1 Examination of the Relevant Markets’ Concentration and Structure  
 
Table 18: Market Concentration in the Relevant Markets 
District Calculation HHI 
Rungwe 23.42 + 76.62 6415.12 
Mufindi 27.42 + 68.62 + 4.02 5472.72 
Muheza 94.32 + 5.72 8924.98 
 
 
According to the U. S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission    
(2010), all the identified relevant markets are highly concentrated at HHI values of 
6415.12, 5472.72, 8924.98 for Rungwe, Mufindi and Muheza respectively based on 
the calculations in Table 19. High concentrations are a recipe for occurrence of 
anticompetitive conducts that this study seeks to identify in its second objective. Key 
informant interviews have also shown that the high concentrations and the 
dichotomy of market shares of the major green tea leaves buyers have been stable 
over a five years period which is considerately long enough to pose a threat of either 
entry barrier or predation or both as asserted by World Bank and DFID (2008). 
 
Key informant interview findings have shown that there has not been much market 
entry in the past 10 years in all the three relevant markets. Findings in Table 25 
(please cross refer) show that, evidently, there have been only two entries of MeTL 
in 2007 and Kisigo Tea Company in 2008 in the past 7 years i.e. 2006 – 2013. This 
market condition of having little or no entry over an extended period (seven years), 
might suggest barriers to entry are high; which is consistent with the assertion by 
World Bank and DFID, (2008). 
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Results in Table 17 (please cross refer) show the fact that a single buyer in Rungwe 
(WATCO), Mufindi (Unilever) and Muheza (EUTCO) account for 76.6 %, 68.6 % 
and 94.3 % respectively which are by every standards substantial parts of the 
respective relevant markets in this study.  These findings are a reasons for concern 
based on the assertion by (World Bank and DFID, 2008), that the existence of high 
concentration may indicate high market power and a competition problem where a 
single buyer, or a small number of large buyers, account for a substantial part of the 
market as is the case in all the three indentified relevant markets of this study.  
 
5.4.2 Barriers to Entry 
Table 19: Results for Response on Buyers Owning Processing Plant by Districts  
District How do you assess the legal requirement that "Buyers" 
must have a processing plant (%) 
Total  
  It is a good 
requirement 
 It is a bad 
requirement 
I do not 
know 
 
Mufindi 
Muheza 
Rungwe 
 0 
0 
0 
 21.6 
26.6 
26.1 
11.6 
6.6 
7.2 
33.2 
33.2 
33.3 
Total  0  74.3 25.4 100 
 
Response in Table 19 on a phenomenon that was considered to be the most grievous 
barrier to entry was subjected to test and the results are showing that most (74.3%) of 
the farmers are considering it a bad requirement whereas a few (25.4%) reported to 
be unaware of the effect of the effect of the requirement in the relevant three markets 
as identified. Furthermore, it is observed that the results were independent of districts 
the responses came from (p>0.05, х2 value = 0.0475) implying that the response is 
common to all green tea leaves farmers irrespective of their tea buying districts in the 
study.  
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The results conform with the assertion in World Bank and DFID (2008) that provide 
for a market to remain competitive, it must be possible for new firms to enter and if 
there are barriers that either prevent entry or would delay it considerably, or that 
would make it costly to enter the market, the existing suppliers might be able to 
lower prices above the competitive level (actual price) as was the case of MeTL in 
Rungwe. 
 
The results further resonate well with World Bank and DFID (2008) on the account 
that even if market shares are high, this might not result in prices below competitive 
levels if new suppliers (buyers) are likely to enter and in the absence of regulatory 
and policy barriers. The restrictions on entry, entrenched in Regulations 12, 16 and 
48 of Tea Regulations have considered too stringent thus failing the test that the 
rationale for restrictions that limit competition requires objective justification as 
asserted in World Bank and DFID, (2008).  
 
5.4.3 Unequal Enforcement of Laws and Regulations in the Identified 
Relevant Markets 
Key informant interviews held in Rungwe have revealed the existence of an 
arrangement between farmers group called Balimi Saccos that sells green tea leaves 
to MeTL. According to the informant and the corroboration done by the researcher, 
this group was originally registered as “Rungwe Tea Cooperative” (RUTECO); it 
was deregistered by the Mbeya Regional Cooperative Office for want of compliance 
with the requirements particularly that of collecting green tea leaves and selling the 
same to the buyers.   
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Following the said deregistration, the members reorganized themselves into the 
incumbent BALIMI SACCOSS. According to the key informant, it was the leaders 
of the group who went to MeTL to convince him (which would be an offer) to buy 
their green tea leaves; upon acceptance by MeTL, the parties entered into a five years 
contract. Further revelations of the key informant showed that the contract entered 
was not that of direct sell of green leaves as per the Tea Regulations but was termed 
as contract of land lease interparty, meaning that the company contracted the land of 
farmers which will be utilized by him and farmers will be paid as laborers hired for 
plucking green tea leaves. According to the key informants, this was done so to 
escape from the law administered by the Tea Board of Tanzania.  
 
This execution of the said contract is contrary to the provisions of Regulation 45 of 
the Tea Regulations, 2010 which declares unenforceable a contract farming 
agreement which is not registered by the Board pursuant to regulations 44 of the Tea 
Regulations, 2010. The arrangement is also in breach of the requirement that a 
company buying green tea leaves must have obtained the District Council within 
which it falls, and for this case the Rungwe District Council.  
 
The competitive harm is according to the key informant derived from the fact that the 
original intention was for the group to collect their green tea leaves and offer the 
same for sale to WATCO. Incidentally, WATCO had already entered into a contract 
with RSTGA. Based on the later, WATCO turned down the offer. Based on this 
analogy, WATCO is suffering loss of green tea leaves to buy from its farmers as 
there is a side “unregistered buyer”.  
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Neither the Tanzania Tea Board nor the Rungwe District Council have instituted any 
action despite the fact that the arrangement is known to the functionaries of the 
respective authorities to the detriment of WATCO, the competitive landscape and the 
relevant market.  These findings are a reason for concern based on the assertion by 
World Bank and DFID (2008) that no any firm in the relevant market should suffer 
from the unequal application of laws or regulations. In this case the silence of the 
authorities is deemed as unequal application of the law especially considering the 
fact that the owner of the alleged firm has been a Member of Parliament and a big 
business.   
 
5.4.4 Vested Interests 
Generally, there have been Members of Parliament sitting in Tea Board for a long 
time. It is even more serious when the Speaker of the National Assembly becomes 
not only a member of the Board but also the Chairperson.  Honorable Speaker of the 
National Assembly is also the Board Chairperson of the Tanzania Tea Board. The 
oversight role of the Parliament is demeaned by such appointments because the 
Board decides and such decisions are subject to oversight of the Parliament that is 
also presided over by the Chairperson of the Tanzania Tea Board. It is an anomaly 
that carries with it a great potential for reduced competition in the Tea sector and in 
particular the relevant markets. 
 
Key informant interview findings have shown that there has been a relocation of a 
department of the Smallholder Tea Growers Agency to the Njombe green tea leaves 
buying district. The department was meant to serve the entire tea sector in Tanzania, 
including the identified relevant markets in this study. The contrary is observed and 
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whether it is by design, default or mere coincidence, the Chairperson of the Tea 
Board hails from Njombe where the affirmative action is dwelt. This is for the 
purposes of this study, regarded as a situation where a stakeholder is opposed to 
equivocal increased competition in the identified relevant markets; the situation is 
consistent with the assertion by World Bank and DFID, (2008) that if the identity 
and objectives of such stakeholders are widely known, their power and influence 
should be reflected in the competition assessment.  
 
5.4.5 Anti-Competitive Conduct  
Horizontal issues are those that are found between competitors, that is, firms in the 
same line of business and thus are required as per the competition principles, to 
operate independent of each other by avoiding any kind of concerted efforts among 
themselves in exercise of the independence. The foregoing refers to issues of 
mergers and anticompetitive agreements. Invariably, firms are expected not to act 
unilaterally and distort the markets by way of abuse of their dominance. 
Identification of anticompetitive conducts is the second objective in this study. The 
findings are as discussed hereunder.  
 
5.4.5.1 Abuse of Dominance  
According key informant interviews findings, farmers selling to MeTL in Rungwe 
experienced a price reduction in June 2015 occasioned by the buyer. According to 
the key informant findings, at the start of the 2015 buying season the MeTL started 
buying green tea leaves at the price of TZS 240 per kilogram. This price was agreed 
upon interparty as the actual buying price for the green tea leaves pursuant to Rule 
49 (2) of the Tea Regulations which in part provide that negotiations for the 
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establishment of the actual price of green leaf tea in a respective tea growing area 
shall be done by tea growers through their associations or co-operative societies and 
buyers.  
 
In June, 2015, MeTL unilaterally, decided to dishonor the agreed actual price with 
farmers citing the reason behind the decision to be bad prices of made tea at the 
world market the company received last season. The price offered was reduced to 
TZS 176 per kilogram which was the indicative price announced by the Tea Board. 
This price was in consonance with the provision of Rule 49 (3) of the Tea 
Regulations that the actual price shall not be below the minimum price. Key 
informant findings further reveal that MeTL argued that the company was 
recuperating the losses incurred from the made tea business for the whole of 2014 
season. This was after the same company had bought green tea leaves at TZS 240 in 
April and May 2015.  
 
In a quick rejoinder, farmers refused to accept the new price of TZS 176 per 
kilogram. After a protracted tag of war interparty, wisdom prevailed and a 
conversation took place between leaders of the farmers and MeTL. In August, 2015 a 
consensus was reached that originally agreed actual price of TZS 240 per kilogram 
should prevail until the end of the season in October 2015 as earlier agreed. 
 
Key informant findings further revealed that as consequences of the reduction of 
green tea leaves price many farmers have moved to selling to WATCO, a company 
that did not reduce the price. This is an act which is prohibited by Schedule 2 of the 
Tea Regulation on Obligations of the Out growers (farmers) which in part requires 
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the farmer not to enter into any other agreement that contradicts or frustrates the 
contract between the parties. Further findings show that some affected farmers 
remained with their green tea leaves unplucked for longer (2 more months) than 
would have been in the absence of the MeTL’s unilateral action to drastically drop 
the buying price.   
 
From the competition perspective, based on the provision of section 5 (6) of the FCA 
which in part provides that “A person has a dominant position in a market if both (a) 
and (b) apply: (a) acting alone, the person can profitably and materially restrain or 
reduce competition in that market for a significant period of time; and (b) the 
person's share of the relevant market exceeds 35 per cent.  
 
With regards to Section 5 (6) (a); on acting alone (MeTL) unilaterally because the 
competitor WATCO did not reduce the actual price), the person (MeTL) can 
profitably (it has reported profits and continues with business) and materially (an 
established company of high repute and owned by an influential member of the 
Public, a member of Parliament) restrain or reduce competition (the price reduction 
made farmers suffer loss of income as they refused to pluck their tea for selling) in 
that market for a significant period of time (two months).  
 
With regards to Section 5 (6) (b); the person's (MeTL) share of the relevant market 
exceeds 35 per cent. Key informant findings have shown that MeTL buys from 
contract farmers, from an association called Balimi and also produces own tea from 
its estates. In consideration of these three elements, MeTL attains a market share of 
36.4 which is above the rule of thumb requiring at least 35% market share.  
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The foregoing is consistent with the assertion by World Bank and DFID (2008) that 
for a firm to abuse dominance in a market, it needs to have a high market share. A 
dominant firm is one that has sufficient market power to allow it to make price and 
output decisions without having to take account of the likely reaction of competitors.  
A dominant firm may among other issues increase prices above competitive levels by 
charging excessive price.  As the relevant market is oligopsonistic in nature in line 
with the assertion in Barry and Argus, (2008) by having a few (2) buyers and many 
sellers, the reverse of increase price above competitive level becomes lowering 
prices below the competitive level (assuming the actual price discovered was the 
competitive price).   
 
Irrespective of the solution that came about after negotiations, the case portrays the 
fact that the relevant market are plagued by possible anti-competitive conducts with 
an abuse of dominance limb of theory of harm.  
 
Table 20: Distribution of Farmers’ Response on Kickback 
  Districts   
                    Response Mufindi Muheza Rungwe Total 
Yes 0.00 0.56 2.79 3.35 
No 32.96 32.96 30.73 96.65 
Total 33.0 33.5 33.5 100 
Average Amount (Kg) - Kickback - 200 35 117.5 
 
This is a malpractice that whereby green tea leaves farmers are forced to either give 
up on their green tea leaves for free or at a throw away price as a result of buyers’ 
decision not to buy from the farmer. The average amounts green tea leaves lost by 
farmers in this practice estimated to be 117.5 kilograms of green tea leaves. Much as 
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it is a small amount, but the practice has a potential to grow and raze havoc to 
already plagued state of affairs of the green tea leaves farmers in the study areas.   
 
5.4.5.2 Collusion and Cartels   
In Rungwe there are two companies, WATCO and MeTL, their pricing behavior is 
as hereunder.  
 
Table 21: Comparison between Indicative and Actual Prices in Rungwe 2011 - 
2015 
Year Indicative Price (TZS) Actual Price (TZS) 
 
2011 
 
196 WATCO 200 MeTL 210 
2012 200 WATCO 200 
MeTL 210 
2013 206 WATCO 231 
MeTL 240 
2014 225 WATCO 231 
MeTL 240 
2015 176 WATCO 231 
MeTL 240 
 
In Muheza, there are two companies (EUTCO) and Bombay Burmah, pricing 
behavior is as hereunder.  
 
Table 22: Comparison between Indicative and Actual Prices in Muheza 2011 - 
2015 
Year Indicative Price (TZS) Actual Price (TZS) 
2011 196 EUTCO 196 
Bombay Burmah 196 
2012 200 EUTCO 200 
Bombay Burmah 200 
2013 206 EUTCO 206 
Bombay Burmah 206 
2014 225 EUTCO 225 
Bombay Burmah 225 
2015 176 EUTCO 176 
Bombay Burmah 176 
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In Mufindi there are three companies MTC, KTC and Unilever; their pricing 
behavior is as hereunder.  
 
Table 23: Comparison between Indicative and Actual Prices in Mufindi 2011 - 
2015 
Year Indicative Price (TZS) Actual Price (TZS) 
2011 196 MTC 200 
KTC 200 
Unilever 200 
2012 200 MTC 200 
KTC 200 
Unilever 200 
2013 206 MTC 206 
KTC 206 
Unilever 206 
 
2014 225 MTC 250 
KTC 250 
Unilever 250 
2015 176 MTC 250 
KTC 250 
Unilever 250 
 
According to World Bank and DFID, (2008), competitors sometimes collude to limit 
the intensity of competition by making agreements to fix prices, to divide the market 
geographically between them, to conduct boycotts or to rig bids for contracts. Given 
the nature of this study, the only plausible limb of competitive harm is price fixing. 
This is so because the Tea Industry Act and the Tea Regulations, 2010 have already 
divided the markets by virtue of Regulations 16 (c) of Tea Regulations requiring sell 
of green tea leaves to be within a geographical distance of 40 kilometers from a tea 
processing factory. Invariably, the issue of conducting boycotts has not been reported 
anywhere in the cause of conducting the interviews whereas bid rigging cannot arise 
as the business model in the relevant markets is not built on bids or tenders to 
warrant bid rigging or collusive tendering.  
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The general assessment of the pricing behavior in Rungwe show that the buying 
companies have in the past five years (2011 – 2015), inconsistently differentiated the 
indicative price by TZS 4 and 14 respectively to WATCO and MeTL in 2011; TZS 0 
and 10 respectively to WATCO and MeTL in 2012; TZS 25 and 34 respectively to 
WATCO and MeTL in 2013; TZS 6 and 15 respectively to WATCO and MeTL in 
2014; and TZS 55 and 64 respectively to WATCO and MeTL in 2015. 
 
In Muheza; the observation is that, the pricing behavior of the buying companies has 
shown that consistently in the past five years (2011 – 2015) the two companies have 
not differentiated the indicative price. This is to say, there has been a synonymous 
pattern of not graduating the indicative price into actual price all through the five 
years of assessment.  
 
In Mufindi; the observation is such that all the three companies differentiate the 
indicative price by TZS 4 in 2011; TZS 0 in 2012; TZS 4 in 2011; TZS 0 in 2013; 
TZS 25 in 2011; TZS 0 in 2014 and TZS 4 in 2011; TZS 74 in 2015. This is to say, 
there has been a synonymous pattern of either graduating or not graduating the 
indicative price into actual price all through the five years of assessment.  
 
The synonymous pattern observed in Muheza and Mufindi considered together with 
the high concentrations in the two relevant markets witnessed by the HHI values of 
8924.9 and 5472.72 for Muheza and Mufindi respectively; the results are consistent 
with report by Khemani and Shapiro (1993) that cartels refer to cases of multiple 
producers acting in agreement that allow them to exercise monopoly power. It is 
evident that firms in the Muheza and Mufindi relevant markets have market power 
based on the HHI values.  
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The synonymous observations drawn from the Muheza and Mufindi cases resonate 
with the assertion that collusion is found in a situation where the prices in a 
seemingly competitive market, closely resemble that of a monopolistic market 
(Massimo, 2006). Given the foreclosure nature of the market resulting from 
regulation in the tea markets and contract farming the findings are also consistent 
with the report by Levenstein and Suslow (2006) that generally, cartels persist 
among firms with similar cost functions, thus facing similar production and 
marketing constraints hence incentives for the participating firms create and remain 
in the cartel. It is true that farmers do source tea seedlings, all farm inputs from one 
source thus having similar costs and thus cost functions thus warranting the 
resemblance as asserted in the foregoing. Empirical findings based on student’s t-test 
are showing that there exist no significant difference in total variable costs between 
the buyers in the relevant markets of Mufindi and Muheza.  
 
 
Table 24: Results (t-test) for Farmers’ Gross Margins in Mufindi and Muheza 
Relevant Markets 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Mufundi 60 2223943 1034361 8012123 154192.7 4293694 
Muheza 60 223728.3 30806.3 238624.5 162085.1 285371.6 
combined 120 1223836 523324.2 5732729 187601.7 2260070 
Diff  2000215 1034819  -49008.7 4049439 
Diff = Mean (1) - Mean (2)     t =1.5329 
Ho: diff = 0     Degrees of Freedom 118 
 
Given the level high level of market transparency on volume or tonnage of crop 
purchased and processed, export and local sales and average price, availability and 
distribution of inputs in accordance with the relevant terms of the farming contract 
allowed by the Regulation 66 (1) of the Tea Regulations, 2010; the findings are also 
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in support of the findings as reported in Levenstein and Suslow (2006), that increase 
in cartel practices is partly due increasing transparency in most market, which makes 
it easier for cartel members to have access to sales and market share data of their 
competitors who eventually become cartel members.  
 
In addressing the cartel issue, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) further reported that 
largely, cartels refer to shady behaviour of competitors in which they co-ordinate 
explicitly or tacitly to regulate markets so as to restrict competition. These 
agreements are frequently verbal and, although they can be harmful to competition, 
are difficult to detect. The patterns observed in Muheza and Mufindi relevant 
markets demonstrate the fact that the synonymous pricing behaviour can be as a 
result of tacit agreements between the green tea leaves buyers reached either verbally 
or in any other un explicit manner which makes it difficult to detect.  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing difficulty, Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007) 
reported that, collusion/cartels can be either explicit (organised) or tacit (implied) 
and that economic principles alone cannot provide a distinction between the two, 
unless abetted by the legal dimension of competition law. The competition authority 
should invoke the foregoing in attempting to find out the genesis and culpability of 
alleged firms based on these findings.  
 
5.4.5.3 Mergers 
Results in Table 26 show that there has been relatively low entry and exist of buyers 
in the relevant market. Evidently, there have been only two entries of MeTL in 2007 
and Kisigo Tea Company in 2008 in the past 7 years i.e. 2006 – 2013. Key informant 
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interview revealed that Kisigo Tea Company came as a Greenfield new entrant into 
the market thus posing no potential for competition harm in the Mufindi relevant 
market.  
 
Key informant interview findings revealed that MeTL bought the G.D Estates from 
Tukuyu Tea Estates Limited (TTEL) on the 28th March 2007. Key informants also 
revealed that the value of assets of TTEL was above TZS 800,000,000. In same 2007 
MeTL was reported to have been at least United States Dollars 7.5 million in 2007 
from its loan deal with Rand Merchant Bank (RMB), this is according to (Citizen 
Newspaper, 2014). Based on the definition of a merger as provided in Section 2 of 
the FCA that a merger means “an acquisition of shares, a business or other assets, 
whether inside or outside Tanzania, resulting in the change of control of a business, 
part of a business or an asset of a business in Tanzania”.  
 
The transaction is therefore established to be as merger as follows; that there was an 
acquisition of a business (TTEL by MeTL) inside Tanzania, that resulted in change 
of control of a business (from TTEL to MeTL) in Tanzania.  Given the fact that the 
transaction amounts to a merger and that it has met the requirement of the 
notification threshold of TZS on combined market value of assets as described above 
in this analysis; the merger was notifiable pursuant to Section 11 (2) of the FCA read 
together with Rule 33 (1) of the FCC Rules of Procedure, 2013.  
 
It should be noted that at the time of the acquisition, both the FCA and the Merger 
Notification had come into operations from 12th May 2004 and 10th March 2006 
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respectively.  Records of the transactions that have been notified at the FCC between 
2006 and 2015 as reported in Mlulla, (2015) do not include the name transaction i.e. 
MeTL as the Acquiring firm and TTEL as the Target firm. Invariably, this non-
notification is deemed to be an offence contrary to Section 11 (2) read together with 
Section 11 (6) of the FCA as described earlier.   
 
This finding concurs with the assertion by World Bank and DFID, (2008) that where 
there is a substantial increase in concentration through mergers or acquisitions, 
dominance or collusion may be more likely. And that if there are high barriers to 
entry, or absence of countervailing buyer power, the anticompetitive influences 
arising from increased concentration might become more severe. 
 
As it can construed from a report by Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007) that 
economic principles alone cannot provide a solution to competition issues unless 
abetted by the legal dimension of competition law, this issue would require 
invocation of the right competition law provisions and particular attention should be 
on the section 60 (8) of the FCA which provides that the Commission may act upon 
an offence at any time within six years after the commission of the offence. Given 
the fact that the transaction was consummated in 2007 and the finding is coming up 
in 2015, the six year time limit is hit and defaulted by two years thus requiring 
justification in the event the FCC finds it plausible to pursue a case against the 
referred buying company in the Rungwe relevant market. 
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Table 25: Trend of Buying Companies in the Three Identified Relevant Markets in 2006 – 2015 
MUFINDI 
 
 
YEAR 2006 - 2007 2007 - 2008 2008 - 2009 2009 - 2010 2010 - 2011 2011 - 2012 2012 - 2013 
COMPANY 
 
 
 
 
MTC 
 
MTC 
 
MTC 
 
MTC 
 
MTC 
 
MTC 
 
MTC 
UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL 
UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL 
UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL UTTL 
  *KTC KTC KTC KTC KTC 
MUHEZA 
 
YEAR 
 
2006 - 2007 
 
2007 - 2008 
 
2008 - 2009 
 
2009 - 2010 
 
2010 - 2011 
 
2011 - 2012 
 
2012 - 2013 
        
COMPANY EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO 
EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO EUTCO 
BBTC BBTC BBTC BBTC BBTC BBTC BBTC 
        
RUNGWE 
 
YEAR 2006 - 2007 2007 - 2008 2008 - 2009 2009 - 2010 2010 - 2011 2011 - 2012 2012 - 2013 
 
COMPANY 
 
TTEL 
 
*MeTL 
 
MeTL 
 
MeTL 
 
MeTL 
 
MeTL 
 
MeTL 
WATCO WATCO WATCO WATCO WATCO WATCO WATCO 
 Entry         
MTC        Mufindi Tea Company 
KTC         Kisigo Tea Company 
BBTC      Bombay Burmah Tea Company 
TTEL       Tukuyu Tea Estates Limited  
UTTL       Unilever Tea Tanzania Limited 
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5.4.6  Regulated Sector   
As per the provisions of (World Bank and DFID, 2008) with regards to the issue of 
sectors condemned to economic regulation and whether they have been selected 
objectively based on economic principles following a credible selection process; the 
already discussed inadequacy of the legal and regulatory provision of competition in 
the relevant markets have highlighted a flawed process and a mismatch of structural 
market conditions and the employed tools. This is evident based on the fact that 
much as the tea sector relevant markets are fore closed in terms of regulated entry 
and exist and that prices are not discovered by orthodoxy way of market forces 
(conditions qualifying for economic regulation); the said agro markets are presumed 
to be under competition to which its basic requirements of price discovery and free 
entry and exit have been statutorily violated by TIA.  
 
The above analysed position is construed to be a recipe for inbuilt and perpetual 
market failure that require to be fixed and thus make good of the identified relevant 
markets, other tea agro markets and other similar agro markets.  To this end a 
solution to this identified problem is provided by way of a plausible competition 
enforcement model as presented hereunder.  
 
5.4.6.1 The Plausible Competition Enforcement Model  
Having described the missing link between the FCA and TIA, the present study 
endeavors to propose a solution to the identified problem in the competition 
enforcement machinery by way of a market competition enforcement model as 
shown in Figure 9 based on the two pieces of legislation read together with their 
subordinate legislation.  
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The model requires the amendments FCA and TIA and so that they recognize each 
other to the effect that the FCA exempts TIA from competition to automatically be 
condemned into economic regulation like EWURA Act, TCRA Act, SUMATRA Act 
and the TCAA Act have been treated under Section 96 (3) of the FCA.  Invariably, 
the TIA should be amended to recognize the FCA as the main Act that provides for 
competition issues in the tea sector as was the case of section 24 of the Petroleum 
Act. The two amendments shall culminate in a coherent framework that leaves no 
loopholes as advocated in World Bank, (2015).    
The last limb of the model, suggests a twofold approach in which the first all 
competition matters shall be statutorily provided for by FCC and the other limb 
proposes a concurrent jurisdiction between the FCC and the TTB with an option of 
reference of competition matters to the afforded to TTB.  Based on the negative 
report on the concurrent jurisdiction reported in Kigwala (2015) with reference to the 
telecommunication sector, the study prefers the alternative that FCC has sole 
jurisdiction on competition matter in the tea sector. The preferred alternative presents 
an upper hand of success over the other for two main reasons, that, there shall be 
statutory certainty on which body does competition work in the tea sector   as the 
mandate shall be provided to the FCC on the face of record.  
Secondly, key informant interview findings have shown that FCC has already built 
the requisite expertise in analyzing competition both at institutional level and in 
terms of staff. The two factors provide comfort that there already exist an institution 
that is capable of handling competition matters thus reducing the burden of building 
the same capacity in a different institution i.e. TTB which might not make full use of 
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such capacity as it is bound to only one sector as compared to the FCC which is a 
multisectoral institution. Diagrammatic presentation of the model is as presented in 
Figure 9.   
 
 
Figure 9: Proposed Market Enforcement Model  
 
The foregoing provides for the plausible enforcement model arising from the 
interlink between sectoral and competition laws to provide for competitive market 
dynamics in the identified relevant markets thus answering the research question of 
this study. 
Fair Competition Act, 2003 and 
Fair Competition Commission 
Rules, 2013 
Tea Industry Act, 2009 and  
Tea Regulations, 2010 
The Tea Industry Act to be amended to recognize the Fair Competition 
Act as the legislation to deal with competition matters in tea agro 
markets. Secondly, condemn tea agro markets to economic regulation 
 
Crop Boards including the Tea Board should be included in the 
provision of Section 96 (3) by express mention to clear any ambiguities 
TTB deals with all competition 
issues in the tea sector. Enact a 
provision in the TIA providing for 
reference of competition issues to 
FCC when appropriate 
FCC deals with all 
competition issues in the 
tea sector 
Concurrent Jurisdiction 
between FCC and TTB 
FCC has Sole 
Jurisdiction 
on 
Competition 
issues 
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5.4.7  Vertical Integration Issues  
Regulations 12, 16 and 48 of the Tea Regulations, 2010 have partly created vertical 
issues in the relevant markets allowing green tea leaves buyers to integrate vertically 
backward to also engage in green tea leaves farming by way of estates as defined in 
Regulation 3 of the Tea Regulations, 2010 to mean an area of not less than 200 
hectares of land planted with tea and has a primary processing factory attached to it. 
A combination of the huge tract of land and the processing factory is construed as 
combining buying, processing and growing of green tea leaves in one player. 
 
Key informant interviews have shown that estates usually do not take good care of 
their green leaf tea and thus depend on the farmers’ green tea leaves to improve on 
the quality of the made tea they produce as processors. As earlier described, the 
vertical integration has been giving the buyer an upper hand in the value chain and in 
particular the issue of price discovery to the detriment of the farmers.  
 
Table 26: Farmers Response on the Driving Force Actor  
District Driving Force Actor (%)  Total 
 Registered 
Buyers 
Other 
Buyers 
Farmers Government Tea 
Board 
 Others  
Mufindi 27.5 0 0.5 0.5 1.2 0 29.7 
Muheza 28.7 0 4.2 0 0 1.2 34.1 
Rungwe 30.5 0.5 1.2 0 3.6 0 35.2 
Total 86.7 0.5 5.9 0.5 4.8 1.2 100 
 
Furthermore, it is observed that the results were independent of districts the 
responses came from (p>0.05, х2 value = 1.26) implying that the response is 
common to all green tea leaves farmers irrespective of their tea buying districts in 
the study. This shows that that buyer’s dominance is felt all over the relevant 
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markets. As for the reasons for being the driving force, most (92%) of the responded 
were of the view that it is because they can determine prices. The fact that price is 
the factor considered to be of driving force in the relevant markets, and that it is 
actually the buyer who is considered the determinant player; the situation leaves the 
assertion by FIAS (2002) that the FCC should to be at the forefront to establish the 
determinants of the reduction of famers’ share into the export price over time 
wanting to date over ten years from the findings were released back in 2002.  
 
Table 27: Distribution of Sources of Information in Setting Price in the Relevant 
Markets 
  Districts   
 Response Mufindi Muheza Rungwe      Total 
Information from Radio 0.5 0.9 0.0 0.9 
Information from the Tea Board 20.5 10.0 30.9 40.9 
Knowledge of the Buyers   17.3 12.7 21.8 34.5 
From Clerks &Association  11.8 27.3 1.8 23.6 
Total 50.0 50.0 54.5 100.0 
 
 
Results on Table 27 show that green tea leaves buyers relied mostly on information 
from the Tea Board and on knowledge of the buyers in their respective relevant 
markets with (40.9%) and (34.5%) respectively.  
 
Table 28: Distribution of Factors Considered in Setting Price in the Relevant 
Markets 
  District 
 Response  Mufindi Muheza Rungwe Total 
Listening to Neighbors 0.0 9.6 1.1 10.7 
Take Buyers Offer 27.7 7.3 18.6 53.7 
Information from the Tea Board 0.0 7.3 5.1 12.4 
Negotiate with Buyer 6.2 1.7 8.5 16.4 
All Stakeholders 0.0 6.8 0.0 6.8 
Total 33.9 32.8 33.3 100 
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Results in Table 28 show that most (53.7%) of the green tea leaves buyers took 
buyers offer as a means of setting their price offer in the process of discovering 
actual price from the indicative price. These findings corroborate that of buyer’s 
being the driver of the green tea leaves business in the relevant markets. Invariably, 
the results were dependent of districts the responses came from (p<0.01, х2 value = 
186.1) implying that the response is not common to all green tea leaves farmers 
irrespective of their tea buying districts in the study. This is explained by the fact that 
buyers in Muheza do not differentiate between indicative and actual price, thus the 
significance of the differentiated responses.     
 
5.4.8  Competition Issues Profile in the Relevant Market  
Based on the findings as discussed above and in consideration of the competition 
issues index as provided in the methodology, the study established the competition 
issues profile in the relevant markets as presented hereunder.   
 
Table 29: Distribution of Competition Issues in the Relevant Markets 
District Anti competitive Harm   Total 
 Vested 
interests  
Vertical 
integration  
Barriers 
to entry  
Un. 
Merger 
Cartel  AOD  
Mufindi 1 2 3 0 5 0 11 
Muheza 1 2 3 0 5 0 11 
Rungwe 1 2 3 4 0 5 15 
 
 
The results in Table 29 connote an attempt to quantify nominal (qualitative) measure of 
the effects of the competition issues in the relevant markets based on the pre-determined 
index as discussed earlier in this study.  
 
5.4.9  Draw Conclusions 
Based on the findings that there are anti-competitive issues in form of abuse of 
dominance and un notified mergers in Rungwe, anti-competitive agreements in 
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Muheza and Mufindi, barriers to entry and vested interests affecting all the three 
identified relevant markets Hypothesis Two is answered not to the affirmative that 
there are anti-competitive conducts in the identified relevant markets as discussed 
above.  
 
5.5  Gross Margins in the Identified Relevant Markets  
In Table 30 gross margins for green tea leaves farmers under the different identified 
relevant markets are compared. The t-test aimed at testing how each of the relevant 
markets’ gross margins compares to that of the control relevant market in the study 
area. Rungwe was chosen as the control relevant market based on the fact that it 
bears the largest number of farmers and also is the oldest green tea leaves area in 
Tanzania. Moreover, it is established to accommodate farmers beyond the green tea 
leaves part of the values chain by providing ownership in the processing phase of the 
value chain.  
 
Table 30: Results for Comparison of Relevant Markets’ Gross Margins 
District df t Mean GM Std. Dev. N Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mufindi 59 2.0 987431.57 2561700.5 60 0.048* 
Rungwe 59 6.4 963360.25 3894986.1 60  
Muheza 59 4.1 754652.5 1026891 60 0.000** 
Total   901814.77 2742631.2 180  
* Significant at 0.05         ** Significant at 0.0 
 
The t test results show that farmers in both Mufindi and Muheza relevant markets 
had average gross margin of TZS 754 652.5 and TZS 987 431.57 respectively and 
that both where significantly different from that of Rungwe partly for the reasons 
explained earlier. Furthermore to triangulate the results, ANOVA results also suggest 
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significant difference between the marketing channels and within the individual 
marketing channel as in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: ANOVA Results for Gross Margins’ Differences in the Relevant 
Markets 
Marketing channel Df F-ratio Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
 
Between relevant markets 2 13.65 .000**  
Within marketing channel 117   
Total 179   
Bartlett's test for equal variances:   Chi 2 (2)    
                                                       Prob > Chi 2 
 83.6827 
0.0000** 
 
**Significant at 0.00 
 
Based on the consistent statistical findings (t-test and ANOVA) that the gross 
margins are significantly different in identified relevant markets of this study; 
Hypothesis Three is answered not to the affirmative that the Gross margins are not 
the same for all the identified relevant markets.   
 
5.6 Factors Affecting Pro Competition Functioning of the Relevant Markets 
Assessed in the Tanzanian Tea Sector 
Table 32: Regression (GLS) Results on Factors Affecting Pro Competition 
Functioning of the Relevant Markets 
Variable Coefficients Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) -13.5 90.8 .145 
Age of respondent .43248 .1479 .024* 
Duration of  tea farming training skills  .26004 .18954 .041* 
Experience in tea leaves farming .6112 .2011 .000** 
Dummy for the marketing channel  .518 .542 .524 
Number of mature tea trees .200 .83 .034* 
Index for competition issues -1.284 .765 .025* 
Distance from the farm to the green tea leaves 
buying centre  (in meters) 
-1.0957 .4093 .043* 
Dependent Variable: Natural log of gross margin of producers 
Adjusted R Square (R2) 0.602        F value 59.698**  
 * Significant at 0.05                       ** Significant at 0.01 
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Coefficients estimated by GLS are known as elasticities which represent a causal-
effect relationship amongst the dependent and independent variables in this research 
model. In economics, elasticity is the measurement of how responsive an economic 
variable is to a change in another. In empirical work an elasticity is the estimated 
coefficient in a linear regression equation where both the dependent variable and the 
independent variable are in natural logs. Elasticity is a popular tool among 
empiricists because it is independent of units and thus simplifies data analysis 
(Marks, 2003). Ideally, the interpretation of the results is such that a unit change (1) 
in independent variable causes a change (magnitude borne in the coefficient ). 
Since the said  are in decimals, they have been expressed in percentages for ease 
of readership and presentation of the findings. To this effect the unit change in 
independent variable is pegged at 10%.  
 
The regression results in Table 32 based on the GLS estimator employed in this 
study show that age of the green tea leaves farmers had a positive sign and was a 
significant factor at (p<0.05) implying that as the age of the green tea leaves farmers 
increased their gross margins also increased. This would be due to the fact that most 
producers were in the age group (40-60 years) with good adherence and commitment 
to green tea leaves farming requirements. Since coefficients estimated by GLS are 
elasticities, it thus follows that a 10% change in age of green tea leaves farmers led 
to 4.3 % increase in their gross margins in the identified relevant markets of this 
study.  
 
It was also seen that 10% change in duration of tea farming training skills was 
significantly associated with 2.6 % increase of gross margin of green tea leaves 
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farmers at (p<0.05). The variable had a positive sign, indicating that the more time 
spent on training the more the gross margin. It is logically true that as one learns 
more on tea farming training skills both practically and theoretically, their farm 
outputs are commensurately expected to increase.  A ten percent change in years of 
green tea leaves farming was significantly (highly) associated with 6.1% change in 
green tea leaves farmers’ gross margins at (p<0.01), meaning that many years of 
farming brought about an overall advantage in gross margin of a green tea leaves 
farmers.  
 
The number of mature tea trees in a farm was also a significant factor at (p<0.05). It 
was also observed that a 10% change of the number of mature trees was associated 
with a 2% increase of green tea leaves farmers’ gross margin as the variable had a 
positive sign. This can be explained further by the fact that mature trees are the ones 
that bear green tea leaves so the more trees (to optimal level) the more green tea 
leaves and thus the higher the gross margins ceteris paribus.  
 
A 10% change of the distance from the farm to the green tea leaves buying centre  
(in meters) was found out to be significant associated with 11% decrease in gross 
margin of producers at (p<0.05). Since this variable (distance from the farm to the 
green tea leaves buying centre) was a proxy in measuring the effect of remoteness of 
the farms to the gross margins, the results suggests that as the distance decreased the 
gross margins increases implying that remoteness as defined affected gross margins 
negatively. This could be due to additional costs incurred in the process of bringing 
the green tea leaves to the buying centre.  
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Regarding the index for competition issues, results show that a 10% change of the 
index for competition issues score was found out to be associated with 13% decrease 
in gross margin of the green tea leaves farmers at (p<0.05). This variable was 
formulated as a proxy in measuring the effect of anticompetitive effects faced by 
farmers in their respective identified relevant markets to the gross margins, the 
results suggests that as the index for competition issues score decreased the gross 
margins increases implying that anticompetitive effects as defined affected gross 
margins negatively. This could be due to either additional costs or loss of revenue as 
a result anti-competitive harm that the competition issues inflicted onto the green tea 
leaves farmers in the identified relevant markets in this study.  
 
The dummy variable for the marketing channel was insignificant (p>0.05). This 
notwithstanding, this variable had a negative sign thus going against the theory that 
institutions (such as marketing channels) reduce transaction cost and increases 
returns (gross margins for this study). This can be explained by the fact that benefits 
can be qualitative such as price stability and easing of liquidity which were not 
captured by this study.  
 
The explanatory power of the model adjusted R2 was found to be 0.602 implying that 
60.2 % of the variations in the dependent variable (gross margins of green tea leaves 
farmers) were explained by the variations in the independent variables in the model. 
The model was powerful enough to explain the variations as it had an F- value of 
59.698, which was also highly significant at (p<0.01). This meant that the model was 
well estimated. 
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Based on the findings that age of the green tea leaves farmers, duration of tea 
farming training skills, experience in tea leaves farming, competition issues, number 
of mature tea trees and distance from the farm to the green tea leaves buying centre  
(in meters) in the identified relevant markets affect pro competition functioning of 
the identified relevant markets in this study; Hypothesis Four is answered not to the 
affirmative that there are factors affecting pro competition functioning of the 
identified relevant markets as discussed above.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1  Chapter Overview  
This chapter covers the conclusions that the study has made from the discussions of 
the findings based on the operationalized objectives which were eventually subjected 
to testing of hypotheses and answering of a research question. Furthermore, the 
chapter covers recommendations which have been rhymed with the conclusions and 
presented in two folds of policy recommendations and the recommendations for 
further studies.   
 
6.2  Conclusion 
This study has four objectives and from the same several findings emanated from the 
analyses done with respect to operatinalisation of the objectives and testing of the 
hypotheses using the described methodologies as discussed in earlier chapters of this 
study. The following are the conclusions drawn from the foregoing.  
 
With regards to the first objective of this study which was to assess the adequacy of 
provisions of the legal and regulatory framework and its resulting value chain in 
providing for competitive market dynamics in the identified relevant markets. It was 
concluded that there is prevalence of market structural condition requiring economic 
regulation in the identified relevant markets. Invariably, it was further concluded that 
the current legal provisions are wanting thus inadequate to provide for competitive 
market dynamics and a contestable value chain in the identified relevant markets. 
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The second objective was to identify relevant markets and anti-competitive conducts 
in the identified relevant markets as per the competition assessment framework. It is 
concluded that the identified relevant markets are the buying and selling of green tea 
leaves in Rungwe tea growing district, the buying and selling of green tea leaves in 
Mufindi tea growing district and the buying and selling of green tea leaves in 
Muheza tea growing district. Furthermore it is concluded that there are anti-
competitive issues in form of abuse of dominance and unnotified mergers in 
Rungwe, anti-competitive agreements in Muheza and Mufindi, barriers to entry and 
vested interests in all the three identified relevant markets in this study.  
 
Invariably, is observed that the buying and selling of green tea leaves in Rungwe tea 
growing district more efficient than those for Mufindi and Muheza, because the 
prevailing market structure for Rungwe is more favourable to existence of 
competition among actors. It is also conclusively observed that the buying and 
selling of green tea leaves in Mufindi and Muheza is more competition efficient than 
that for Rungwe because the prevailing market structure is most favourable to 
existence of competition among actors. Furthermore it is concluded that the buying 
and selling of green tea leaves in Mufindi is more oligopsonistic than those for 
Rungwe and Muheza, because the prevailing green tea leaves market structure is 
more favourable to existence of competition among actors. 
 
The third objective had sought to assess and compare the performance of identified 
relevant markets in the competition assessment framework perspective. Gross 
margins were used a proxy measure for performance of the identified relevant 
markets. Consistently, triangulated statistical results (t-test and ANOVA) showed 
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that the gross margins are significantly different in the identified relevant markets of 
this study and thus the conclusion attached thereto.   
 
The fourth objective had dwelt with the identification of the factors affecting pro 
competition functioning of the identified relevant markets. GLS results as triangulate 
with cross tabs and key informant interview findings herewith show that the age of 
the green tea leaves farmers, duration of tea farming training skills, experience in tea 
leaves farming, competition issues, number of mature tea trees and distance from the 
farm to the green tea leaves buying centre (in meters) in the identified relevant 
markets do affect pro competition functioning of the identified relevant markets in 
this study; invariably this objective is concluded as per the later assertion herein 
above.   
 
6.3  Recommendations 
6.3.1    Policy Recommendations 
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, the current study puts forward a set 
of recommendations that might be a starting point or addition already existing body 
of knowledge regarding competition issues in the identified relevant markets. The 
recommendations are as hereunder provided.  
 
There should be a deliberate and concerted effort between the Fair Competition 
Commission and the Ministry responsible for the relevant markets that aims at 
developing a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework to provide for economic 
regulation in the identified relevant markets so as to ensure fore openness and 
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continuous contestability of the value chain for the better welfare of the green tea 
leaves farmers.  
 
The anti-competitive issues in form of abuse of dominance and unnotified mergers in 
Rungwe, anti-competitive agreements in Muheza and Mufindi should be thoroughly 
investigated by the Fair Competition Commission and upon satisfaction of the 
alleged infractions; requisite cases should be instituted against the culprits. 
Invariably, the barriers to entry and vested interests identified in all the three 
identified relevant markets in this study should be pursued as matters of competition 
advocacy by the Fair Competition Commission in collaboration with the Ministry 
responsible for the relevant markets.  
 
The Fair Competition Commission and the Ministry responsible for the relevant 
markets should collaborate in a inventing an incremental programme that shall 
ensure the percentage of green tea leaves farmers’ gross margins in the export price 
for the made tea is at a level deemed equitable on the face of record.  
 
The Fair Competition Commission and the Ministry responsible for the relevant 
markets should embark on advocacy and awareness creation programmes with the 
green tea leaves farmers educating them on business acumen and in particular 
competition issues related to the green tea leaves farming business and the need for 
application of good agronomic practices in green tea leaves farming business. The 
advocacy and awareness creation programmes shall ensure that the identified for pro 
competition functioning in the relevant markets are either created, increased or 
sustained as the case may be in the identified relevant markets.   
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6.3.2    Recommendations for Further Studies 
The study recommends that there should be undertaken studies advancing the course 
of the proposed enforcement model in other related agro markets in an attempt to 
resolve seemingly homogeneous statutorily provided market failures.    
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix  1: Producer Questionnaire 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE STUDY TITLED COMPETITION 
ENFORCEMENT AND EFFICIENCY IN RELEVANT MARKETS: THE 
APPLICATION OF COMPETITION ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK IN THE 
TANZANIAN TEA AGROMARKETS  
Producer Questionnaire 
A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Respondent’s Number…………………………………………………………………. 
Name of Enumerator:…………………………………………………….……………. 
Date of Enumeration:………………………………………………….……………… 
1. Location Data 
(a) Village name………………………………………..…………………….. 
(b) Ward:………………………… ……………………...…………………… 
(c) Division: …………………………………………………….….………… 
(e) District:…………………… ……………………………………………… 
 
2. Bio Data of the Respondent 
(a) What is your Age (Years) …………………………………………….……. 
(b) What is your Highest Level of Education  
1. None 2. Primary School 3. Secondary 4. Tertiary 
(c) Duration of Tea Growing Skills (Number of days)…………… ……..……… 
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3. Do you sell you Tea Leaves to a Green Tea Leaves Processor ……….……… 
1) Yes    2) No.  
If No. Drop the Respondent. 
If Yes. Proceed as hereunder. 
4. What is the name of the Green Tea Leaves Processor ……………...………… 
5. In case there is more than one Green Tea Leaves Processor in your Tea 
Growing District. Are you allowed choose from among them?  
Explain 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
Are you allowed to sell to any other Green Tea Leaves Processor outside 
your Tea Growing District?  
1) Yes    2) No. 
If you Answer Question 6 with No.  
6. At what price difference would you risk to sell outside your Tea Growing 
District?  
 
Explain 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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B: VALUE ADDING PROCESS (THE VALUE CHAIN) 
7. Where do you belong as a Smallholder Tea Grower  
1) Small Holder Tea Group 2) Small Holder Tea Association 3) Individual 
Farmer       
 4) Institution 5) Others (specify)…………………… …………………….. 
8. For how long have you been involved in green tea leaves trade (number of  
ears)…............................................ 
 Period covered ………….. e.g. (1990 – 1995) 
 
Association/Group 
9. Do you belong to any green tea leaves (a) Association (b) Group? (Tick the 
correct) 
1) Yes     2) No. 
 
If No. Go to Question No. 14. If Yes. Go to Question No. 11 
If Yes .Why did you join the green tea leaves Association/Group? 
1) To secure good prices 2) Risk sharing  3) Requirement of law 
4) Others (specify)….......................................................   
10. How effective is the green tea leaves Association/Group? 
1)Very effective            2) Fairly effective 
      3) Not effective      4) I don’t know. 
11. Did you have any contract with the Green tea leaves Association/Group? 
1)  Yes         2) No. 
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12. Did the Association/Group have any contract with the Green Tea Leaves 
Processor? 
1)  Yes         2) No. 3) I don’t know 
(Note that belonging to an association is treated as a form of contact) 
 
Individual Farmer/Institution / Other 
(Make sure you interview Leaders of Institutions/Association/Group whichever 
applicable) 
13. (If you responded with No for Question No. 10.) As whom do you trade? 
1) Individual Farmer 2) Institution   3) Others 
14. To whom do you sell your green tea leaves? 
1) Green Tea Leaves Processing Factory 2) Small Holder Tea 
Association3) Small Holder Tea Groups        4) Others (specify)………… … 
15. Did you have any contract with the Green Tea Leaves Processor last season? 
1)  Yes         2) No. 
 
If the Answer for Either Question 12 or 13 is Yes. Please answer 1-5 below: 
(i) Period in which the contract was entered  (Dates, characteristic of the 
crop) ………………………………………………….…………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………….. 
(ii) Inspection. Was there any inspection done? If Yes. Who did the 
inspection? ................................................................................................... 
……………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………. 
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(iii)  Pricing. What was the basis for pricing the tea leaves? (Who set the 
price? Did you negotiate?)……………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(iv) Payment arrangement (Was there any down payment? How was it 
determined? When was it paid? When was the balance paid?  Was there 
interest attached? )……………………………………………………….. 
…………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
(v) Documetation. Was there any written document for the contract? (See if 
you can have it)......................................................................................... 
……………………………………………………...……………………
…………………………………………………………………………... 
For the contracts entered either that in question 12 or 13. Please answer 
Questions 14-17  
16. What advantages have you gained from the contract you entered into? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
What problems have you encountered from the contract you entered into? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
Have you experienced a breach of contract? 
1) Yes.  2) No. 
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17. Where was the dispute resolved (specify who was present and who defaulted 
any fee paid if any) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………   
If Yes. What was the penalty / compensation (specify) 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
18. How often do you change the Buyer you trade with and/or enter into contract 
with  
1) Very often 2) Very rare 
For whatever the answer above specify reasons 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
19. If you did not enter into green leaf sale agreements system this season. Who 
are you selling your tea leaves to? (Note that Belonging to an association is 
treated as a form of contact) 
1) Individual buyers (middlemen) 2) Others (specify)…………………… 
 
20.  What were the arrangements?           
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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(Proceed with All Respondents)  
21. How did you determine your selling prices? 
1) Listening to neighbours  2). Take buyers offer 3). Information from the 
Tea Board 4) Negotiate with buyer 5) Other (specify). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
22.  What are your indicators for price setting? 
1) Information from Radio  2). Information from the Tea Board 3) 
Knowledge of the buyers market (Mombasa Auction Vs World Market Price)  
4).  Others (specify). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…..…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
23.  What major factors did you consider when you sold your green tea leaves? 
1)  Price offered        2) Personal ties with buyer 3) Household cash needs.   
4)   Penalty from last last season5) No alternative marketing outlet 6) Others 
(specify)………………………………………………………………………. 
 
24. How far (metres/kilometres) is your farm from the Green Leaf Tea Buying 
centre? ……………………………………………………………….………. 
 
25. What time does it take to get to the Green Leaf Tea Buying centre 
(remoteness) ………………………………………………………………… 
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C: PERFORMANCE OF IDENTIFIED RELEVANT MARKETS  
 What are the variable costs you incurred on the green tea leaves enterprises lasts 
season. 
 
 Fill in the box below 
Item Amount (TZS) 
Weeding   
Pruning   
Transport (to the Green Leaf Buying centre)  
Spraying tool (hiring)  
Chemicals  
Fertilizer  
Protective gears   
Plucking (Labour)  
Plucking baskets  
Others (specify)  
Total  
 
26. What was your crop value for green tea leaves in the last season? 
Fill in the box below 
Quantity of  Tea  
Leaves (Kgs) 
Price 
(TZS) 
Total (TZS) Deduction  from 
Total  (TZS) 
Net to Farmers 
(TZS) 
     
Total     
(Insist on getting Totals if the details are not easily availed) 
 
D: FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE IN THE IDENTIFIED RELEVANT  
     MARKETS  
27. For how many years have you been Farming and Selling Tea Leaves 
………............................................................................................................…  
 
28. (a) What is the acreage of your farm?................................................................ 
(b) What is the acreage with mature tea in your farm?...................................... 
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(c) What is the acreage with immature tea in your farm?................................... 
(d) What is the number of mature trees in your farm?……………….………... 
(e) Number of immature trees (not harvested) in your farm?…………………. 
 (f) What is the vacant percentage in your farm?………..……………..………. 
 
29. Did you give “KICK BACK” (forced to give tea leaves for free or at a 
reduced price) to the  
buyer last season? 
1) Yes   2) No 
If  Yes. How many (kg) of tea leaves ………………………………………… 
 
D: GOVERNMENT ROLE 
30.  What does the government both district and central do to facilitate Greenleaf 
tea marketing? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
31.  What do you expect the government to do to improve Greenleaf tea 
marketing in the future (price and others)? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
32.  How do political leaders’ attitude towards the Greenleaf tea trade? Affect 
your business (Positive/supportive or negative/restrictive). Explain. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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E: DRIVING FORCE ACTOR / GROUP 
33. Whom do you think is/are driving force group /actors in the chain of 
marketing of tea leaves? 
1) Tea Processors/Buyers 2) Other Buyers (if any) 
3) Farmers 4) Government 5) Tea Board of Tanzania 
6) Others specify……………………………………….……………………… 
 
34.  Why do you think the above group actors are the driving force? (Specify). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
35.  What do you think are the requirements (that you do not have) to join the 
group above? …………………………………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
36.  What do you think are the requirement to sell green tea leaves to buyers 
profitably.……………………………………………………………………… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
36(a) How do you assess the legal requirement that “Buyers” must have a processing 
plant? Explain……………………………………….………………………… 
………………………………………….………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
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F: COMPETITION RELATED MATTERS 
37. Have there been instances where buyers decreased prices below competitive 
levels (buy green tea leaves at a price lower than actual price agreed)? If Yes. 
Describe the acts.  
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
38. Have there been instances where buyers have prevented smaller competitors 
from increasing their market shares? Describe the acts. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
39. Have there been instances where buyers have discouraged market entry 
(engage in an exclusionary act)? Describe the acts. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
……… 
 
40. Have there been instances where buyers or farmers have been favoured by 
virtue of politics, including funding for political parties from sector interests 
(vested interests). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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41. Have there been instances where buyers have refused to give competitor access 
to essential facility (denial/restrictions of access to processing plant facilities)? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
42. Have there been instances where competitors sometimes collude to limit the 
intensity of competition by making agreements to fix prices, to divide the 
market between them, to conduct boycotts or to rig bids for contracts? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
43. Have there been instances where competitors have engaged in mergers and 
acquisitions amongst themselves? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
44. Please complete the following Table below:  
Competition Harm Index 
Anti competitive harm  Weight (w) Assigned Assigned 
Score 
Vested interests  ≤ 1  
Vertical integration ≤ 2  
Barriers to entry  ≤ 3  
Un notified mergers ≤ 4  
Cartels ≤ 5  
Abuse of market power ≤ 5  
Total  
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSES 
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Appendix  2: Buyers Questionnaire 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE STUDY TITLED COMPETITION 
ENFORCEMENT AND EFFICIENCY IN RELEVANT MARKETS: THE 
APPLICATION OF COMPETITION ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK IN THE 
TANZANIAN TEA AGROMARKETS  
 
Buyers Questionnaire 
A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Member of Respondent ………………………… 
Name of Enumerator ……………………………. 
1. Have you ever bought green tea leaves from farmers? 
1).Yes  2).  No 
2. Are you allowed to buy from any other Green Tea Leaves Processor outside 
your Tea Growing District?  
Explain................................................................................................................ 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
2(a) Are you allowed to buy from growers outside your Tea Growing District? 
Explain 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
3. At what price difference would you risk to sell / buy outside your Tea 
Growing District? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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4. For how long have you been involved in green tea leaves trade (number of 
years)…………….. Period covered ………….. e.g. (1990 – 1995) 
5. What was the average volume of trade (tones or number of tea leaves) for the 
period …………………... 
6. How did you acquire business 
capital……………………………………………………… 
Fill in the Table below 
Source Yes No Amount 
Own saving     
Borrowed from relative    
Borrowed from a formal 
institution 
   
Grant    
Other (specify)    
 
B: VALUE ADDING PROCESS 
Vertical Integration Backwards 
7. Which category of Small Holder Farmers do you trade with? 
1) Small Holder Farmers Associations  
2) Small Holder Farmers Groups  
3) Individual Farmers  
4) Institutions  
5)      Other (specify)………………………………………………………… 
8. Do you have contract with Individual Farmers/Institutions / 
Associations/Groups? 
1) Yes  2) No. 
If Yes. 
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 Contracts between Buyers and Categories of Farmers (Last Season) 
SN Party to the Contract Number of Contracts 
1 Small Holder Farmers Associations   
2 Small Holder Farmers Groups   
3 Individual Farmers   
4 Institutions   
5     Other (specify)  
 Total  
 
(a) For how many years have you been having these contracts………..  
(b) How many contracts did you have when you started business 
………........................................……… 
(c) How many of these farmers are in contract with you for the first 
time……..............................................................….            
9. How did you come in contact with the farmers 
1) They approached me 2). Through village leadership 3) I approached 
them 4) other (specify)…................................. …… ………. 
 
10. Do you buy green tea leaves from farmers without contracts? 
1) Yes  2) No …………………………………….. 
 
If Yes / No 
11. Which system (non-contract or contract) is more effective/efficient and why? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
12. How do you compare the contract system in terms of advantages and 
disadvantages?        
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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13. How does the exchange of green tea leaves occur (from the farmers to buyer). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
14. Is there a contract at the point of exchange? If No. Why? 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
15. How do farmers get paid green for their green tea leaves by the buyers? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
16. Do you also grow Green Leaf Tea?  
If Yes. Give % Distribution ………………. % Farmers ………………… % 
Own Produce 
 
 Vertical Integration Forward 
17. How do you sell your Made Tea? 
1) Through direct sell to Local Packers  
2) Through direct sell to International Packers  
3) Through direct sell to Local Blenders  
4) Through direct sell to International Blenders  
5) Through Auction sell to Local Packers  
6) Through Auction sell to International Packers  
7) Through Auction sell to Local Blenders  
8) Through Auction sell to International Blenders  
9) Through Own Auction sell at Mombasa Auction 
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18. How do you compare direct sell to Auction channels of selling green tea 
leaves? Explain 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
Which among Direct Sell and Auction channels of selling green tea leaves do 
you prefer? Why? Explain 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
19. How do you decide on the indicative buying price of green tea leaves to the 
farmers? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
20. What are the main factors considered in actual buying price setting? 
(Common practice) 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
21. Have you ever sold your made tea at the Mombasa Auction? If Yes. Explain 
you experience………………………………………………………… 
.............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. 
 
If No. Explain why you have not? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………  
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22. What do you think are the special conditions for made tea to be sold through 
the Mombasa auction (specify). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
23. Do the conditions differ from those required while selling locally? 
.............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. 
 
C: PERFORMANCE OF IDENTIFIED RELEVANT MARKETS  
24.  What was your Crop Value last season? 
Quantity of Made Tea Price per Kg in  
(TZS)  
Estimated total  value (TZS) 
   
Total   
 
25. What variable costs did you incur last season? 
ITEM AMOUNT (TZS) 
Purchase of Produce /  Green tea  
Labour  
Communication  
Transport  
Taxes and levies  
Enforcing contracts  
Others ( specify)  
Total  
(Insist on getting at least the Totals, both out growers and the farmers if details 
cannot be easily available) 
 
 
 
203
D: POLITICAL, GOVERNMENT AND ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS 
26.  How do you find the attitude and conduct of political leaders towards this 
green tea leaves trade? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
27. How does their attitude and conduct affect your business? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
28. What do you think should be the role of government in this green tea leaves 
trade? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
29.  Whom do you think is the driving force/ actor in this chain and why?  
(Farmers/Government/Tanzania Tea Board/Processors/Big Buyers 
Abroad/Blenders/Packers) 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
30.  Are you registered anywhere else (in Local Governments) as a green tea 
leaves buyer? 
1). Yes  2). No. 
31. If Yes. Where are you registered? What is the fee for registration? What are 
the benefits compared to non registered buyers (specify)    
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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32. What is your assessment of the possession of processing plant legal 
requirement? (specify) 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
E: COMPETITION RELATED MATTERS 
33. Have there been instances where buyers decreased prices below competitive 
levels (buy green tea leaves at a price lower than actual price agreed)? If Yes. 
Describe the acts. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
34. Have there been instances where buyers have prevented smaller competitors 
from increasing their market shares? Describe the acts. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
35. Have there been instances where buyers have discouraged market entry 
(engage in an exclusionary act)? Describe the acts. 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
36. Have there been instances where buyers or farmers have been favoured by 
virtue of politics, including funding for political parties from sector interests 
(vested interests). 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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37. Have there been instances where buyers have refused to give competitor 
access to essential facility (denial/restrictions of access to processing plant 
facilities)? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
38. Have there been instances where competitors sometimes collude to limit the 
intensity of competition by making agreements to fix prices, to divide the 
market between them, to conduct boycotts or to rig bids for contracts? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
39. Have there been instances where competitors have engaged in mergers and 
acquisitions amongst themselves? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
40. Please complete the following Table below:  
Competition Harm Index 
Anti competitive harm  Weight (w) Assigned Assigned Score 
Vested interests  ≤ 1  
Vertical integration ≤ 2  
Barriers to entry  ≤ 3  
Un notified mergers ≤ 4  
Cartels ≤ 5  
Abuse of market power ≤ 5  
Total  
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR RESPONSES 
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Appendix  3: Significance of Cross Tabulation on Variables 
 
 
 
Significance from Cross Tabulations with Districts Sig X2 Value df 
Age categorization  0.111 18.142 12 
Level of education categorization 0.294** 22.3 8 
Government facilitation categorization 0.000** 238.6 14 
Government improvement in tea marketing 0.000** 72.811 16 
Political leader altitude categorization 0.000** 62.429 8 
Kickback  0.057* 9.185 4 
Price determination categorization 0.000** 197.9 16 
Price setting indicators 0.000** 186.1 8 
Factors considered when selling green leaves Tea 0.000** 115.7 10 
** Significance at 0.01 
* Significance at 0.05 
 
 
